Developing Production Skills through Implicit Learning by Bovolenta, Giulia
Developing Production Skills
through Implicit Learning
Giulia Bovolenta
Jesus College
University of Cambridge
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
September 2019

Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own work and
includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration
except as stated in the Declaration and specified in the text.
It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is
being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qual-
ification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or
similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in
the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation
has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for
any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of
Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as
declared in the Preface and specified in the text.
This dissertation does not exceed the regulation length of 80,000 words
including footnotes, references and appendices but excluding the bib-
liography.
Giulia Bovolenta
September 2019

Dedicated to Mira,
who once convinced me to do a Masters degree.

Acknowledgements
My time at Cambridge has been a very happy one, and this was in no
small measure thanks to the people I met during my time in the De-
partment (now Section) of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics. For
four years, they have helped me in many ways great and small, and
made me feel part of a community. I would like to express my grati-
tude to my supervisor, John N. Williams, for giving me the freedom to
explore my ideas, but always being there to help me when I needed it.
I would like to thank Dimitris Alikaniotis, Connor Quinn and Carla
Pastorino Campos, who welcomed me as a friend on my very first day
in the PhD room; Elaine Schmidt and Ana I. Pere´z, for their con-
stant help and friendship, and all the other fellow PhD students and
postdocs with whom I shared life in the department: Andrew Caines,
Cherry Lam, Chris Mengying Xia, Elspeth Wilson, Roberto Sileo,
Alim Tusun, Julia Heine, Costanza Conforti, Xiaobin Chen. I would
especially like to thank Jane Walsh, Napoleon Katsos, Prof. Ianthi
Tsimpli, Dora Alexopoulou and my advisor, Brechtje Post, for their
guidance, advice and friendship. I should also express my gratitude to
E. Matthew Husband: the mentorship and teaching he provided dur-
ing my time as his student continue to prove invaluable. I gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the Economic and Social Sciences
Research Council, which funded the first two years of this doctorate.
Finally, I would never have been in the position to do any doctorate
if it weren’t for the loving support of my family over all these years,
both moral and material: my husband Mira, my parents Mirella and
Germano, my brother Ennio and his partner Valentina, to whom I
give my heartfelt thanks.

Abstract
Language proficiency largely relies on implicit knowledge, which is unconscious
and operates independently of voluntary control. Implicit learning is a pro-
cess of incidental learning which results in the acquisition of implicit knowledge.
We know that adult learners can acquire knowledge of novel L2 linguistic rules
through implicit learning, as evidenced by their performance on receptive tasks.
However, it is unclear whether implicit learning processes can also support the
development of L2 production skills. The central question of this dissertation
was whether it would be possible for learners to acquire implicit knowledge of
a new rule through implicit learning and use it directly in spoken production.
Our second question concerns the relationship between production and compre-
hension: we asked whether implicit knowledge acquired through a production
task would also lead to improved performance in comprehension. To address
these questions, we trained participants on a semiartificial language based on a
rule naturally found in Czech: specifically, the usage rule for a pair of spatial
prepositions (v and na) which alternate depending on the distinction between
open and enclosed spaces. Training was carried out using a novel methodology
based on elicited oral imitation, which was also used to test productive knowl-
edge. Participants were also tested on comprehension, using both reaction time
and recognition memory paradigms. Our findings suggest that it is possible to
acquire implicit productive knowledge through a production-based task, and to
generalise it to new instances in spoken production. The results of our experi-
ments also show that learning outcomes were sensitive to the specific procedure
used to train participants, which appeared to interact with individual differences
in working memory. Finally, we found limited evidence that implicit knowledge
acquired through production could be transferred to comprehension, supporting
a skill-specific account of implicit knowledge.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When performing many daily tasks, we rely on finely tuned knowledge which
we can use effectively, even though we may not able to talk about it. Knowing
how to ride a bicycle, for instance, does not mean we can describe the laws
of physics which allow the bike to remain upright when moving forwards, or
state the amount of force we need to exert on the bike for that to happen –
we just know how to pedal without falling. Our knowledge of it is implicit: we
have it but we are not aware of it, and we cannot verbalise it. Language is
another skill which largely relies on implicit knowledge: in our native language,
we usually have strong intuitions about what is correct and what is not, even
though we may not be able to explain why. First language (L1) acquisition –
including the development of production skills – takes place in a largely implicit
way: children acquire the structure of their L1 with no explicit instruction and
little feedback (Ambridge et al., 2013; Jackendoff, 2002; Kulinich et al., 2019;
Wonnacott et al., 2012). By contrast, adults who learn a second language (L2)
often do so in a formally instructed context, by committing vocabulary items to
memory and studying grammatical rules, usually followed by deliberate practice
through various kinds of activities. The knowledge initially developed by L2
learners in these settings is predominantly explicit: conscious knowledge of facts
and rules, which learners can access and use by making a deliberate effort. Even
in more naturalistic settings, adults bring a level of metalinguistic awareness to
language learning which is lacking in infants, such as the concepts of word and
word meaning, which shapes their goals and expectations. They make a conscious
1
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effort to learn the language, which is more likely to result in explicit knowledge.
Of course, L1 speakers tend to have explicit knowledge of their language, too
(e.g. due to education). Over-reliance on explicit knowledge, however, limits L2
attainment. While there is debate on the exact nature of the relationship between
implicit and explicit knowledge, it is generally agreed that the development of
implicit knowledge is necessary for the attainment of L2 proficiency (Krashen,
1981b, 1982; N. Ellis, 2005, 2011; DeKeyser, 2003; Hulstijn, 2002, 2005; R. Ellis,
2006c, 2012). Implicit knowledge, or at least, highly automatised explicit knowl-
edge (DeKeyser, 2003; Li and DeKeyser, 2017) is the basis for fluent, automatic
L2 processing in both comprehension and production. The question addressed
in this thesis if whether implicit knowledge - specifically, knowledge that can be
used in production - can be acquired directly, or whether learners must first go
through a stage of explicit knowledge to be able to draw on it in production. The
development of implicit knowledge, and the conditions which allow for it, are the
focus of implicit learning (IL) research, a field of study originating in cognitive
psychology. Initially developed with a focus on sequence learning using artificial
stimuli (Reber, 1967), implicit learning paradigms are increasingly being used in
the study of L2 acquisition, to investigate the extent to which we can directly
acquire implicit knowledge of novel linguistic rules. The application of these
paradigms to second language acquisition (SLA) research has revealed that we
can implicitly acquire knowledge of structural aspects such as word segmentation
(Saffran et al., 1996a), orthography (Pacton et al., 2001), phonotactics (Chambers
et al., 2003), and syntax (Francis et al., 2009; Rebuschat and Williams, 2012),
as well as novel form-meaning connections and their usage (Leung and Williams,
2011; Paciorek and Williams, 2015; Williams, 2005).
However, this strand of research tends to rely on comprehension tasks as
measures of implicit knowledge: there is limited evidence that it is possible to
acquire productive language skills through implicit learning, too. Being able to
use linguistic rules in production is a fundamental skill in L2, which, like com-
prehension, is reliant on implicit knowledge to be fully developed. Therefore, the
main goal of this dissertation is to investigate the following question: whether it
may be possible to acquire implicit knowledge which can be directly used in spo-
ken production, even while remaining unaware of it. This has clear pedagogical
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implications, but also touches on the nature of the relationship between produc-
tion and comprehension in implicit knowledge. In implicit learning research, it is
common to conclude that subjects have acquired implicit knowledge if they show
evidence of discrimination in comprehension. The assumption underlying this
claim is that, even though the knowledge is acquired in one domain (comprehen-
sion), it is not itself domain-specific. However, evidence from research comparing
production and comprehension in L2 learning suggests that implicit knowledge
may be limited to the domain in which it is acquired (DeKeyser and Sokalski,
1996; Li and DeKeyser, 2017). Therefore, the second goal of this dissertation is
to investigate the relationship between production and comprehension in implicit
learning, by testing whether implicit knowledge developed through a production
task may also transfer to comprehension.
The contents of this dissertation are structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on implicit knowledge and
implicit learning in the context of SLA research. It then focuses on the more
concrete aspects of implicit learning, reviewing the literature on implicit and
explicit learning in L2 instruction and the role of attention in the process.
The final section focuses on the role of production in SLA and its interaction
with implicit knowledge, in relation to both training and testing.
• Chapter 3 introduces the rule on which we based the materials for our study,
derived from a pair of spatial prepositions found in Czech, and provides a
rationale for the methodology we used, which was based on elicited oral
recall. It then reports the findings of Experiment 1, in which we began to
investigate elicited recall as a training and testing procedure for implicit
productive knowledge.
• Chapter 4 reports the findings from Experiments 2 and 3, in which we
introduced a new version of the testing methodology used in Experiment
1: this involved long-term recall and an element of generalisation, requiring
participants to produce novel instances of the rule. We also developed the
training methodology, testing different ways to induce implicit learning by
either loading memory capacity (Experiment 2) or by directing attention
to relevant aspects of the stimuli, by means of questions (Experiment 3).
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• Chapter 6 explores the role of working memory and consolidation in the
learning process. It reports the results of Experiment 4, in which we built
on the procedure used in Experiment 2 by adding delayed testing after
overnight consolidation, as well as measures of working memory to investi-
gate its interaction with our learning paradigm.
• Chapter 7 carries out a comparative analysis of Experiments 2, 3 and 4,
providing an account of their findings based on the training paradigm used
and focusing on ways in which specific features of the training procedure
could have influenced learning outcomes.
• Chapter 8 presents a general discussion of our findings, in relation to our
research questions and to the existing literature.
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Implicit learning and production
in L2 acquisition
2.1 Implicit and explicit knowledge
In cognitive psychology, the distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge
in its basic form hinges on whether it is knowledge that we have conscious mental
access to (Williams, 2009). Explicit knowledge is knowledge that we know that
we know (Dienes and Perner, 1999) and can therefore use deliberately; implicit
knowledge, by contrast, can guide our behaviour even if we are not aware that
we have it (Cleeremans et al., 1998). In the field of SLA, the issue was first
brought to the fore by Krashen’s Monitor Theory (Krashen, 1981a, 1985), which
famously drew a distinction between explicit learning and implicit acquisition
in L2: learning is the process by which vocabulary and grammatical rules are
consciously committed to memory and rehearsed, while acquisition is the sub-
conscious internalisation of those rules, resulting in increased competence and
fluency. In production, utterances are initiated by the implicit system, but for-
mal explicit knowledge may be used to alter or correct these utterances by the
conscious system, or Monitor (Krashen, 1981b, 1985). Learning is only available
to the the conscious part (the Monitor), implicit knowledge can only be devel-
oped through acquisition (Krashen, 1982). In order for acquisition to happen,
the learner needs to be exposed to and process input that is slightly more com-
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plex than their current competence level (the Input hypothesis (Krashen, 1994)).
Krashen’s distinction was initially criticised as loosely defined and unfalsifiable
(McLaughlin, 1978); it does, however, come quite close to the psychological defi-
nition in including consciousness as a criterion. In SLA, the distinction between
implicit and explicit knowledge was popularised again by N. Ellis (1994), who
highlighted its importance in language processing and acquisition. The second
hallmark of implicit knowledge, after a lack of conscious access, is lack of vol-
untary control: implicit knowledge guides behaviour without intention, while
explicit knowledge can be used deliberately (Cleeremans and Jime´nez, 2002; Di-
enes and Perner, 1999). Lack of voluntary control, however, does not necessarily
equate with automaticity. According to graded theories of awareness (Cleeremans
and Jime´nez, 2002), in order to have voluntary control of a representation, it is
necessary to be aware of it; implicit representations are outside of voluntary con-
trol because they are not accessible to conscious awareness. However, it is also
possible for representations to be outside of voluntary control despite awareness,
because their strength and stability is such that they guide behaviour automati-
cally (Cleeremans and Jime´nez, 2002): automatic processes can be “ballistic”, in
that they cannot stopped once initiated (Segalowitz, 2003). Implicit representa-
tions, on the other hand, may also be quite weak - too weak to enter conscious
awareness, but still strong enough to influence behaviour.
There is evidence that the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge
is at least partly rooted in neuroanatomy, with implicit and explicit knowledge
being subserved by different memory systems, the declarative and procedural sys-
tems (Paradis, 1994, 2004). The declarative system underlies knowledge of facts
and events (knowledge “that”); declarative knowledge is usually explicit and can
be consciously recollected (Paradis, 2004; Ullman, 2001). Declarative memory
relies on the hippocampus, medial temporal lobes, and large portions of neocor-
tex in the temporal and parietal lobes (Paradis, 1994; Suzuki and Amaral, 1994).
The procedural system underlies the learning of new cognitive and motor skills
(knowledge ”how”), especially involving sequences, as well as their control once
they have been established (Ullman, 2005). Procedural memory is subserved by
a number of brain structures, which include the cerebellum, striatum and other
basal ganglia, and parts of the left perisylvian cortical region (Paradis, 2004).
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According to Paradis (1994, 2004), explicit, metalinguistic knowledge of lan-
guage is subserved by the declarative system; implicit knowledge of language
structure (“linguistic competence” in Paradis’ terms), such as morphosyntax, is
subserved by the procedural system (Paradis, 2004). Knowledge of lexical mean-
ing, unlike structural knowledge, is explicit and rooted in the declarative system
(Paradis, 1994). The Declarative/Procedural (DP) model of language (Ullman,
2001, 2005) emphasizes this distinction, hypothesizing that the processing of dif-
ferent aspects of language (lexicon and grammar) in native speakers is subserved
by different systems. According to the DP model, vocabulary is mostly stored
in declarative memory, while grammar, which requires the application of rules,
is supported by procedural memory. While Paradis (1994, 2004) mostly iden-
tifies explicit knowledge with declarative memory and implicit knowledge with
procedural memory, the DP model does not assume that all implicit knowledge
is procedural knowledge: the procedural memory system is one among several
system which underlie implicit representations (Williams, 2009).
The DP model also makes specific predictions with regards to second language
acquisition. Evidence suggests the dimension in which late learners of an L2 are
most lacking, compared to L1 acquisition, is grammar, while lexical processing
is relatively spared (DeKeyser, 2000; Hahne and Friederici, 2001; Wartenburger
et al., 2003; Weber-Fox and Neville, 1996). According to Ullman, this is because
adults, due to “age-related attenuation of the procedural system” (Ullman, 2005,
p. 152), tend to rely on the declarative system more than the procedural for
both vocabulary and rules, particularly in a pedagogical setting. The use of the
declarative system alone can lead to fairly high proficiency, but not to native-
like processing. However, it is expected that practice will lead to procedural
learning and increasingly native-like reliance on the procedural system (Ullman,
2001, 2005), a prediction which is supported by experimental studies on artificial
language learning showing that, even with an implicit learning procedure, the
learning progress is associated with declarative memory performance in the early
stages of acquisition, and with procedural memory in the later stages (Hamrick,
2015; Morgan-Short et al., 2014; Ruiz et al., 2018).
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2.1.1 Interface between implicit and explicit knowledge
The exact nature of the relation between implicit and explicit knowledge is the
subject of ongoing debate. Theoretical positions on the matter range from “no
interface” positions (Hulstijn, 2002, 2015; Krashen, 1981a, 1985; Paradis, 1994,
2004), which maintain that the two types of knowledge are completely separate
from each other, through “weak interface” ones (Doughty and Williams, 1998; N.
Ellis, 2005, 2015), which argue for separate but co-operative types of knowledge,
to “strong interface” positions, according to which one kind of representation can
be converted into the other (DeKeyser, 2003, 1997; Suzuki and DeKeyser, 2017).
According to the “no interface” position (Hulstijn, 2002, 2015; Krashen, 1981a,
1985; Paradis, 1994, 2004) there is no interaction between the two types of knowl-
edge: explicit knowledge cannot be transformed into implicit knowledge through
practice. In Krashen’s view, learning (explicit) and acquisition (implicit) are
entirely separate processes; it is also maintained that, from a neurocognitive per-
spective, it is not possible for representations stored in the declarative system
to physically “transform” themselves in representations stored in different neural
structures (Hulstijn, 2002, 2015).
In the “weak interface” view (Doughty and Williams, 1998; N. Ellis, 2005,
2015), explicit and implicit knowledge are dissociable and reliant on different
neural networks, but also cooperative. There is a “dynamic interface” between
the two: for instance, explicit knowledge of form-meaning connections plays a role
in implicit learning, where explicit constructions from analogy and mnemonics
can feed into proceduralisation and implicit learning (N. Ellis, 2005, 2015). Nick
Ellis notes that “many aspects of a second language are unlearnable – or at best
acquired very slowly – from implicit processes alone (N. Ellis, 2005, p. 307).
While explicit knowledge, similarly to the “no interface” hypothesis, cannot be
transformed into implicit representations, it can provide the conditions necessary
for implicit knowledge to develop: “slot-and-frame patterns, drills, mnemonics,
and declarative statements of pedagogical grammar [. . . ] all contribute to the
conscious creation of utterances that then partake in subsequent implicit learning
and proceduralisation” (N. Ellis, 2005, p. 308).
Finally, according to the “strong interface” hypothesis, explicit knowledge can
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be converted into implicit knowledge, by means of gradual speeding up and au-
tomation (DeKeyser, 2003, 1997; Suzuki and DeKeyser, 2017). This process is
often referred to as proceduralisation, following Anderson’s ACT Theory of skill
acquisition (Anderson, 1996, 1983; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998). In ACT the-
ory, skill acquisition involves transitioning from a stage that is characterised by
declarative knowledge, to one reliant on procedural knowledge: initially, a task is
executed by retrieving the relevant declarative knowledge, which is used to apply
a rule. With practice, as the same rule is applied repeatedly and consistently, its
application becomes increasingly rapid and automatic: automatic processes are
the result of “consistent mapping of the same input on the same pattern of activa-
tion over many trials” (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 34). This process of automatisation
is thought to reflect a shift from declarative to procedural memory (DeKeyser,
2007). In order for proceduralisation to be possible, the right conditions need
to be in place: the declarative knowledge required as well as appropriate tasks
that require that knowledge to be employed (DeKeyser, 2007). Proponents of the
strong interface acknowledge that implicit knowledge and automatised explicit
knowledge are distinct constructs, because the former involves lack of awareness,
while the latter does not (Suzuki and DeKeyser, 2015, 2017). However, they ar-
gue that automatised explicit knowledge is “functionally equivalent” to implicit
knowledge, in that both involve rapid access to linguistic knowledge (DeKeyser,
2003; Suzuki and DeKeyser, 2017).
2.2 Implicit and explicit learning
The distinction between “implicit” and “explicit” knowledge can be extended
to the learning process by which that knowledge is acquired, by distinguishing
between explicit and implicit learning. Explicit learning is a conscious, usually
intentional process, in which learners make and test hypotheses about structure
(N. Ellis, 1994, 2015) and engage in a “process of concept formation and concept
linking” (Hulstijn, 2002, p. 206). By contrast implicit learning, as the term is
used in cognitive psychology, is learning that happens without intention to learn,
and which results in implicit knowledge (Williams, 2009). The term “implicit
learning” was first used by Arthur Reber in his seminal study on artificial gram-
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mar learning (AGL)(Reber, 1967). Participants were exposed to a series of letter
sequences generated by a finite-state grammar (a set of possible letters together
with rules for concatenating them), and were asked to memorise them. Following
the exposure phase, they were informed that the strings followed a set of rules.
They were then tested on a grammaticality judgment task with novel strings, and
were asked to indicate whether the strings conformed to the grammar or not. Par-
ticipants were significantly above chance level (79%) in discriminating between
strings, even though they could not report what the underlying rule was. There-
fore, Reber concluded that they had acquired implicit knowledge of the rule, and
suggested that the same mechanism may be involved in other domains, including
language acquisition (Reber, 1967). AGL learning is found even in subjects suf-
fering from amnesia (Knowlton and Squire, 1996), which suggests that learning
can occur in an entirely implicit way, without relying on the declarative system.
By separating the nature of the learning process from that of the resulting
knowledge, we can further distinguish between implicit and incidental learn-
ing. In psychology, incidental learning refers to a situation in which subjects
learn something without intending to, regardless of the nature of the knowledge
acquired (Williams, 2009). In SLA, the term incidental learning, in its more
general connotation, may be similarly defined as “learning without the intention
to learn”; or, in a more specific interpretation, as the “learning of one stimu-
lus aspect while paying attention to another stimulus aspect.” (Hulstijn, 2003).
For instance, incidental language learning may involve focusing on the acoustic
properties of sounds while at the same time developing procedural knowledge of
the articulatory movements required to produce them, or internalising the mor-
phosyntactic features of an utterance while focusing on its semantic or pragmatic
content (Paradis, 2004). In SLA research, the term implicit learning is sometimes
used to refer to incidental learning (Schmidt, 1994; N. Ellis and Cadierno, 2009),
while in the cognitive psychology literature, implicit learning refers specifically
to a process of incidental learning which results in implicit knowledge (Reber,
1967; Williams, 2009; N. Ellis and Cadierno, 2009). Under this definition, an
implicit learning process may result in explicit knowledge if learners reflect on
the knowledge they have acquired implicitly; or, it is possible that a process
of explicit learning directed at one feature may result in the incidental implicit
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learning of another feature (R. Ellis, 2009a, p. 6). Here, we will use the term
incidental learning to refer to a process of “learning of one stimulus aspect while
paying attention to another stimulus aspect.” (Hulstijn, 2003), and the term im-
plicit learning as incidental learning which results in implicit knowledge, following
Williams (2009).
The processes involved in implicit learning have also been the object of study
of a separate, but related, research strand in psychology, that on statistical learn-
ing. Rather than focusing on the learners’ cognitive state, research on statistical
language learning focuses on the complex statistical associations that exist be-
tween different elements of language, on the assumption that language acquisition
involves acquiring information about those statistical regularities (Saffran, 2001;
Saffran et al., 1996a). The mechanism was illustrated by Saffran et al. (1996a),
who exposed 8-month old infants to a continuous stream of 3-syllable nonsense
words (e.g. babupudutabapidabu...) repeated in random order by a speech syn-
thesizer. Due to the lack of prosody, the only cue to word boundaries were the
transitional probabilities between syllables (i.e. how likely a given syllable was to
be followed by another one: very likely for syllables belonging to the same word,
less likely for syllables on the boundary between two words). After only two
minutes of exposure, they were exposed to 3-syllable combinations in a listening
paradigm, where they could discriminate between “words” from the stream and
other syllable combinations, even those made of part-words, showing that they
were sensitive to the statistical properties of the input. Statistical learning is be-
lieved to be involved in the acquisition of sequences in general, even in domains
other than language (Conway and Christiansen, 2005, 2009). While the defining
feature of statistical learning is the use of statistical regularities in the input,
the resulting knowledge is often unconscious, as is the case in implicit learning
(Batterink et al., 2015b; Conway and Christiansen, 2005), although it may also
involve a mixture of conscious and unconscious knowledge (Bertels et al., 2012;
Franco et al., 2016). Neurophysiological evidence also suggests that both types
of learning are supported by common neural mechanisms, involving the interplay
of procedural and declarative knowledge (Batterink et al., 2019). Traditionally,
statistical learning research has explained findings in terms of the computation of
transitional probabilities, while implicit learning research has focused more on the
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acquisition of subsequences, or “chunks” (Perruchet, 2019). The other key dis-
tinction between the two traditions lies in the fact that implicit learning research
has specifically focused on the implicit vs. explicit distinction, including ways
of testing for awareness in participants. However, more recent research is bridg-
ing the gap between these two approaches, for instance by combining statistical
learning paradigms with measures of awareness, showing that explicit knowledge
can affect the way in which statistical learning operates (Monaghan et al., 2019).
Due to the large amount of overlap between implicit and statistical learning, the
term “implicit statistical learning” is increasingly being used (Christiansen, 2019;
Reber, 2015; Walk and Conway, 2015) to stress the fact that they investigate the
same phenomena, only from different angles.
In the field of SLA research, the operation of implicit statistical learning
mechanisms on language acquisition can be captured by the notion of contin-
gency learning (N. Ellis, 2006a,b; Shanks, 1995), also known as associative learn-
ing. Like statistical learning, the concept of contingency learning entails that
language acquisition is a process of acquiring statistical regularities within the
input; however, it emphasises the fact that the statistical regularities available to
learners are not simply co-occurences between forms in the input, but also cues to
an outcome (Williams, 2009). Often, this may be a form to meaning contingency
(N. Ellis, 2006a), such as the final -s in walks in the sentence “He walks up the
stairs”, which is a cue to the fact that the verb is inflected in the 3rd person
singular. The validity of a cue is a function of its availability (how frequent it is)
and its reliability (how likely it is to predict the outcome) (N. Ellis, 2006a). In L1
acquisition, high-validity cues are the first ones children focus on (MacWhinney
et al., 1985); these are purely statistical properties, akin to transitional probabil-
ities. However, contingency learning can also account for non-statistical factors
which may affect how likely learners are to attend to a given cue, such as per-
ceptual saliency and competition between cues. For instance, the sentence “He
walks up the stairs” contains redundant information. The ending -s is not the
only cue to the verb inflection: the pronoun he, too, indicates that the verb is
inflected in the 3rd person singular, and it too is a widely available and reliable
cue. However, he is more perceptually salient than -s ; therefore, it is more likely
to be attended to, at the expense of -s. This is an attested phenomenon among
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L2 English learners (Hawkins and Casillas, 2008; White, 2003) and can be seen
as an instance of overshadowing, which happens when two cues jointly predict
the same outcome, but one is more salient than the other (N. Ellis, 2006a).
2.2.1 Testing the knowledge derived from implicit learn-
ing
Experimental research on implicit learning, particularly in the tradition derived
from Reber’s 1967 artificial grammar learning experiments, relies on the ability
to distinguish between explicit and implicit knowledge. In AGL paradigms, in
order for learning to be implicit, participants must not be aware of the regularity
they have learned, while demonstrating some knowledge of the rule: under the
definition of implicit knowledge as “causally efficacious in the absence of aware-
ness” (Cleeremans et al., 1998, p. 406), if a subject exhibits knowledge but is not
aware of its content, we can conclude that the knowledge is implicit. Given the
emphasis on ensuring that the knowledge being used is implicit, the way in which
awareness is measured is critical to the outcome. Therefore, implicit learning
studies aim to detect implicit knowledge by combining tests of knowledge (such
as grammaticality judgment tasks) with measures of awareness. When knowledge
is evaluated by a judgment task, as is often the case in AGL studies, awareness can
be assessed by subjective measures: participants are asked to report the source
of their answers (e.g. “guess”, “memory” or “rule”, or “intuition”), and to state
how confident they are (Dienes and Scott, 2005; Rebuschat, 2008; Rebuschat and
Williams, 2012). The premise of this paradigm is that it allows to distinguish
between two kinds of knowledge: structural knowledge, which subjects have about
the stimuli they have been exposed to, and judgement knowledge, which is the
ability to recognise whether new items follow the same structure as previously
encountered ones (Dienes and Scott, 2005). While performance on a test such as a
GJT reveals structural knowledge, subjective measures allow researchers to inves-
tigate the nature of a subject’s judgement knowledge. According to Dienes and
Scott (2005), conscious structural knowledge should lead to conscious judgement
knowledge (which subjects may attribute to “rule” or “memory”). However, it is
possible for structural knowledge to be implicit while judgement knowledge is ex-
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plicit - that would be a case of ”intuition”, which reflects the common situation of
L1 speakers who may be very confident of their grammaticality judgements, even
though they do not know why (Rebuschat, 2013). Finally, if a subject’s accu-
racy is above chance even though they attribute their responses to “guess” (the
guessing criterion), we can conclude that both their structural knowledge and
their judgement knowledge are unconscious (Dienes et al., 1995). One potential
problem with this methodology is response bias (for instance, some subjects may
attribute their responses to “guess” unless they are absolutely sure, others may
be more liberal). A second problem is that, by asking participants to consciously
reflect on their answers, it may encourage rule-searching and cause participants
to become aware of the rule.
Perhaps the most commonly used measure of awareness, which dates back
to the original Reber (1967) study, is retrospective verbal report (Dienes et al.,
1991; Reber, 1967; Williams, 2005). Participants are simply asked after the test
phase whether they noticed any patterns or rules in the stimuli (Williams, 2005).
If their test performance shows sensitivity to the regularity but they do not re-
port any awareness of it, then it is assumed that the learning was implicit. One
advantage of retrospective verbal report is that it is not task-specific: subjective
measures are well suited for judgment tasks but not as appropriate for tasks in-
volving spoken production or elicited recall, such as the ones used in our study.
The use of retrospective verbal reporting is not without problems, however. It
has been suggested that it may not be the most appropriate way to detect im-
plicit knowledge, on the basis of what Shanks and St. John (1994) call the Sen-
sitivity and Information criteria. By sensitivity, they mean that a measure of
awareness needs to be sensitive enough to detect as much conscious knowledge
as possible. With retrospective verbal reporting, there is a risk that participants
may be under-reporting conscious knowledge, if they do not feel very confident
(Rebuschat, 2013). The Information criterion, on the other hand, concerns the
content of the knowledge being tested: for the measure of awareness to have any
validity, it must be assessing conscious access to the knowledge that is actually
driving participants’ performance in the test. For instance, in an AGL paradigm
using a finite-state grammar, it makes little sense to determine whether partic-
ipants have conscious knowledge of the grammar if it’s possible for participants
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to perform above chance by relying on means other than grammar knowledge,
such as memory for chunks. While this is a genuine concern, it may be argued
that it is less relevant for studies that do not involve abstract structural rules but
focus instead on form-meaning connections and usage patterns, such as the study
by Williams (2005) on animacy-based determiners. In these studies, there is no
distinction to be drawn between patterns of co-occurrence and an abstract rule,
since the co-occurrence patterns are the rule. In our study, we decided to use a
debriefing questionnaire as a measure of awareness. Details of the questionnaire
and motivations for using it can be found in Section 3.1.2.3.
Detecting implicit knowledge by the absence of awareness is only viable if
subjects do not also have some explicit knowledge of the same regularity. While
this may be obtained under controlled laboratory conditions, it is rarely the case
with natural language, whether L1 or L2. For this reason, the ability to directly
test for implicit and explicit knowledge is particularly important in SLA research.
Implicit knowledge may be accessed through online measurements such as eye-
tracking (Godfroid et al., 2015; Godfroid and Winke, 2015) or EEG (Batterink
and Paller, 2017; Batterink et al., 2015b). For instance, morphosyntactic viola-
tions in the L1 normally elicit the P600 component (a positive shift in electric
potential registered around the parietal lobe, 600ms after stimulus onset); as pro-
ficiency increases, a shift towards this pattern of processing can be detected in
L2 learners (Osterhout et al., 2008). Investigations of incidental learning of an
artificial language using EEG (Friederici et al., 2002; Morgan-Short et al., 2012b)
have revealed native-like processing of incongruities after very little instruction.
Additionally, EEG measurements can reveal sensitivity to newly acquired distinc-
tions even though behavioural measures show no difference (McLaughlin et al.,
2004; Tokowicz and MacWhinney, 2005).
Behaviourally, it is possible to detect implicit knowledge by focusing on its
second hallmark, lack of voluntary control. Under the assumption that implicit
knowledge affects behaviour automatically, while explicit knowledge can be used
deliberately, it is possible to discriminate between the two with tasks that manip-
ulate the degree of conscious control involved in performing the task. For instance,
in a process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), subjects are instructed to ei-
ther use the knowledge they acquired (inclusion task) or avoid using it (exclusion
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task). If participants are able to refrain from using the knowledge in the exclu-
sion task, it assumed to be conscious, while failure to do so indicates unconscious
knowledge. According to R. Ellis (2006c), implicit knowledge is best assessed
through tasks that tap into what learners intuitively feel is correct, are time-
pressured, place primary focus on meaning, and do not call for metalinguistic
knowledge. Oral production tasks that encourage communicative and sponta-
neous L2 use with few constraints are also considered a good way to tap into
implicit knowledge (Doughty, 2003; Norris and Ortega, 2003), although it can
be difficult to elicit target structures under these conditions. Conversely, explicit
knowledge should be assessed with tasks that encourage learners to use “rules”,
are not time-pressured, place primary focus on form, and invite the use of met-
alinguistic knowledge. For this reason, ungrammatical sentences in a GJT may be
a better indicator of explicit knowledge than grammatical ones (Gutie´rrez, 2013),
because detecting them requires greater metalinguistic knowledge. However, evi-
dence from eye-tracking suggests that the effect of ungrammatical items may be
reduced under time pressure, which suppresses right-to-left gaze regressions and
prevents reanalysis of ungrammatical items (Godfroid et al., 2015). In fact, the
same task conducted with and without time pressure may tap into different types
of knowledge. Untimed Grammaticality Judgment tasks (GJT) and metalinguis-
tic tests tend to cluster together, while both elicited oral imitation and narration
tasks correlate with performance on a time-pressured GJT, suggesting that they
tap into implicit knowledge (R. Ellis, 2009b). Likewise, in a series of studies on
the processing of L2 Spanish by English speakers, Tokowicz and colleagues find
a dissociation between untimed GJT and online measures: learners showed sen-
sitivity to morphosyntactic violations in both self-paced reading (Tokowicz and
Warren, 2010) and EEG (Tokowicz and MacWhinney, 2005), but not in an un-
timed GJT. More generally, a lack of time constraints allows explicit knowledge
to be used, especially in the case of written tasks, while performing a task under
time pressure is more likely to engage implicit knowledge (N. Ellis, 2005; Norris
and Ortega, 2003).
A commonly used measure of implicit knowledge which involves both time
pressure and oral production is the Elicited Oral Imitation task (Erlam, 2006,
2009; Slobin and Welsh, 1973), which forms the basis for the paradigm used in
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this study. The task relies on the observation that, when processing language,
the amount of material we can recall depends on the extent to which we have
stored representations of it in memory (i.e. previous knowledge). For instance,
English speakers are better at remembering lists of English words than Aymara
words of the same length (Erlam, 2009). This facilitatory effect of existing repre-
sentations is thought to come from regeneration: a sentence in a known language
can be decoded and then re-encoded upon recall, whereas one in an unknown one
can only be stored in short-term phonological memory as a string of phonemes
(Lombardi and Potter, 1992; Potter and Lombardi, 1990, 1998; Slobin and Welsh,
1973). Therefore, the accuracy with which an L2 sentence is recalled by a learner
provides a measure of the learner’s L2 knowledge. Critics of this interpretation
have suggested that need not be the case, and that it may be possible to do
the task just by rote repetition (Bley-Vroman and Chaudron, 1994; Erlam, 2006;
Spada et al., 2015; Vinther, 2002). However, there is empirical evidence in sup-
port of the “regeneration hypothesis” (Lombardi and Potter, 1992; Potter and
Lombardi, 1990), such as the finding that intruding semantically related items
during recall cause interference effects (Potter and Lombardi, 1990). Such effects
are even found in bilinguals when the intervening task is in a different language
from the sentence, and in monolinguals when the intervening task is picture-based
(Lee and Williams, 1997). The hypothesis is also supported by the tendency to
normalisation repeatedly found in elicited imitation studies: when asked to re-
peat ungrammatical sentences, participants will often correct any mistakes in the
sentences without realising it (Erlam, 2009; Slobin and Welsh, 1973). Accord-
ing to Potter and Lombardi, the fact that recall is often verbatim is due to the
fact that exposure to a sentence (whether for comprehension or recall) causes
long-term activation of the lexical-semantic representations of the words in the
sentence, which in turn makes it more likely that they will be accessed in pro-
duction (Potter and Lombardi, 1990); syntactic priming can also contribute to
making recall verbatim (Potter and Lombardi, 1998). Conversely, Rummer and
colleagues (Rummer et al., 2013; Schweppe et al., 2015, 2009) argue that expo-
sure to a sentence can cause long-term activation of representations on several
levels, and that a verbatim recall task will cause both grammatical information
and surface phonological representations to be maintained (Rummer et al., 2013).
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Finally, it has also been suggested that the EOIT may not be a suitable way to
tap into implicit knowledge, as it could be affected by metalinguistic knowledge,
for instance through self-monitoring during production (Suzuki and DeKeyser,
2015). In meta-reviews, the EOIT has consistently been found to correlate with
measures of implicit knowledge, such as time-pressured GJT and oral narration
tasks (N. Ellis, 2005; Bowles, 2011; Erlam, 2009; Spada et al., 2015; Zhang, 2015).
However, Suzuki and DeKeyser (2015) argue that performance the task should be
seen as a reflection of automatised explicit knowledge, rather than true implicit
knowledge, because it correlates with time-pressured judgement tasks but not
with others which are deemed to be more robust to intrusion from explicit knowl-
edge, such as word monitoring tasks (Suzuki and DeKeyser, 2015). Arguably, the
role of automatised explicit knowledge is less of a concern for implicit learning
studies using novel stimuli, where participants will not have had the amount of
practice necessary for automatisation. It is possible, however, that the EOIT
could generally reflect a contribution from explicit knowledge developed during
exposure to the stimuli of implicit learning study, perhaps through monitoring.
For this reason, the experiments in this study will also include retrospective ver-
bal report as a measure of awareness, in order to establish the presence of implicit
knowledge with greater confidence.
2.2.2 What can be learned implicitly in L2?
The application of implicit statistical learning paradigms to language acquisi-
tion research has shown that we can implicitly acquire knowledge of various as-
pects of language: from structural properties (such as word and phrase structure,
orthographic and phonotactic rules, and syntactic structures) to form-meaning
connections, such as novel determiners encoding animacy and thematic roles.
Experimental evidence supporting these claims is reviewed below.
2.2.2.1 Structural properties
The finding that language learners can use transitional probabilities to segment
individual words from the speech stream (Saffran et al., 1996a) has been repli-
cated in numerous studies with both infants (Aslin et al., 1998; Hay et al., 2011;
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Johnson and Jusczyk, 2001; Saffran, 2001) and adults (Karuza et al., 2013; Saf-
fran et al., 1996b). It also appears that infants can use the words extracted
through statistical learning as labels for new objects (Cunillera et al., 2010; Estes
et al., 2007; Hay et al., 2011), which suggests that the mechanism could plausi-
bly play a role in L1 vocabulary acquisition. There is evidence to suggest that
different languages may require different segmenting strategies, however, as nat-
ural languages differ in the type of statistical cues they contain (Saksida et al.,
2017). Phonotactic regularities, too, can be acquired implicitly: infants can use
phonotactic cues as well as transitional probabilities to segment words (Chambers
et al., 2003; Johnson and Jusczyk, 2001; Mattys and Jusczyk, 2001; Mattys et al.,
1999), and adults can learn phonotactic constraints through implicit statistical
learning (Dell et al., 2000; Warker and Dell, 2006), as well as orthographic regu-
larities (Chetail, 2017; Pacton et al., 2001). Research using artificial stimuli has
shown that implicit statistical learning can also support the acquisition of more
complex structures, such as phrasal units (Morgan et al., 1987; Thompson and
Newport, 2007) and non-adjacent dependencies (Amato and MacDonald, 2010;
Ferry et al., 2016; Go´mez, 2002; Lany and Go´mez, 2008; Lany et al., 2007; Pacton
and Perruchet, 2008). The evidence for non-adjacent dependencies (e.g. AxB)
is in fact mixed (Newport and Aslin, 2004), but it appears that they can be ac-
quired under facilitating conditions: for instance, if there is sufficient variety in
intervening syllables (Go´mez, 2002), if lexical meaning is added to the elements
(Amato and MacDonald, 2010), if participants have their attention directed to the
non-adjacent elements (Pacton and Perruchet, 2008) or if they are first exposed
to simpler adjacent dependencies (Lany and Go´mez, 2008; Lany et al., 2007).
There is evidence that hierarchical structures, too, can be acquired through sta-
tistical learning (De Vries et al., 2012; Fitch and Hauser, 2004). In addition to
finite state grammars (e.g. ABABAB), it appears that a nested grammar, too
(e.g. AAABBB) can be learned implicitly (Fitch and Hauser, 2004); however, if
embedded dependencies are added (e.g. A1A2A3B3B2B1), the grammar is still
learnable, but only up to two-level embeddings (De Vries et al., 2012).
Perhaps of greater interest for SLA research is whether learners can implic-
itly acquire natural language syntax, too. Studies applying implicit learning
paradigms to the acquisition of novel syntactic structures suggest that this is
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the case (Francis et al., 2009; Rebuschat, 2008; Rebuschat and Williams, 2012;
Williams and Kuribara, 2008; Williams and Rebuschat, 2012). Rebuschat and
Williams (2012, Exp. 2) exposed participants to sentences made up of English
lexis, but arranged according to three possible German word order patterns. Par-
ticipants were instructed to repeat each sentence and judge its semantic plausibil-
ity; after the exposure phase, they were tested on a GJT with subjective measures
of awareness. A control group was also included, who did the GJT without any
prior exposure to the stimuli. In the GJT, endorsement of novel grammatical
items by unaware participants (who attributed their judgments to intuition) was
higher than that of the control group and significantly above chance, indicating
that some implicit learning of the novel structures had occurred, and that the
knowledge could be generalised to new items. However, unaware participants
were not able to reliably reject ungrammatical items, and they were more likely
than the control group to endorse them. This suggests that they were at least
partly basing their responses on memory for patterns encountered in training.
Rebuschat and Williams’s findings (Rebuschat and Williams, 2012) illustrate
the tension between two posited learning mechanisms underlying implicit learn-
ing, namely abstract rule learning and chunking (the memorisation of grammati-
cal substrings from training items, which participants may then rely on when giv-
ing grammaticality judgement for novel items). Since the original Reber (1967)
study, the issue of whether learning effects in AGL tasks are best explained in
terms of abstract rule learning or chunking has been a long-standing debate in
the field (Perruchet, 2019; Perruchet and Pacton, 2006).1 Indeed, the findings
that learners can automatically segment a sequence of syllables into words (Saf-
fran et al., 1996a) and that they can automatically extract the abstract rules
underlying letter strings in AGL (Reber, 1967) are seemingly at odds with each
other. These are different ways of approaching a sequence of stimuli - one where
transitional probabilities are used to segment the surface form into chunks, and
one where the same transitional probabilities are used to extract abstract com-
1This was partly motivated by Reber’s original claim that participants had acquired a “rule”
(Reber, 1967). Reber has since distanced himself from the expression, and clarified that he sees
the core operation of implicit learning as the “detection of patterns of covariation between
elements in complex stimulus domains” (Reber, 2015, p. viii), rather than the acquisition of
abstract grammatical rules.
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binatorial rules beneath that surface form. It is not clear what should determine
which of the two mechanisms is used given a specific set of stimuli.
On the one hand, there is evidence that participants in AGL experiments are
acquiring something more abstract than letter chunks, as evidenced by transfer
to different letter sets, and even to different modalities. A way to test for the
transferability of learned regularities in AGL studies is to train participants on
one grammar, and then test them on sequences generated by a second grammar,
which is derived from the first by systematically swapping the letters with new
ones. Studies adopting this method showed that participants were still perform-
ing significantly above chance in a GJT, even if accuracy was lower than for
the training letter set (Knowlton and Squire, 1996; Mathews et al., 1989; Re-
ber, 1967). Transfer is possible across modalities, too. Participants who were
trained on an artificial grammar in the auditory modality still performed above
chance when tested in the visual modality (Altmann et al., 1995; Bigand et al.,
1998). Transfer from the visual to auditory modality, however, is not equally
successful (Forkstam et al., 2009), perhaps because different modalities seem to
affect implicit learning in different ways: comparisons of performance on artifi-
cial grammar learning tasks across visual, auditory and tactile modalities have
found that learning outcomes are best when presentation was auditory, espe-
cially at faster presentation rates (Conway and Christiansen, 2005, 2009). On
the other hand, the extent to which the input can be broken down into chunks
has been shown to have an effect on participants’ grammaticality judgements, too
(Knowlton and Squire, 1996). Knowlton and Squire (1996) constructed an AGL
experiment where chunk strength (the frequency of a given chunk in the input)
was manipulated. In a GJT administered after exposure, participants were above
chance when endorsing novel grammatical strings, with similar endorsement rates
regardless of whether the items were made up of low- or high-frequency chunks.
However, for ungrammatical items, chunk strength was shown to have an effect:
novel ungrammatical strings containing frequent chunks were significantly more
likely to be judged as grammatical. Knowlton and Squire (1996) conclude that
participants were relying on both item-specific and abstract information when do-
ing the task. Knowlton and Squire’s findings have been replicated by Robinson
(2005) using a natural language (Samoan). More recently, Frost and Monaghan
21
Chapter 2 Implicit and explicit learning
(2016) have shown that segmentation and the extraction of non-adjacent depen-
dencies from the speech stream can occur simultaneously from the same cues,
suggesting that both speech segmentation and the extraction of regularities de-
pend on the same mechanism. Therefore, it would appear that both mechanisms
are available and operating at the same time.
2.2.2.2 Form-meaning connections
The distinction between chunking and the extraction of abstract combinatorial
rules is particularly relevant to the study of how learners process continuous
streams of stimuli, such as those used in AGL and statistical learning paradigms.
These stimuli are usually devoid of meaning, as the focus is on the acquisition
of form. A more recent area of research within implicit learning, which is also
the object of the present study, seeks to investigate the acquisition of novel form-
meaning connections, using either natural or artificial languages. These studies
have shown that it is possible to implicitly learn the meaning of novel determiners
encoding animacy (Williams, 2005; Williams et al., 2004) or thematic roles (Leung
and Williams, 2006, 2011, 2012), novel morphology (Marsden et al., 2013; Rogers
et al., 2016) and verb usage patterns (Paciorek, 2012; Paciorek and Williams,
2015).
In Williams (2005, Exp. 1), L1 English speakers were exposed to a semi-
artificial language in which novel determiners gi, ro, ul and ne were paired with
English nouns. Participants were first introduced to the determiners and told
that two of them were used with near objects (gi and ro), and the other two
with far objects (ul and ne). Unknown to participants, the determiners were
also alternating based on the objects’ animacy: gi and ul only occurred with
living things, ro and ne only with non-living ones. Participants were exposed
to the determiner-noun pairs (e.g. gi lion, ro table) embedded in English carrier
sentences (e.g. “I was terrified when I turned around and saw gi lion right behind
me”). For each sentence, they had to indicate whether the object following the
determiner was near or far, and whether it was living or non-living, by pressing
the appropriate keys on a keyboard. After the exposure phase, participants did a
forced choice task in which they were presented with individual nouns (including
22
Chapter 2 Implicit and explicit learning
nouns not encountered during training) and had to select the correct determiner
for each. Awareness of the animacy rule was assessed by verbal report using a
debriefing questionnaire at the end of the experiment. Even participants who
remained unaware of the rule were significantly above chance in the forced choice
task even with novel nouns, indicating that they had acquired implicit knowledge
of the distinction and could generalise it to new instances. The effect has been
replicated with L1 Chinese speakers (Chen et al., 2011).
However, other replication attempts have yielded conflicting results (Faretta-
Stutenberg et al., 2011; Hama and Leow, 2010; Rebuschat et al., 2015, 2013).
Unlike Chen et al. (2011), which tested a different population with the same
paradigm, these replication attempts aimed to further investigate the nature of
the knowledge acquired, by using different methodologies to test for awareness
both during and after the learning task. Hama and Leow (2010) reproduced
Williams (2005) with the addition of a think-aloud protocol to assess awareness
during the learning task, as well as a production task in the test phase. They
found no evidence of learning in participants who were classed as unaware; similar
results were obtained by Faretta-Stutenberg et al. (2011). Rebuschat et al. (2013)
pointed out that both think-aloud and verbal retrospective verbal reports were
limited in that they rely on verbalisation to assess awareness. They replicated
Williams (2005) using confidence ratings and source attribution (guess, intuition,
memory, rule) instead. They found that even when participants could verbalise
the rule (70% could) some of the knowledge remained implicit, as evidenced by
above chance performance on responses attributed to guess and intuition. In
a subsequent replication, Rebuschat et al. (2015) directly compared source at-
tribution and think-aloud reports as measures of awareness in a between-group
design. The results from the source attribution group corroborated findings from
Rebuschat et al. (2013). On the other hand, the think-aloud group showed re-
duced learning - specifically, no ability to generalise the rule to new items - leading
the authors to suggest that the think-aloud protocol itself was interfering with
the learning process, which may explain the results of Hama and Leow (2010).
The claim that novel form-meaning connections can be learned implicitly may
seem to be in contrast with dual-system accounts, which assume that vocabulary
knowledge is explicit, represented in declarative memory (Ullman, 2001, 2005) and
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dependent on hippocampal structures for its acquisition (N. Ellis, 1994, 2005), as
evidenced by the fact that vocabulary learning is impaired in amnesics (Gabrieli
et al., 1988). As Paciorek and Williams (2015) note, however, what is learned
implicitly is not the novel arbitrary mapping between a form and its core (refer-
ential) meaning, but rather the usage patterns for the new form, which are also
part of lexical meaning (collocational meaning) (Paciorek and Williams, 2015, p.
999).
In a development of Williams (2005), Leung and Williams (2006, 2012) used
the same set of determiners (gi, ro, ul and ne) embedded in English sentences,
but this time they were encoding thematic role (agent vs. patient) rather than
animacy. Participants were informed that determiners gi and ro were used be-
fore personal names referring to adults, while ul and ne were used before those
referring to children. They were not told that gi and ul were only used with
agents, and ro and ne with patients. Leung and Williams also introduced a novel
training and testing methodology based on reaction times. Participants heard
each sentence in a fixed word order that did not give any thematic role cues (e.g.
“Kiss ul Mary a boy on the face”) while being a shown the corresponding picture
(in this case, of a girl kissing a boy on the cheek). Then then had to indicate by
button press whether the named character (Mary in this case) was on the left or
right of the picture. If participants became sensitive to the fact that the deter-
miner contained a cue to the thematic role of the named character, they would
be able to direct their attention to the relevant character in the picture as soon
as they heard the determiner, and therefore become faster in their responses.
After giving their response, they were asked to reformulate the sentence using
English word order but retaining the determiner; every two sentences, they had
to recall the reformulated versions of the previous two items. All this was done
to ensure that participants would pay attention to the sentences in their entirety,
and process thematic roles as expected. Awareness of the thematic role rule was
assessed by debriefing questionnaire. In the last block of the experiment, the
mapping between determiners and thematic roles was inverted (violation items).
Participants who remained unaware of the rule showed the expected decrease in
reaction times as the experiment progressed, and significant increase in the vi-
olation block at the end, indicating that they had developed sensitivity to the
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thematic role markers, while remaining unaware of the regularity.
As noted by Leung and Williams (2011), animacy is a semantic feature of
nouns and can be derived from the lexicon, while thematic role is contextually
determined, which means that acquiring thematic role markers requires learners
to “abstract over representations of instances of use of the word that contains
contextually derived information.” (Leung and Williams, 2011, p. 38). The find-
ing that this can happen implicitly is compatible with usage-based approaches to
SLA, which assume that individual instances are what is initially is acquired, and
that their frequency distribution forms the basis for generalisation. Commenting
on the role of frequency in language processing and learning, N. Ellis (2002) notes
that:
“...language learning is exemplar based. The evidence reviewed here
suggests that the knowledge underlying fluent use of language is not
grammar in the sense of abstract rules or structure but a huge collec-
tion of memories of previously experienced utterances. [...] Linguis-
tic regularities emerge as central tendencies in the conspiracy of the
database of memories of utterances.”(N. Ellis, 2002, p. 166)
It is a well-known fact that morphological and morphosyntactic markers are
a common stumbling block for L2 learners, in both production (Bardovi-Harlig,
2000; Clahsen and Felser, 2006; Klein, 1986), and comprehension (Jiang, 2004,
2007). Usage patterns, too, are notoriously difficult to acquire in L2. For in-
stance, speakers of languages with no distinction between definite and indefinite
articles (e.g. Slavonic languages) have little difficulty acquiring the meaning of
the determiners the and a, but struggle with using them in the appropriate con-
texts. Likewise, the meaning of spatial and temporal prepositions in English and
other languages is largely a function of their usage, which creates a complex set
of distributional and idiomatic properties (e.g. cf. the expressions “at the time”,
“on time”, and “in time”). These are areas of SLA which could plausibly ben-
efit from the application of implicit learning paradigms. The following section
outlines the work done on comparing the role of explicit and implicit instruction
on SLA, highlighting some of the potential benefits of applying implicit learning
paradigms to L2 instruction.
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2.3 Applying implicit learning paradigms to L2
instruction
The research reviewed so far has focused on investigating implicit learning mech-
anisms in controlled experimental settings, with the aim of discovering what, if
any, properties of language can be acquired implicitly. We will now turn to the
application of implicit learning to SLA research and L2 pedagogy. In the light
of Krashen’s claims on the distinction between learning and acquisition, and the
superiority of the latter (Krashen, 1981b), the idea that implicit L2 knowledge
may be developed through implicit learning has held considerable interest for L2
pedagogy. Research on the application of implicit learning methodologies to SLA
has tended to focus on learning outcomes in comparison with explicit learning:
rather than asking whether a given property of language can be learned implicitly,
the point of interest is whether it is best learned implicitly. It has been suggested
that complex rules (e.g. relative clause structure) may be harder to teach ex-
plicitly than simple ones (e.g. morphological markers), and that better results
should be obtained by teaching them through implicit learning, with meaning-
based practice (Krashen, 1994, 1982). This is supported by evidence from AGL
research: explicit rule search can be detrimental to performance on more complex
sequences in AGL (Reber, 1976, 1989) and serial reaction tasks (Fletcher et al.,
2005). However, the opposite point has also been made: Hulstijn et al. (1994)
claim that “hard” (complex) rules are too difficult to notice in natural settings,
and should therefore benefit from explicit teaching, while simpler rules are more
easily noticed and can therefore be learned implicitly. In fact, the very defini-
tion of “simple” and “complex” rules can vary considerably between authors,
depending on the criteria used (Spada and Tomita, 2010). Perhaps due to these
methodological issues, research in this field has so far found limited evidence that
implicit learning is preferable for complex rules (DeKeyser and Sokalski, 1996);
however, there seems to be a large amount of evidence showing that explicit in-
struction is generally more effective than implicit learning (DeKeyser, 1995; Goo
et al., 2015; Norris and Ortega, 2000; Robinson, 1996; Spada and Tomita, 2010).
DeKeyser (1995) investigated the acquisition of Implexan, a miniature arti-
ficial language with morphological inflections for gender, number and thematic
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role, comparing a deductive (explicit) and an inductive (implicit) methodology.
The goal of the study was to test the hypothesis that deductive learning would
be more effective for categorical rules, while “fuzzy” (probabilistic) rules would
be best taught using inductive methods. During training, Implexan sentences
appeared on screen one at a time, together with pictures depicting their mean-
ing. Occasionally, participants were asked to indicate whether the content of the
sentence matched the picture (incorrect sentences contained vocabulary errors,
but were never ungrammatical). The training procedure was the same for both
groups, with the exception that the explicit group were also given explicit rule
instruction at various times during the training sessions. Participants were then
tested on a written production task, where they had to type sentences matching a
picture cue. Accuracy on vocabulary was similar for the two groups, but accuracy
on categorical grammatical rules was significantly higher for the explicit group.
Performance on fuzzy rules was somewhat better for the implicit group (they
were closer to the expected prototipicality pattern in their responses), but not
significantly so. Similarly, DeKeyser and Sokalski (1996) compared the acquisi-
tion of simple and complex English grammatical rules under implicit, incidental,
rule-search and instructed conditions. Participants in the implicit conditions were
instructed to focus on word order, while subjects in the incidental conditions were
asked comprehension questions focusing on the meaning of the sentences. In a
GJT administered at the end of the experiment, the instructed group outper-
formed all other groups on both simple and hard rules. The implicit and inciden-
tal group were not better than the instructed group on complex rules; however
a comparison of the implicit and rule-search groups shows that the formed did
better on complex rules and the latter on simple rules, which replicates Reber’s
findings with AGL (Reber, 1976).
Norris and Ortega (2000) carried out a meta-review of SLA studies to assess
the effectiveness of different types of instruction. Explicit and implicit instruc-
tion were defined following the same criteria as DeKeyser and Sokalski (1996):
explicit instruction involved explicit rule explanation (deductive, metalinguistic)
and/or directing learners’ attention to specific forms with the aim of figuring out
the rules (inductive). Implicit instruction was defined as a treatment involving
neither rule presentation nor directions to attend to particular forms (Norris and
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Ortega, 2000, p. 437). Norris and Ortega (2000) found larger effect sizes for ex-
plicit instruction. However, the tests used in the studies they review were largely
measures of explicit knowledge: 65% used constrained constructed response mea-
sures, 39% used selected response, 29% used metalinguistic judgments, and 16%
used free constructed response (Norris and Ortega, 2000, p. 470). The closest
thing to a test of implicit knowledge were “free constructed responses”, defined
by the authors as “measures that required participants to produce language with
relatively few constraints and with meaningful communication as the goal for
L2 production (e.g., oral interviews, written compositions)” (Norris and Ortega,
2000, p. 440). Free constructed response tests showed the smallest effect sizes
across all studies (no information was provided about the specific effect of implicit
instruction on this type of test). However, it should also be noted that due to the
unconstrained and communicative nature of the tasks, scoring for accuracy on a
particular feature depended on whether the feature was spontaneously produced
by the learner (Norris and Ortega, 2000, p. 441), which may not necessarily
provide an accurate picture of the learner’s competence level.
Spada and Tomita (2010), using the same definitions of implicit and explicit
instruction as Norris and Ortega (2000), carried out a meta-review comparing ef-
fect sizes obtained with explicit and implicit learning methodologies. Unlike Nor-
ris and Ortega (2000), they focused on studies on L2 English learning, including
a variety of simple and complex grammatical features. Spada and Tomita (2010),
too, found larger effect sizes for explicit than for implicit instruction, on both
simple and complex structures. This is the case both for both “controlled” and
“free” test measures (defined according to the same criteria used by Norris and
Ortega (2000)), which should in theory tap into explicit and implicit knowledge
respectively. However, Spada and Tomita (2010) suggest that some of the tasks
classed as free response, such as picture-cued oral performance tasks, may rely
on speeded explicit knowledge, rather than implicit (Spada and Tomita, 2010, p.
287). The “free response” category also included free written production tasks,
which may be argued to rely on explicit knowledge. Goo et al. (2015) carried out a
meta-review of SLA studies published between 1993 and 2011, following the same
criteria as Norris and Ortega (2000) and Spada and Tomita (2010) for defining
implicit and explicit instruction and for classifying the types of knowledge test
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used. As in previous meta-reviews, Goo et al. (2015), too, found explicit instruc-
tion to be more effective than implicit instruction on all measures, including free
response.
2.3.1 Issues affecting the application of implicit learning
to L2 instruction
Overall, the evidence reviewed above suggests a limited role for implicit learning
paradigms in L2 pedagogy. However, there are a number of issues with the way
in which implicit learning and knowledge are treated in these studies, which are
crucial to learning outcomes: 1) the way in which knowledge was tested, 2) what
sort of activities were designated as implicit learning, and 3) whether training
and testing were based on comprehension or production activities.
The first issue is how the resulting knowledge was tested. The distinctive
feature of implicit learning is that it can help develop implicit knowledge, yet the
studies surveyed did not always use tasks designed to tap into implicit knowledge,
possibly because they focused on comparing the relative effectiveness of implicit
and explicit instruction for different types of rules instead. DeKeyser (1995) used
an untimed written production task to test for learning; Robinson (1996) used
a timed grammaticality judgement task. Similarly, the meta-reviews by Norris
and Ortega (2000), Spada and Tomita (2010) and Goo et al. (2015) did not
classify outcome measures depending on their suitability for detecting implicit or
explicit knowledge (e.g. time-pressured vs. untimed task). Some, but not all,
of these categories could be directly mapped onto a specific type of knowledge:
for instance, tests involving “metalinguistic judgement” are good measures of
explicit knowledge. The category closest to a set of implicit knowledge measures
was “free constructed response”; however, even this category included tasks which
are likely to benefit from explicit knowledge to a large extent, such as untimed
writing tasks.
The second issue which affects these studies is the fact that implicit instruction
in these studies was operationalised as simple exposure to the stimuli, without ei-
ther explicit instruction or any manipulation of attention (DeKeyser and Sokalski,
1996; Norris and Ortega, 2000; Spada and Tomita, 2010). However, as VanPatten
29
Chapter 2 The role of attention in SLA and implicit learning
et al. (2013) note, the question of whether learners are provided with explicit rule
instruction is separate from the explicit/implicit learning distinction: it is possi-
ble for learning to be explicit even if no rule instruction is provided (VanPatten
et al., 2013). Likewise, directing learners’ attention to particular aspects of the
stimuli is compatible with both explicit and implicit learning, and may in some
cases be necessary for L2 learning to occur at all. Section 2.4 below will explore
the role of attention in SLA and in implicit learning specifically.
Finally, the studies included did not control for modality: for instance, whether
training was done with comprehension tasks and testing with production tasks,
or vice versa. Participants in DeKeyser (1995) were trained with comprehension-
based activities, but tested on a written production task. Tasks classed as “free
response” in the meta-reviews (Goo et al., 2015; Norris and Ortega, 2000; Spada
and Tomita, 2010) were all production tasks, but there is no information on
whether training was production-based. The issue of modality and the relation
between production and comprehension in L2 learning will be explored in greater
detail in Section 2.5.
2.4 The role of attention in SLA and implicit
learning
In the studies reviewed in the previous section, what is meant by “implicit learn-
ing” is often mere exposure to the stimuli, as in DeKeyser (1995). In the meta-
reviews, too, implicit instruction was defined in negative terms, as learning with-
out explicit rule explanation, or where participants’ attention was not directed
to particular forms. However, we know that attention is a fundamental aspect of
SLA, and that mere exposure often does not result in successful L2 learning in
adults. Attention plays a central role in theories of L2 acquisition (Leow, 2015;
Robinson, 2003; Schmidt, 1992a, 1990). According to Schmidt’s Noticing Hy-
pothesis (Schmidt, 1992b, 1990), only forms or form-meaning connections that
are attended to - and therefore, noticed - can be learned: this is what Schmidt
calls “awareness at the level of noticing”, and is different from having explicit
knowledge of the underlying regularity, which he calls “awareness at the level of
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understanding”. While the latter is not necessarily a prerequisite for language
learning, noticing of forms is (Schmidt, 2001). In naturalistic L2 learning, not
everything is picked up by learners. For instance, observation of naturalistic lan-
guage learning shows how L2 learners who acquired English in everyday settings
settle on a “basic variety” of English with minimal morphology and inflection
(Perdue, 1993; N. Ellis, 2006b; N. Ellis and Sagarra, 2010). This may be due
to maturational constraints which specifically affect different components of lan-
guage (Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson, 2003), or to a decrease in the ability to
develop new procedural representations, in favour of declarative memory (Ullman,
2005). However, it can also be due to attentional bias: both explicit knowledge
of the L2 and prior L1 experience can shape the way in which learners attend to
the input.
It has been shown that awareness of regularities in the input can affect the
way in which the input is attended to, not only in L2 learning, but even in basic
L1 processing. For instance, in L1 priming, it is sufficient to manipulate whether
primes can be consciously perceived (by making them either subliminal or visible)
to alter the nature of the priming effects elicited (Alonso et al., 2006). Likewise,
attentional bias exerts a powerful effect on L2 learning. In contingency learning,
attention to L2 cues can be shaped by overshadowing and blocking mechanisms.
Over time, overshadowing (competition between cues of different salience) gives
rise to blocking: a cue that is initially overshadowed by a stronger one is then dis-
regarded even if it becomes a good predictor, compared to another one with the
same predictive power, but no previous overshadowing (Chapman and Robbins,
1990; N. Ellis, 2006a). N. Ellis and Sagarra examined the effect of blocking on the
acquisition of morphological and lexical cues to temporal reference (specifically,
verb inflection and temporal adverbs). L1 English speakers were asked to learn a
number of Latin expressions and their English translations, which contained dif-
ferent kinds of temporal reference cues for past, present and future (adverbs such
as cras, “tomorrow”, and inflected verbs such as cogitabo, “I will think”). Before
being trained with full sentences, they were pre-trained on either the adverbs or
the verbal inflections, for past and present tense only. In a comprehension test,
they were found to rely preferentially on the type of cue they had been trained on
(as evidenced by bias in the case of conflicting cues). Strikingly, this was trans-
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ferred even to expressions from a tense they had not being trained on (future
tense) showing that they had learned a pattern of attention which they could
apply to new input (N. Ellis and Sagarra, 2010, Exp. 1). In this sense, blocking
is “the result of an automatically learned inattention” (N. Ellis, 2006a, p. 178).
Sensitivity to cues in L2 learning and processing is also affected by L1 (N. Ellis
and Sagarra, 2010; Leung and Williams, 2014; MacWhinney, 2001; MacWhinney
et al., 1984). In their study on the acquisition of Latin temporal adverbs and
verbal inflection, N. Ellis and Sagarra (2010, Exp. 2) also compared English
speakers to L1 speakers of Chinese, a language which does not have verbal inflec-
tion and relies on adverbs for temporal reference. Even if the two groups went
through the same training, Chinese speakers were significantly more likely to rely
on adverbs in a comprehension task, and more accurate in producing them than
the English group (while they were less accurate in producing verbal morphol-
ogy). Similarly, in MacWhinney et al. (1984), highly proficient German speakers
of L2 English relied preferentially on animacy and verb agreement to identify the
subject of a sentence, rather than pre-verbal placement (which is a primary cue
in English, but not German), exhibiting what MacWhinney calls a “syntactic
accent” (MacWhinney, 2001). Finally, in a study on the implicit learning of a
classifier system derived from Mandarin Chinese, L1 Mandarin speakers showed
evidence of learning, while L1 English speakers did not (Leung and Williams,
2014).
The shortcomings of naturalistic, exposure-only L2 learning have led authors
such as Doughty (2003) to hypothesise that instruction may be “necessary to com-
pensate for developmental changes that put adults at a cognitive disadvantage”
(Doughty, 2003, p. 257). However, instruction can still be implicit in nature:
the crucial thing is that is should direct attention to relevant form-meaning con-
nections. Evidence from implicit learning and priming studies shows that it is
possible to influence which contingencies associations participants become sen-
sitive to, even while they remain unaware of them (Custers and Aarts, 2011;
Jime´nez and Me´ndez, 1999). Jime´nez and Me´ndez (1999) conducted a SRT (se-
rial reaction time) experiment in which participants saw symbols appear one at
a time in one of four possible locations on screen, and had to press the button
corresponding to that location as quickly as possible. The symbols used (“*”,
32
Chapter 2 The role of attention in SLA and implicit learning
“?”, “!” and “x”) appeared random, but there was a hidden connection between
the shape of each symbol and the location of the following symbol in the se-
quence (e.g. whenever “!” was shown, the next symbol would appear in the
rightmost location on screen). If participants were only told to pay attention to
the position of the symbols and tap the corresponding key, they did not learn
the hidden regularity. But if they were given a task which also required them to
pay attention to symbol shape (e.g. counting how many times ”*” appeared in
the sequence), they became sensitive to the hidden regularity, as evidenced by a
slowdown in reaction times if the regularity was violated. The study shows that
being exposed to the stimuli was not enough for them to learn the regularity: in
Schmidt’s terms, they had to notice both character form and the position of the
following stimulus in order to learn the association between the two, even if they
did not have “awareness at the level of understanding“ of the connection.
The findings by Jime´nez and Me´ndez (1999) also show how attention can be
selectively manipulated in implicit learning paradigms in order to promote learn-
ing of specific associations. The importance of directing attention to the relevant
features of the input is also what motivates approaches to L2 teaching such as
Processing Instruction (VanPatten, 1996; VanPatten and Cadierno, 1993), which
aim to direct learners’ attention to specific form-meaning contingencies in the in-
put that participants may otherwise disregard. In PI, learners first receive explicit
instruction on the target rule and then practice with a series of “input processing”
activities, comprehension-based tasks (e.g. picture matching task) which require
learners to attend to form-meaning connections specific to the target rule. Learn-
ers are also alerted to cognitive biases which may cause them to disregard less
salient features of the input, as a way to direct their attention to such features.
Processing instruction has been shown to be a highly effective methodology, lead-
ing to better performance on comprehension measures compared to traditional
drill-based textbook methods (VanPatten, 2002; VanPatten and Cadierno, 1993).
It is equivalent to traditional instruction on certain measures of production, such
as sentence completion (VanPatten and Cadierno, 1993) and written narration
tasks (VanPatten and Sanz, 1995). These results were replicated even when learn-
ers did not receive explicit rule instruction at the start (VanPatten and Oikkenon,
1996); this has led VanPatten to argue that the learning is a result of the way
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in which attention is directed during input processing activities, rather than con-
scious application of the rule during tests (VanPatten et al., 2013; VanPatten and
Oikkenon, 1996). However, while it stresses the role of input processing activi-
ties over rule instruction, PI is still designed to be a type of explicit instruction
(VanPatten et al., 2013); it does not seem to improve performance on measures
of production that rely more on implicit knowledge, such as oral narration tasks
(Marsden and Chen, 2011; VanPatten and Sanz, 1995).
Finally, it has been shown that prior explicit knowledge can have deep effects
on L2 acquisition even if the rest of the training procedure is incidental; these ef-
fects may be detected by EEG, but not by behavioural measures (Batterink et al.,
2015b; Morgan-Short et al., 2012a,b). Morgan-Short and colleagues (Morgan-
Short et al., 2012a,b) trained participants on an artificial language, Brocanto2,
similar in structure to Romance languages. Participants were trained over three
sessions using either an “explicit” or “implicit” methodology. The explicit group
were auditorily exposed to sentences in Brocanto2 together with explanation of its
grammar, while the implicit group heard the sentences only (however, rule aware-
ness was not assessed in this group; following the terminology used so far, the
procedure they underwent would rather be classed as incidental learning). Fol-
lowing this initial phase, both groups engaged in communicative comprehension
and production practice, where they had to play a chess-like board game by giving
and receiving instructions in Brocanto2; corrective feedback was also provided.
In the post-test, both groups performed similarly well in behavioural measures.
However, only the “implicit” group showed L1-like ERP responses when exposed
to ungrammatical Brocanto2 sentences, suggesting that the provision of explicit
information at the start had fundamentally altered the way they had acquired
the language, even when undergoing the same training procedure. Similarly, Bat-
terink et al. (2015b) looked at the effect of explicit instruction administered prior
to a statistical word segmentation task. They found that giving participants
explicit instruction on the words prior to the task led to lower reaction times
for predictable targets in a post-test; however, it also elicited a greater P300 re-
sponse to the same targets, which suggests more controlled, effortful processing
(Batterink et al., 2015b). From a memory system perspective, there is evidence
that learning in declarative memory (which is promoted by explicit training) can
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inhibit procedural learning (Fletcher et al., 2005; Packard, 1999; Poldrack and
Packard, 2003). Morgan-Short and colleagues suggest that this is implicated in
their findings and that it may be related to blocking phenomena, where “...the
retrieval of lexicalized knowledge (thought to rely on declarative memory) blocks
the application of grammatical rules (thought to rely on procedural memory)”
(Morgan-Short et al., 2012b, p. 12).
However, there is also evidence that explicit knowledge of one aspect of a
language can speed up incidental learning of a different aspect of it. Monaghan
et al. (2019) used a cross situational-learning paradigm to investigate the acqui-
sition of an artificial language, comparing an entirely uninstructed condition to
one where participants were given prior information on the syntactic structures
of the language. The group who received explicit grammar instruction acquired
the artificial language vocabulary (composed of novel nouns and verbs) earlier
than the uninstructed group, showing higher accuracy during training. However,
the effect was only temporary, and all participants eventually converged on sim-
ilar levels of accuracy by the end of the training phase. Within the uninstructed
group, participants who incidentally developed awareness of grammar rules also
showed faster vocabulary learning compared to those who had remained unaware,
but this difference eventually disappeared, too. Monaghan et al. (2019) then ran
a second experiment designed to track the emergence of awareness during the
learning phase under uninstructed conditions, which confirmed that the develop-
ment of awareness was driving the increase in accuracy, rather than being the
product of it.
In conclusion, attention is a crucial factor in both SLA and implicit learning.
Implicit learning should not be conceived of as simple exposure to the stimuli,
which, as we know from investigation of naturalistic L2 learning, is vulnerable
to attentional effects such as blocking, overshadowing and L1 transfer. On the
contrary, adequately designed implicit learning paradigms could help overcome
these biases, directing attention to the relevant form-meaning connections while
ensuring that learners engage with the material in a naturalistic, communicative
way. In this respect, it may offer an advantage over a similarly attention-focused
methodology such as PI, which includes highly targeted activities: the evidence
reviewed above shows that focusing attention exclusively on one feature can be
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detrimental to the acquisition of other features (N. Ellis and Sagarra, 2010). Cru-
cially, blocking effects may be difficult to spot in an instructed L2 setting, because
they affect features other than the ones being taught and tested. For instance,
if participants in N. Ellis and Sagarra (2010) had just been assessed on their
ability to use and comprehend adverbs, as may often be the case in instructed L2
learning, they would have scored well and no detrimental effect would have been
noticed. The other advantage of implicit learning over PI is the lack of explicit
instruction: effects of explicit instruction on subsequent learning such as those re-
ported by Morgan-Short et al. (2012b) suggest that developing explicit knowledge
before exposure to the input may be detrimental to subsequent acquisition. For
this reason, it may desirable to employ implicit learning paradigms specifically
in the initial stages of exposure to an L2, focusing on directing attention to the
relevant form-meaning connections rather than on overt rule explanation, which
may be useful at a later stage. This is supported by evidence from an AGL study
by Mathews et al. (1989), which shows that the best results in an AGL task with
a biconditional grammar were obtained with an initial phase of implicit learning
followed by a phase of explicit (rule-search) learning. In fact, the learning gains
obtained in this way were greater than the sum of the scores obtained using ei-
ther implicit or explicit learning alone (Mathews et al., 1989); this suggests that
a synergy exists between implicit and explicit learning, which may also be bene-
ficial to L2 acquisition. Finally, PI is based entirely on comprehension; perhaps
unsurprisingly, one of its weaknesses seems to be a limited capacity to improve
performance on implicit production tasks. The relation between production and
comprehension, and how they interact in training and testing, is often not explic-
itly addressed in the literature on implicit learning and L2 acquisition, where the
emphasis is on distinguishing between implicit and explicit abstract knowledge.
However, it is of great consequence for L2 learning, and should be taken into
consideration when designing implicit learning paradigms, too. The next section
provides an overview of the role of production in SLA and in implicit learning,
and then focuses on the question of whether the latter could be used to generate
implicit productive knowledge in L2.
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2.5 Production in SLA and implicit learning
2.5.1 Modelling the role of production in L2
The most commonly used framework of production in L2 research is Levelt’s
model of speech production (Levelt, 1993, 1995, 1999, 1989). It is made up of two
principal components, the rhetorical/semantic/syntactic system and the phono-
logical/phonetic system, each including sub-components responsible for different
phases of speech production; syntactic and phonological rules are automatised and
part of the encoding systems (Levelt, 1989). The model was expanded by De Bot
(1992) and later further modified by Kormos (2009) to adapt it to bilingualism.
We will refer here to Kormos’ version (Fig. 2.1). In the first component, concep-
tual preparation (which has access to general and contextual world knowledge)
takes place; the resulting “preverbal message” is then grammatically encoded, by
retrieving lemmas and relevant syntactic information from the mental lexicon.
The output of the first component is then fed into the second component (the
phonological/phonetic system), where morpho-phonological encoding takes place,
also drawing on information retrieved from the lexicon. This results in a “phono-
logical score” (internal speech) which is then phonetically encoded by retrieving
articulatory gestures from a dedicated store (the “syllabary”), and the resulting
“articulatory score” is then used for articulation. The sub-component responsible
for conceptual preparation can monitor the subsequent steps through a number
of feedback loops: specifically, it can check the preverbal message, the phono-
logical score (produced by morpho-phonological encoding) and the final speech
output. In addition to world knowledge, the lexicon and the syllabary (which are
shared between L1 and L2), Kormos’ version of the model (Kormos, 2009) also
includes a store of declarative L2 rule knowledge, which can be accessed during
both grammatical and morpho-phonological encoding (Kormos, 2009, p. 168).
Since the lexicon and syllabary are shared between the L1 and L2, L1 transfer
errors can occur if the syntactic and lexical information for grammatical encoding
is retrieved from the L1 lemma instead of the L2. For instance, Hungarian speak-
ers of English may often say “enter into a room” because they transfer the VP +
PP structure that the Hungarian equivalent of “enter” points to (Kormos, 2009,
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p. 172). In the next phase of grammatical encoding, which involves phrase and
clause building, L2 learners may deviate from native speakers in various ways.
L1 and advanced L2 speakers will rely on procedural knowledge of syntactic and
morphological rules, and apply those rules automatically. By contrast, lower pro-
ficiency L2 speakers may have declarative knowledge of the rules, and use them
consciously. If they have no knowledge of the rules in any form, they may use
communicative strategies such as deliberate transfer of L1 structures or simple
juxtaposition of lexically encoded concepts (Kormos, 2009, p. 172).
The presence of loops monitoring internal and external speech allows for hy-
pothesis testing and can aid noticing of errors in the learner’s own output, such as
in case of a mismatch between preverbal message and phonological score (De Bot,
1996). According to the Output Hypothesis (Swain, 1985, 2005; Swain and Lap-
kin, 1995), this property of speech production makes it a valuable part of L2
learning. Production contributes to the development of accuracy, by drawing
attention to form and forcing learners to process language at a deeper level than
input does: output may stimulate learners to move from the semantics-based
processing prevalent in comprehension to the complete grammatical processing
needed for accurate production, meaning that output plays a significant role in
the development of syntax and morphology (Swain, 1993). It also allows learners
to “notice” gaps in their L2 (Schmidt and Frota, 1986), which in turn enables
them to acquire the correct target form. This applies both to output generally and
to “pushed” output, that is, attempting to produce output slightly above one’s
own capabilities (Swain, 1985). Pushed output is usually obtained by means of a
text reconstruction or “dictogloss” task, in which students are asked to take notes
while listening to a text, and then reconstruct it (Kowal and Swain, 1994, 1997;
LaPierre, 1995; Wajnryb and Maley, 1990). Studies conducted by Izumi et al.
using this paradigm show that it leads to improvements in both comprehension
and untimed written production, which was tested with a sentence combination
task (combining two sentences into a main and a relative clause) and a cued sen-
tence completion task (Izumi, 2002; Izumi et al., 1999). These production tasks
are quite explicit in nature; as already argued by LaPierre (1995), this suggests
that the benefits of pushed output through text reconstruction are largely due
to increased awareness (and therefore, explicit knowledge), which supports the
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Figure 2.1: Kormos’ model of bilingual speech production (Kormos, 2009, p.
168). Copyright c©2006 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Used by permis-
sion.
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Output hypothesis (Swain, 1985, 1993).
Besides raising awareness, it is widely acknowledged that productive practice
can improve speed and fluency in production (Gass and Mackey, 2007; Lee and
VanPatten, 2003; Schmidt, 1992b; Swain, 1985; R. Ellis, 1988). However, whether
this amounts to creating new implicit knowledge is a point of contention, which
hinges on the nature of implicit knowledge and of the relation between production
and comprehension.
2.5.2 Relation between production and comprehension
Production practice can help generate awareness and improve accuracy on explicit
tasks, and it can help improve fluency. But can it generate new implicit knowl-
edge, which could then be used in production? De Bot (1996) argues that learning
during production can also take place through proceduralisation, as connections
between lemmas and procedures are strengthened by being repeatedly made in
the grammatical encoding phase. Repetition priming effects in production have
been observed (Lupker, 1988; Mitchell and Brown, 1988), with reductions in pic-
ture naming latencies observed even several months after priming (Cave, 1997).
The duration of the priming effects observed has led some to argue that these
should be viewed as learning effects rather than just priming (Griffin and Fer-
reira, 2006). In fact, in usage-based views of language acquisition (N. Ellis, 1998;
Barlow and Kemmer, 2000) priming and learning are fundamentally part of the
same mechanism, on the assumption that “short-term effects lead to long-term
effects [...] as the individual increments of learning integrate over time to form the
processes, representations, and attentional biases that constitute human minds.”
(N. Ellis and Sagarra, 2010, p. 570).
However, in the field of implicit L2 learning research, few studies to date
have targeted production measures (for an exception, see De Jong (2005)). In
IL studies those that did include measures of production, the aim to was to
evaluate abstract rule knowledge, rather than productive skills per se (Hama
and Leow, 2010; Ruiz et al., 2018; Wonnacott, 2011; Wonnacott et al., 2017) or
to compare explicit (instructed) learning to learning under incidental conditions
(DeKeyser, 1995; Doughty, 1991; Goo et al., 2015; Norris and Ortega, 2000; Spada
40
Chapter 2 Production in SLA and implicit learning
and Tomita, 2010). Ruiz et al. (2018) adapted the implicit learning paradigm from
Rebuschat (2008) and Rebuschat and Williams (2012), using an artificial language
made of English vocabulary arranged following German word order rules (unlike
previous studies, each sentence also contained a novel pseudoword). Training
was based on reading for comprehension: one group (incidental group) was only
tasked with judging semantic plausibility and learning the novel pseudowords;
the second group (intentional group) was additionally instructed to discover the
word order rules. Testing included a 4-alternative forced choice task (4AFC), a
grammaticality judgment task and a written sentence production task. While
both the 4AFC and grammaticality judgment task showed evidence of learning,
accuracy on the production task was generally low, both for the incidental group
(26%) and for the intentional one (44%). Similarly, studies comparing implicit
with instructed learning have found little to no learning gains when participants
were tested on production tasks following implicit instruction. However, two key
factors were generally not controlled in these studies: the type of production task
(tapping into implicit or explicit knowledge) and the type of training activity
(comprehension or production-based). For instance, DeKeyser (1995) compared
implicit learning of an artificial language to instructed learning; for the implicit
group, DeKeyser found no evidence of learning in a written production task, even
after lengthy exposure. However, participants were trained on comprehension,
but tested on production: they were evaluated on a task best suited for assessing
explicit knowledge, and in a modality other than the one they were trained in.
Therefore, it is difficult to establish whether the outcome is due to the fact that the
training procedure did not generate any implicit knowledge, or whether implicit
knowledge acquired through comprehension cannot be deployed in a production
task.
To know whether we can directly create implicit knowledge that can be used
in production, we need to know what the nature of that knowledge is. Does the
same abstract knowledge underlie both comprehension and production? In L2
acquisition, it is common for comprehension skills to develop before production.
This is partly because comprehension can rely on semantic and pragmatic cues to
compensate for gaps in syntactic (Clahsen and Felser, 2006, 2018) and morpho-
logical (Clahsen et al., 2010) knowledge. However, the same is not possible for
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production. There are two possible explanations for this: either comprehension
and production rely on the same knowledge, but production posits additional
processing difficulty, or they are separate skills.
Some researchers in the field of SLA have assumed that both L2 comprehen-
sion and production rely on the same abstract knowledge (Bates and MacWhin-
ney, 1989; Krashen, 1985; Schwartz, 1993; VanPatten and Cadierno, 1993), even
though they acknowledge that the requirements of actual processing may differ
considerably between modalities (Bates and MacWhinney, 1989). The assump-
tion is that production requires the same basic knowledge or skill as comprehen-
sion, with the addition of extraneous factors such as word retrieval and motor
skills, which may mask the true extent of linguistic knowledge. Comprehension,
under this view, is a “purer” measure of linguistic knowledge, offering a window
into abstract language knowledge; while production can be affected by lexical
access or word retrieval problems which can make it hard to gauge the actual
extent of rule knowledge (Chondrogianni et al., 2015). The hypothesis of shared
representations is supported by syntactic priming: comprehension of specific syn-
tactic structures can prime their production (Bock et al., 2007; Branigan et al.,
2000, 1995; Potter and Lombardi, 1998), and vice versa (Branigan et al., 1995).
There is evidence that syntactic priming modulates activity in the same brain
areas (inferior frontal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus and bilateral supplemen-
tary motor area) and to the same extent, regardless of whether it occurs within
modalities (e.g. production to production) or across them (Segaert et al., 2012).
Morphosyntactic and lexical properties such as gender and number can also be
primed across comprehension and production (Pickering et al., 2000).
Others, most notably DeKeyser (DeKeyser, 2017, 1997; DeKeyser and Sokalski,
1996; Li and DeKeyser, 2017) have taken the view that comprehension and pro-
duction are separate skills, and develop in accordance with the power law of skill
acquisition (Anderson, 1993): once proceduralised, knowledge is highly skill spe-
cific. This predicts that production training will lead to gains in production only,
and comprehension tasks will likewise only lead to improvement on measures
of comprehension. These different positions on the relation between production
and comprehension generate different predictions with regards to our question:
in Krashen’s view, comprehension-based training should be enough to generate
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implicit knowledge that can be used in production. In DeKeyser’s view, produc-
tion practice should be needed to develop implicit productive knowledge through
proceduralisation.
2.5.3 Can we generate implicit productive knowledge?
According Krashen’s Input Hypothesis, input is what drives acquisition: specifi-
cally, comprehensible input that is slightly more complex than the learner’s cur-
rent level, or “i+1”, where i is the learner’s current state (Krashen, 1989, 1994,
1981b, 1982). In this view, the only role output can serve in acquisition is that
of generating self-input for the learner. Similarly, VanPatten argues that Input
Processing activities are sufficient to develop both comprehension and productive
skills. While he acknowledges that output practice is useful for developing fluency
at a later stage (Lee and VanPatten, 2003), VanPatten maintains that production
practice in the early stages of acquisition may in fact be detrimental: it would be
like “putting the cart before the horse” by requiring learners “to produce when
the developing system has not yet had the relevant intake data” (VanPatten and
Cadierno, 1993, p. 436). In a similar vein, it has been pointed out that practice
may enhance fluency, but it does not necessarily improve accuracy (R. Ellis, 1988;
Schmidt, 1992b). In Krashen’s and VanPatten’s view, accuracy in production can
be obtained simply through adequate exposure to input.
A number of studies comparing Processing Instruction (PI) with output-based
tasks have shown that students trained with PI performed better than output
groups on interpretation tasks, and on the same level as output groups in pro-
duction tasks (Cheng, 1995; VanPatten and Cadierno, 1993; VanPatten and Sanz,
1995; VanPatten and Wong, 2004), which would seem to support the hypothesis
that input practice is sufficient for developing competence in production. Van-
Patten and Cadierno (1993) investigated the acquisition of Spanish word order by
L1 English learners. They trained one group using input processing – a methodol-
ogy that involves explicit explanation and a range of comprehension tasks forcing
subjects to attend to specific form-meaning connections, but no production tasks.
They compared this to a second group who received traditional instruction based
on a current university textbook, and to a control group who received no instruc-
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tion. After two days of instruction, participants were tested on a comprehension
task (picture matching) and a production task (gap filling). They found that
only the Input Processing group showed significant improvement in the compre-
hension task, relative to pre-test. On the production task, both groups showed
the same improvement, which is striking because the PI training protocol did not
include any production task, unlike the traditional instruction group. VanPatten
and Cadierno conclude from this that input processing has a significant effect on
learners’ L2 development, which is detectable in output as well as input, despite
the fact that learners did not produce any output during training (similar results
were obtained by Cheng (1995)). However, they used a very constrained written
production task (gap filling), with no time constraints. To examine what the
outcome would be in a freer, more communicative context, VanPatten and Sanz
(1995) carried out a partial replication of VanPatten and Cadierno (1993) using
two groups (one input processing, one control) but with three tasks for testing
production: the sentence completion task used in VanPatten and Cadierno (1993)
and a video narration task, administered both orally and in writing. They found
that, in the written mode, the PI group significantly improved on both the sen-
tence completion and video narration task. However, in the oral mode they only
showed significant improvement in the sentence completion task and not in the
video narration one (arguably, the only one requiring fluency). Likewise, in Van-
Patten and Uludag (2011), participants who were trained with PI and were then
tested on a text reconstruction task showed no difference in performance from par-
ticipants who were trained with a dictogloss task, which promotes explicit knowl-
edge. Similar results were obtained by Erlam et al. (2009) in a study on the role
of output in the acquisition of the definite/indefinite/zero article alternation in
English, which incorporated measures of both explicit knowledge (untimed gram-
maticality judgment task (UGJT)) and implicit knowledge (elicited oral imitation
task (EOIT)) in testing . Subjects were given explicit instruction on the rule and
then performed a battery of tasks, either production- or comprehension-based:
production activities consisted of free meaning-oriented practice with target struc-
ture, while comprehension activities were based on PI protocols (VanPatten and
Cadierno, 1993). Both groups made significant improvements on both UGJT and
EOIT, which suggests both treatments had increased implicit as well as explicit
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knowledge. However, only the production group performed significantly better
than a control group on the EOIT, and only they showed generalisation to new
items in a delayed EOIT two weeks later, which suggests that output activities
were instrumental in developing productive implicit L2 knowledge. Overall, the
evidence covered so far suggests that input training can lead to improved perfor-
mance on explicit production tasks, but is not as successful with productive tasks
that require automatic knowledge, as also noted by Marsden and Chen (2011).
Instead, production activities seem better suited to develop productive automatic
L2 knowledge.
The importance of production activities to develop productive skills is also
stressed by DeKeyser (DeKeyser, 2007, 1997; DeKeyser and Sokalski, 1996), who
argues that production and comprehension do not operate based on the same
abstract information, but are separate skills. Production training is not simply
useful for developing fluency, but it is necessary to develop implicit productive
knowledge (which, in DeKeyser’s framework, is obtained through the automa-
tisation of declarative knowledge). To test this hypothesis, DeKeyser (1997)
investigated the acquisition of an artificial language (Autopractan) over 8 weeks
of training: participants were trained with either comprehension tasks only, pro-
duction tasks only or with a mixture of both. Comprehension was trained and
tested with a picture-matching task; production, with a written production task
in which participants had to type sentences cued a picture. Each task was ad-
ministered under both single- and dual-task conditions, the latter to tap into
automatic processing. Participants were significantly better in the practiced skill
than in the reverse, with regards to both speed and accuracy. They still showed
some improvement in the unpracticed domain, however, even if not as great as
the practiced one. According to DeKeyser (1997), this is due to the fact that per-
formance in the trained domain was driven by proceduralized knowledge, while
transfer to the other domain relied on declarative knowledge. However, there was
one exception to this pattern: the production-only and mixed groups actually
had higher accuracy than the comprehension group on one measure of compre-
hension, a picture-matching task done under dual-task conditions (designed to tap
into automatic knowledge). DeKeyser attributes this result to the task having
low reliability, rather than to an effect of production training, however, it sug-
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gests that not only is production training required to develop implicit productive
knowledge, but that it may be beneficial for comprehension, too.
Taken together, results from VanPatten’s and DeKeyser’s studies suggest that
while transfer between comprehension and production is possible, production
training may be required to develop implicit productive knowledge. On the one
hand, results from VanPatten and Oikkenon (1996); VanPatten and Sanz (1995);
VanPatten and Uludag (2011) show that comprehension-based practice can lead
to productive performance on explicit, but not implicit, measures; this is com-
patible with findings by DeKeyser (1997) and DeKeyser and Sokalski (1996),
who found that performance on production measures, under both single- and
dual-task conditions, was better for subjects who received productive training
on the relevant structure. DeKeyser’s findings also show evidence of transfer
between comprehension and production, which is compatible with shared repre-
sentations. However, production practice actually led to higher accuracy than
comprehension-based practice on an automatic comprehension task; the reverse
was not true. This is compatible with shared representations, but it also suggests
a primacy for production, providing support for models that see production and
comprehension as instances of action and action perception respectively (Dell
and Chang, 2014; Pickering and Garrod, 2013). In Pickering and Garrod’s (2013)
integrated model of comprehension and production, the two processes are interwo-
ven in language use. Specifically, production is recruited during comprehension as
comprehenders make “covert models” of production during comprehension, which
allows them to make predictions about upcoming input. Based on this model, we
would expect the development of production to have an effect on comprehension
- not just due to shared representations, but because production is harnessed by
comprehension. Indeed, EEG studies on implicit learning which found learners
had developed L1-like processing of a miniature artificial language, when tested
with a comprehension task (GJT) (Friederici et al., 2002; Morgan-Short et al.,
2012a,b), used a communicative production task to train participants, which lends
some support to this hypothesis.
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2.6 Research questions
Research on implicit learning in SLA has shown that it is possible for learners
to acquire both novel forms and form-meaning connections from the input in
an implicit way. However, evidence for this claim comes primarily from studies
using comprehension tasks to test for implicit knowledge. Little attention has
been devoted so far to the relation between comprehension and production in im-
plicit learning, focusing instead on the acquisition of abstract implicit knowledge,
assumed to underlie both processes.
Our first research question was whether it would be possible for learners to
develop implicit knowledge of a novel linguistic rule and use it correctly in pro-
duction. Based on the the evidence reviewed here, we hypothesised that it would
be be possible for the knowledge acquired through implicit learning to be used
productively, provided that en element of production training were included in
the learning phase. To test our hypothesis, we devised a novel learning and
testing methodology based on the elicited oral imitation task, in order to have a
production task that would focus attention on form-meaning connections without
encouraging the application of explicit rules.
Our second research question was whether developing implicit knowledge
through a production task would also lead to learning gains in comprehension.
Here, different theoretical positions predicted different outcomes, allowing us to
test different accounts of the relationship between comprehension and produc-
tion. If both production and comprehension relied on the same abstract knowl-
edge, with additional processing demands for production, we hypothesised that
that the knowledge acquired through a production task should immediately be
available in comprehension, too. On other hand, if production and comprehen-
sion were different skills relying on different kinds of automatised knowledge, we
would not expect the knowledge acquired in a production task to readily transfer
to a comprehension one, without comprehension-based training. To address this
question, we included comprehension tasks in the study, specifically a reaction
time listening task (Experiment 1) and a recognition memory task (Experiments
2 & 3).
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Experiment 1: Elicited recall of
novel prepositions
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the existing literature suggests that it may
be possible for learners to acquire implicit knowledge that they can then use
in production. To test this hypothesis, we turned to a feature of language that
commonly presents problems for adult L2 learners, namely prepositions. As func-
tion words with limited semantic content, prepositions are often neglected by L2
learners (VanPatten and Oikkenon, 1996). Furthermore, their correct usage of-
ten depends on semantic properties of the content words they are paired with,
rather than just the lexical meaning of the prepositions themselves. For this rea-
son, they may be particularly suited to benefit from a training paradigm which
directs learners’ attention to relevant form-meaning connections and does so in
a holistic manner, requiring participants to pay attention to the association of
prepositions with different nouns, rather than just to the prepositions themselves.
Section 3.1.1 provides an introduction to the materials we used as stimuli, which
were based on a pair of spatial prepositions found in Czech, v and na.
The literature on implicit learning and production which we surveyed suggests
that, in order for learners to develop productive implicit knowledge, production-
based training may be necessary. At the same time, it is crucial that the task
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used to test learners should be well-suited to detect implicit knowledge. There-
fore, in order to evaluate production skills, we needed a productive task that could
directly tap into implicit knowledge, minimising interference from conscious con-
trol. In order to meet both requirements - the need for production-based training,
and for a suitable test of implicit knowledge - we decided to use an elicited oral
imitation task, which would serve as both training and testing methodology. It
is widely accepted that the EOIT is a suitable test of implicit knowledge (see
Section 2.2.1); this chapter (Section 3.1.2.1) will lay out the rationale for using
the task as a learning tool, too. Finally, the existing literature also suggests that
knowledge developed through implicit learning may transfer to a comprehension
task, although the nature of that transfer process is not clear. If participants are
able to acquire abstract, implicit rule knowledge through the production task, we
may expect to them to display sensitivity to the rule in a comprehension test,
too. On the other hand, if transfer between modalities relies on explicit declar-
ative memory, as DeKeyser (1997) argues, we may expect to see a dissociation
between productive and receptive measures of implicit knowledge, with partici-
pants scoring above chance in a production task, but not in a comprehension one.
We selected a reaction time (RT) task as measure of receptive implicit knowledge,
which will be described in Section 3.1.2.2. Section 3.2 will then present the first
experiment we ran using this methodology, which aimed to test the effect of a
hidden regularity on participants’ recall accuracy.
3.1.1 Czech spatial prepositions: v and na
As the basis for our study, we selected a specific set of spatial prepositions found
in Czech: v and na. In Czech, as in other Slavonic languages, the same spatial
preposition may exist in different forms, which usage depends on the physical
properties of the space being referred to. Both v and na indicate a stationary
position (which may be variously translated as ”at”, ”in”, or ”on”), but they are
used before different entities. Nouns denoting open spaces tend to be preceded
by the preposition na, whereas enclosed spaces are normally preceded by v. In
this sense, there is partial overlap between the Czech rule and the English in/on
distinction: generally, nouns that take on in English are likely to take na in
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Czech (e.g. na balkoneˇ, “on the balcony”). However, the reverse is not true, as
the range of nouns that take na in Czech is much wider than that (e.g. na hrˇiˇsti,
“in the playground” or na koncerteˇ, “at a concert”). In fact, it is not merely a
distinction between open and enclosed spaces. It is a fuzzy category, which can
fully be captured only by a variety of rules, some of which may at times conflict
with each other. Hrdlicˇka (2000) identifies tendencies driving usage, based on
properties of the physical location being referred to (e.g. how bounded or hidden
it is, whether it is lower or higher then the surroundings), “social importance”
(e.g. institutions), type of locality (administrative unit, etc.), physical properties
of a substance / locality (e.g. water, earth), and intensity of contact between
agent and patient. The complex nature of this category makes it a common
stumbling point for L2 learners of Czech, to whom the distinction often appears
arbitrary. Conversely, native speaker intuitions on this subject are usually strong
and uniform, even for novel items such as newly introduced loanwords. We can
also identify certain morphological regularities among nouns, which may serve as
cue for the v/na distinction. For instance, nouns ending in –iˇsteˇ (e.g. hrˇiˇsteˇ,
“playground”; parkoviˇsteˇ, “car park”), which usually denote open spaces, over-
whelmingly tend to use na as preposition. Conversely, nouns ending in –a´rna,
which normally denote enclosed spaces (e.g. kava´rna, “cafe´”; cˇeka´rna, “waiting
room”), will usually occur with v (Luksˇija, 2010). It is possible that native speak-
ers rely on implicit knowledge of these distributional properties when acquiring
the rule, as well as semantic properties of the nouns. As the examples above
show, the v/na alternation in its original form is a very complex rule, where se-
mantic generalisations interact with both pragmatic and morphological factors.
Therefore, in order to avoid confounds and ensure that participants were sensitive
to the basic spatial distinction underlying the rule, we thought it necessary to
begin by testing a simplified version of it. Therefore, we decided to focus on the
core part of the rule, namely the physical distinction between open/outdoor and
enclosed/indoor spaces. Place nouns used for each category were selected based
on frequency and natural usage in Czech; more details on how study materials
were prepared can be found in Section 3.2.2.
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3.1.2 Methodology
3.1.2.1 Using elicited oral imitation as a learning tool
As mentioned previously, the EOIT is commonly used as a test of implicit knowl-
edge in L2 research. However, elicited imitation has also been used in implicit
learning research, as a way to get subjects to engage with the training material on
a deeper level than could be achieved by simple exposure. In Leung and Williams
(2006, 2011), participants were auditorily exposed to sentences in a semi-artificial
language (English lexis with novel case markers, and either VSO or VOS word
order) while performing a RT task. After giving their response, they had to re-
formulate the sentence they had just heard using normal English word order, but
retaining the case markers; every two trials, they had to recall these reformulated
versions. According to the authors, this was done to “stimulate concurrent active
processing of the action portrayed and the article used” (Leung and Williams,
2006, p. 467). Similarly, in a study on the implicit learning of novel syntactic
structures by Rebuschat and Williams (2012, Experiment 2), the addition of an
elicited imitation task during training improved learning outcomes. Rebuschat
and Williams attribute this to the fact that the addition of a recall task required
participants to process word order more directly, thus facilitating the acquisition
of the different syntactic structures.
Elicited oral imitation combines a number of different processes which have
been shown to be beneficial for learning: memorisation, retrieval and production.
The use of memorisation as a way to get subjects to engage with stimuli has been
a common feature of studies on artificial grammar learning: in a typical AGL
experiment, participants are instructed to memorise strings, under the pretence
that they are doing a memory task (Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1976). Memo-
risation has been shown to yield better learning effects than rule-search (Reber,
1976, 1989), which suggests that it offers benefits beyond those stemming from
simple exposure to the material. It appears to be a kind of “desirable difficulty”
(Bjork, 1994) which can aid processing, by forcing participants to process material
in greater depth than they would if they were just reading for comprehension.
Greater depth of processing can lead to better item recall even when memori-
sation is not the goal of the task. For instance, when reading an ambiguous
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sentence, it has been shown that making an effort to comprehend the sentences
for several seconds before receiving a disambiguating cue enhances sentence re-
call later on, compared to receiving the cue immediately, even if it does not affect
comprehension scores (Zaromb et al., 2010).
Retrieval practice, too, has been shown to be beneficial for learning, a phe-
nomenon known as the “testing effect”. Testing learners on newly acquired in-
formation improves retention of that information, more so than simply giving
subjects the opportunity for restudy (Carpenter and DeLosh, 2005; Cull, 2000;
Karpicke and Roediger, 2008; ?). The beneficial effect of testing is not just due
the repeated exposure subjects receive during testing: for instance, Zaromb and
Roediger (2010) show that, if we substitute learning episodes with testing (free
recall), performance at delayed testing significantly increases, suggesting that the
effect is not simply due to repeated exposure to the material. Crucially, the
benefits of testing are found even if learners do not receive any feedback. In
a typical study, participants may be tested on word lists (Karpicke and Roedi-
ger, 2007; Zaromb and Roediger, 2010), and simply be asked to recall as many
words as they can remember; or, if they are asked to learn word translation pairs
(Karpicke and Roediger, 2008), the testing phase may just require them to type
the English translation. Either way, they are not told whether the response is
correct; the effort of retrieval is what seems to drive the learning effect. According
to the “elaborative retrieval” hypothesis, this effect of immediate memory testing
on long-term retention occurs because, as subjects search they memory for the
required piece of information, “the information activated during retrieval may
spread to other related concepts and eventually activate an elaborative semantic
network with multiple pathways leading to the correct target.” (Carpenter, 2009,
p. 1564). This would not happen during restudy, as the information would be
readily available. On the other hand, we would expect this effect to be triggered
during elicited oral recall, which will require participants to activate the relevant
information even in the absence of further exposure.
While the testing effect has been shown to enhance retention for individual
items, the aim of this study is not for participants to just learn individual items:
the focus is on whether they can extract patterns of regularities from the in-
put and use them productively. However, following a usage-based account of L2
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acquisition, we assume that learners will first need to store individual represen-
tations in memory in order to abstract from them; therefore, a paradigm which
aids the retention of individual items should ultimately also aid rule extraction.
Indeed, evidence suggests that memorisation and recall can support the acquisi-
tion of abstract regularities, too. In a study on the acquisition of novel affixes,
cued recall was used by Tamminen et al. (2015) to promote the learning of stem
+ affix combinations; participants were then able to generalise the affixes to new
stems in a comprehension task, showing that they had abstracted away from the
individual combinations they were taught. Based on the regeneration hypothe-
sis of sentence recall (Potter and Lombardi, 1990), we also hypothesise that the
memory load coming from having to recall large amounts of material will provide
an incentive to decode and re-encode sentences wherever possible, rather than
relying solely on phonological working memory, thus making subjects more likely
to extract the regularity from individual items. Research on rule induction by
Radulescu and colleagues (Radulescu, 2014; Radulescu et al., 2019) provides some
support for our hypothesis: it suggests that the extraction of regularities from
a string of letters is a function of channel size (memory capacity) and stimulus
complexity. In two AGL studies using strings of syllables as stimuli, increasing
internal string complexity (e.g. the number of possible X syllables in a string of
type XXY) made participants more likely to extract categorical generalisations
from the input (Radulescu et al., 2019).
In this study, we will attempt to put pressure on memory capacity not by
increasing stimulus complexity, but rather by increasing the amount of mate-
rial to be stored in short-term memory. Memory load is a crucial component of
the EOIT: in order for the task to be effective, it should not allow subject to
rely entirely on phonological memory, so as to tap any internalised grammatical
knowledge. To achieve this, researchers can manipulate various factors includ-
ing stimulus length, time pressure, and interval between stimuli (Erlam, 2009).
However, once parameters such as sentence length and the time interval are set,
they will be the same for all participants. This means that individual differences
such as working memory may still play a role, making it difficult to determine
the relative contribution of phonological short-term memory across subjects. Our
experiment will circumvent this problem by using a within-subject design, where
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each participant will be given the exact same set of sentences: one half of the
sentences will follow the Czech preposition rule, while the other will not. If par-
ticipants have acquired the rule, it should be possible for them to re-analyse the
rule-based sentences, which in turn should make it easier to recall them, com-
pared to those with no underlying rule. The task we developed will be described
in greater detail in Section 3.2.3.2.
3.1.2.2 Measuring receptive knowledge
In order to explore the relation between production and comprehension in the
development of implicit rule knowledge, our study will also include a measure of
receptive knowledge. Similarly to the production task, the comprehension task
should be able to tap into any existing implicit knowledge, without prompting
rule searching. Following Leung and Williams (2006, 2011), we selected a reaction
time (RT) task based on aural presentation of the sentences, which will require
participants to give speeded responses based on information that can be inferred
from the critical items. The assumption behind this task is that, in a time-
pressured situation, participants will use any cues from the input that may allow
them to carry out the task as quickly as possible. In rule-based sentences, the
specific preposition used will depend on place type, thereby offering a cue as to
which type of noun will follow. In the other sentences, by contrast, there will be
no such relation, giving the listener no means to predict which noun will follow.
Therefore, a subject who has acquired the underlying rule could be expected to
react faster to the rule-based sentences than to ones with no rule. Details of the
task can be found in Section 3.2.3.2.
3.1.2.3 Measuring awareness
As means of assessing awareness of the Czech preposition rule, we decided to
use retrospective verbal reports, which will be collected by means of a debriefing
questionnaire at the end of each experiment. While the use verbal report as a
measure of awareness is not without drawbacks, we judged it to be the most ap-
propriate measure for our task. We decided not to use a now commonly employed
measure, judgement source attribution (Dienes and Scott, 2005), because it would
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not be suitable for our paradigm. As pointed out by Batterink et al. (2015a), the
guessing and zero-correlation criteria which underpin the use of source attribu-
tion apply to judgement knowledge, defined as the ability to recognise whether a
particular test item has the same structure as training items (Dienes and Scott,
2005). That is not not applicable to our task, which involves cued recall and
production, rather than judgement. Pragmatically, asking for the source of each
response in a recall task would not be appropriate, since the premise of the task is
that participants are relying on their memory to produce the sentences. Further-
more, it may make participants more self-conscious and less spontaneous in their
behaviour, which may be particularly detrimental in a production task; it might
also make them more inclined to search for rules. In order to avoid the problem
of under-reporting, our questionnaire includes multiple indirect questions; for in-
stance, participants will not only be asked whether they think there were any
rules underlying the use of pseudowords, but also to attempt a translation for
them. A copy of the questionnaire used can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 Experiment 1
The aim of this first experiment was to explore the effects of incidental exposure
to a novel rule on subsequent recall, as an initial measure of production. In
order to make it as similar as possible to a naturalistic L2 learning situation,
we selected a rule borrowed from a natural language, Czech, keeping only its
core semantic distinction between open and enclosed spaces. When choosing
tasks to test production and comprehension, the main criterion was that they
should be able to tap into implicit knowledge, while discouraging rule searching
and minimising the chances of participants relying on explicit knowledge during
testing. We settled on a time-pressured elicited oral imitation task (Erlam, 2006;
2009), and on a reaction time task (RT) following Leung and Williams (2006).
If participants acquire implicit knowledge of the rule, we would expect them
to make fewer recall errors when recalling rule-based items compared to the other
items, even if they have no explicit knowledge of the rule. Likewise, if participants
acquire implicit knowledge that can be used in comprehension, too, we would
expect them to be faster when responding to items which follow the rule, and are
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therefore potentially predictable, compared to those which do not.
3.2.1 Participants
28 native English speakers aged 18-45 were recruited from the University of Cam-
bridge and surrounding community (17 females, mean age 24, SD = 5.92), and
received £8 as compensation for taking part in the study. Most participants had
knowledge of at least one foreign language, but only two subjects reported hav-
ing any knowledge of a Slavonic language (Russian), which could have provided
an advantage due to its similarities with Czech. Other participants reported
knowledge of languages belonging to the Romance (n = 32), Chinese (n = 11),
Germanic (n = 8) and Indo-Aryan (n = 6) families, as well as Greek (n = 4),
Malay (n = 2), Korean (n = 1), Navajo (n = 1) and Hawaiian (n = 1).
3.2.2 Materials
We first extracted lists of the nouns used most frequently in Czech with either v
or na, using the SYN2015 corpus of written Czech as source (Krˇen et al., 2015).
From these, we eliminated nouns that did not conform to the simplified rule we
were going to use, such as: names of countries being used with v, or names of
institutions being used with na. We kept only those nouns referring to physical
locations (large enough for a person to occupy them), which could clearly be
ascribed to either category by virtue of their physical properties (enclosed vs. open
space). We translated the nouns into English and ranked them based on their
frequency in the British National Corpus (2007). The 32 most frequent nouns
were kept for each category, for a total of 64 unique place nouns (mean frequency
42.5 per million words). The full list of place nouns used and corresponding
pictures is provided in Appendix C.
Place nouns were embedded in simple sentences, all with the structure subject
– “is” – preposition – place noun, e.g. “Harry is gi desert”. The subject was
always one of two characters, “Harry” or “Lucy” (which corresponded to a stick
figure drawing of either a male or a female), randomly assigned at each trial.
Four pseudowords (“gi”, “ro”, “wa” and “ne”) were used as prepositions, and
for each participant they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions –
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Awareness of the Hidden Rule was 
assessed by post-test questionnaire.
Overt Rule
“Harry is {ro/ne} desert”
Prepositions used interchangeably
“Harry is {ro/ne} kitchen”
No rule
Random pair
Outside frame
“Harry is gi desert”
Preposition based on place type
(open vs. enclosed)
“Harry is wa kitchen”
Hidden Rule
System pair
Inside frame
Aware / Unaware
Preposition pair based on 
character position
Figure 3.1: Description of rules used in experiment (Overt and Hidden)
System or Random. The two prepositions in the System condition followed the
simplified Czech rule: one preposition could only be used with open space noun,
the other with enclosed space ones (Overt rule). The two prepositions assigned to
the Random condition, on the other hand, were used interchangeably (Fig. 3.1).
Each Random preposition appeared with both types of noun over the course of
the experiment, an equal number of times with each place type. The assignment
of specific prepositions to the Random and System condition was counterbalanced
across participants.
Audio recordings of the sentences were produced using Apple’s OS X 10.11
built-in VoiceOver voice synthesizer. All place nouns as well as other sentence
parts were recorded separately. Subject + predicate pairs (“Harry is” / “Lucy is”)
were recorded as one unit and edited to have the same length (0.812s). The four
prepositions were recorded individually and were also of equal length (0.447s).
Sentences were then formed online by concatenating the audio clips during pre-
sentation. In this way, we ensured that all critical word onsets (prepositions and
place nouns) occurred at the exact same time point for all sentences. During
training, each sentence would be accompanied by a visual representation, com-
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posed of a drawing representing either Harry or Lucy, and a picture depicting the
place noun. Place pictures were sourced from the ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009)
and SUN (Xiao et al., 2010) databases. The place picture always occupied the
centre of the screen, while the position of the character drawing varied depending
on sentence type. In System sentences (which followed the simplified Czech rule)
the character was superimposed on the left side of the picture, whereas in the
Random condition the character appeared beside the picture – this was the Overt
rule. Participants were invited to pay attention to the position of the character
on screen, encouraging them to discover its association with a particular pair of
prepositions.
3.2.3 Procedure
Participants were seated at approximately 60cm from a 19” LCD screen, which
was connected to a Windows desktop PC and a standard computer keyboard. Vi-
sual stimuli and instructions were displayed on the screen while audio stimuli were
played through a pair of headphones, which participants wore throughout the ex-
periment. During recall trials, their responses were recorded by a microphone
positioned on the desk and connected to the PC. Both stimulus presentation and
recording were carried out using PsychoPy software (Peirce et al., 2019). The
procedure consisted of a training phase, a recall testing phase and a comprehen-
sion testing phase (reaction time task), delivered in this order. Each task was
preceded by a set of written instructions, which participants read at their own
pace. At the start, participants were informed that they would hear a series of
sentences, each accompanied by a drawing of the scene it described. Every sen-
tence would be almost entirely in English apart from one word, which would be
a foreign word. Participants were encouraged to discover the Overt rule: they
were told that different words were associated with different character positions
on screen, and that they would be tested on the association later (full instructions
are included in Appendix B). They were not encouraged to discover the meaning
of the novel words. After instructions, participants would do a practice block for
each task, and then begin the task. At the end, participants were asked to fill in
a debriefing questionnaire, before being informed of the nature of the experiment
58
Chapter 3 Experiment 1
and the Hidden rule.
3.2.3.1 Training phase
The training phase consisted of 96 sentences, divided into 8 blocks of 16. Each
block was further divided into four groups of 4 sentences each: in each group, the
four sentences were first presented in sequence, followed by four recall trials (in
random order), one for each sentence. There was one exposure trial and one recall
trial per sentence, for a total of 32 trials per block; there was a compulsory 10-
second break at the end of every block of 32 trials. In an exposure trial, the audio
recording of the sentence was played while the corresponding image (character
+ place picture combination) was displayed on screen. As soon as the sentence
was over, the exposure trial for the next sentence began. Presentation was rapid,
with minimal interval between stimuli. This was done on the basis of the results
of a pilot study carried out beforehand. During piloting, we found that a greater
interval between exposure trials had two disadvantages: it allowed participants
to rehearse the sentences they had just heard, and this in turn encouraged many
of them to employ mnemonic strategies (e.g. associations of ideas) to help them
remember the sentences. After four exposure trials, the screen background colour
changed from white to grey, and participants did four recall trials on the same
sentences they had just heard (Fig. 3.2). In a recall trial, the image was displayed
on screen for 6s, but no audio recording was played. Instead, participants were
instructed to repeat the sentence corresponding to that image. Recall trials were
shuffled: participants had to repeat the sentences they had heard in the last four
exposure trials, but not in the same order as they had heard them. This, too,
was based on the pilot study: we found that if recall trials followed the same
order as the exposure ones, participants could simply memorise the sequence
of prepositions (the only aspect of a sentence which could not be immediately
retrieved from a picture) over the course of the four trials, without forming an
association between each pictures and preposition. Shuffling the recall trials, on
the other hand, ensured that participants had to form an association between the
picture and the preposition in order to remember the sentences. The 96 sentences
of the first task were made up of a mix of 64 matched sentences and 32 unmatched
59
Chapter 3 Experiment 1
Figure 3.2: Training phase procedure for Experiment 1
sentences. The 64 matched sentences were based on a subset of 32 place nouns
(half of the entire noun set). These were equally distributed between place types,
and each appeared in two sentences – once in the System and once in the Random
condition (32 nouns x 2 conditions = 64 matched sentences). The 32 unmatched
sentences were based on the other half of the place noun set, which only appeared
in one condition, counterbalanced between participants (32 nouns x 1 condition
= 32 unmatched sentences).
3.2.3.2 Testing phase
Recall task The recall task used the same items as the training tasks and was
identical to it in all respects, apart from the internal composition of each block.
Blocks were still made up of 16 trials, but recall was every 8 trials, instead of
every 4 (Fig. 3.3); the order in which items were presented for recall was still
randomized. As in the training phase, there was a compulsory 10s break after
every block of 16 trials. The choice of the number of exposure/recall trials for
each task (4 for training, 8 for recall) was also based on the results of the pilot
study. While in the training phase we wanted to minimize the number of recall
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Figure 3.3: Recall task procedure
errors (in order to prevent incorrect associations from being formed), in the recall
phase we wanted to maximise it, in order for the task to be as sensitive as possible
and to avoid ceiling effects. On the other hand, the memory load could not be
so great as to discourage participants from carrying out the task altogether. We
found that a recall span of 8 sentences seemed to offer the best balance, taking
account of individual differences.
Listening task Each trial began with a fixation cross which remained on screen
for 0.5s. After that, the audio of the sentence started playing, while the screen
remained blank. At 0.8s from the beginning of the sentence, simultaneously with
the onset of the preposition, two pictures representing different locations (without
any characters) appeared on screen, next to each other (Fig. 3.4). One of the
pictures depicted the place mentioned in the sentence (Target picture), while the
other (Distractor picture) was always drawn from the opposite category (either
open or enclosed spaces). All pictures had already been used in both previous
tasks and were therefore familiar to the participants. The target and distractor
pictures were randomly assigned to either the left or the right side of the screen;
participants were instructed to press a key on the keyboard (“D” for left, “K” for
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”Harry is gi desert”
Target picture Distractor picture
Figure 3.4: Sample trial from RT task. The target and distractor picture are
always drawn from different place categories.
right) as quickly as possible to indicate which of the two pictures depicted the
place mentioned in the sentence. Reaction times were measured from the onset
of the preposition. At the end of each block, participants received feedback on
how fast their responses had been on average, encouraging them to try and lower
their response times further. Similarly to previous tasks there was a compulsory
break between blocks, in this case of 15s. The task consisted of a total of 128
trials, divided into 8 blocks of 16. The first 6 blocks were made up of the same 96
sentences already used in the training and recall phases, followed by one Gener-
alisation and one Violation block. The stimuli in the generalisation and violation
blocks were derived from the 32 unmatched sentences included in the training
phase: if a place noun appeared in the training phase in the System condition,
it would then appear in the generalisation block as Random, and vice versa (this
was counterbalanced between participants). Both Generalisation and Violation
items, then, were composed of previously seen pictures in novel combinations;
additionally System items in the Violation block had reversed preposition assign-
ment, so as to make them ungrammatical.
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3.2.3.3 Debriefing questionnaire
Awareness of both the Overt and the Hidden rule was assessed by a questionnaire
administered at the end of the experiment (Appendix A). Throughout the experi-
ment and in the questionnaire, the prepositions were never described as such, but
either mentioned specifically word by word or referred to simply as the “foreign”
words. This was done so as not to condition participants’ responses and gain an
unbiased picture of their intuitions concerning the novel words. To assess aware-
ness of the Overt rule (which they had been encouraged to discover), participants
were asked whether they thought that the choice of preposition used depended
on the character’s position on the screen. To assess awareness of the Hidden rule
(the Czech-like rule), on the other hand, participants were not explicitly asked
if they thought that the nature of the place depicted in the picture determined
preposition use. Instead, they were simply asked if they had spotted any other
rules besides the Overt one. This was done in order to avoid confirmation bias
on the subjects’ part, and also based on findings from the pilot study. We found
that providing a description of the rule, even in the form of a question, could in
fact cause participants to become aware of it – which made it an unreliable tool
for assessing prior awareness during the experiment.
3.2.4 Results
3.2.4.1 Recall task scoring
Each trial in the recall task was marked as either correct or incorrect depending
on whether participants successfully reproduced the correct preposition during
sentence recall; failure to produce the correct character name or place name
was not marked as error. Occasionally, subjects would produce non-target-like
versions of the phonological forms of the prepositions (e.g. “gwa” for wa, “bro” for
ro, “glee” for gi). As a general rule, if a non-target-like form was unambiguously
derived from a target form (usually by consonant/glide epenthesis on the syllable
onset), and was used consistently in place of the target form, it was scored as the
target form. On the other hand, non-target-like forms that consisted of a mix
of different target forms (e.g. “nee” or “gwe”), and/or were used inconsistently
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alongside the target forms, were rejected. When scoring the task, we extracted
two measures of accuracy: Overt rule and Hidden rule accuracy. Overt rule
accuracy was the proportion of all recall trials in which participants correctly
used the Overt rule, that is, when out of four possible prepositions, they used
one of the two which were appropriate for that condition (System or Hidden,
as cued by the character’s position on screen relative to the place picture). To
calculate Hidden rule accuracy, we only retained trials in which participants had
used the Overt rule correctly, and calculated the proportion of those trials for
which participants correctly recalled the exact preposition used in the item during
training. Since the choice was between two possible preposition, chance level for
Hidden rule accuracy was 50%.
3.2.4.2 Rule awareness
Participants’ awareness of the Overt and Hidden rules was assessed using the
debriefing questionnaire (Appendix A). Awareness of the Overt rule was assessed
by Question 1 (“Did you think the use of words ro, wa, ne and gi was governed by
any rules?”) and Question 2 (“Did you think it depended on whether the char-
acter was inside or outside/near the place pictured?”). If participants answered
“Yes” to Question 2, they were classed as having discovered the Overt rule and
were included in the analysis.
Awareness of the Hidden rule was assessed by Question 1, Question 3 (“Did
you think there were any other rules? [...] If you answered ‘Yes’, please describe
the rules”) and Question 6 (“Could you give a rough translation of the words ro,
gi, wa and ne?”). Both questions served the same purpose, but Participants were
classed as Aware if their answer to either Question 3 or 6 made reference to the
rule. In Question 3, they would need to answer “Yes” and describe the rule by
mentioning the relevant distinction, e.g. “open” vs. “enclosed” spaces, “indoor”
vs. “outdoor” spaces, or “inside” vs. “outside”, or in any other recognizable
way, even indirectly. For instance, the following answer would class a participant
as Aware: ”I thought that wa was used for places which you could be inside,
i.e. rooms, caves, whereas gi was used for places which you could be at but not
inside, e.g. dock, savannah”. Participants were counted as Aware regardless of
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whether they gave assignments for specific prepositions in Question 3 (e.g. “I
thought ro was used for outdoor spaces” as opposed to ”It depended on whether
the space was indoor or outdoor”). In marking Question 6, we followed similar
criteria: participants would need to provide translations which referenced the
Hidden rule distinction, in any of the ways just described. Many participants
incorrectly extended the Hidden rule to the Random pair of prepositions (e.g.
“gi = inside building/room, ne = at or on terrace / external place, ro = far
away from enclosed space, wa = far away from open space”); they were classed
as Aware regardless of whether they did so, as long as they detected the presence
of the Hidden rule.
3.2.4.3 Analysis
Participants who failed to discover the Overt rule (n = 6) were not included in
the analysis; a further 2 participants were excluded due to low accuracy (<80%)
in the RT task. In total, 21 subjects were included in the analysis (13 females,
mean age 23 years, SD = 4.33); of these, 12 remained unaware of the Hidden
rule, as assessed by debriefing questionnaire. Based on Hidden rule awareness,
participants were divided into two groups: Unaware (n = 12) and Aware (n = 9).
Using mixed-effect modelling allowed us to look at trial-level data and account
for variation between subjects and items within the same model, eliminating the
need for by-subject and by-item analysis. Additionally, mixed-effect modelling is
robust to missing data (Baayen et al., 2008). This feature was particularly useful
when analysing Hidden Rule accuracy data, which was derived from a subset of
the data based on Overt Rule accuracy (meaning that it would probably not be
balanced, since the the selection criterion was blind to condition treatment).
We analysed the data using mixed-effect modelling, implemented in R using
the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015b). We used a generalized linear mixed-effect
model (GLMER) for binomial data to analyze accuracy scores, and a linear mixed-
effect model (LMER) for RT data. In both cases, following Barr et al. (2013), we
adopted a design-driven, rather data-driven, approach to random structure selec-
tion. As recommended by Bates et al. (2015a) and Matuschek et al. (2017), we
followed a parsimonious approach rather than starting from a maximal random
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structure, including random effects as justified by the experimental design. We
constructed an initial model including the maximal fixed structure and random
intercepts for subjects and items. We then gradually added random slopes as
justified by the design, only keeping them if they significantly improved model
fit. We measured this by using maximum likelihood ratio tests (LRT), as recom-
mended by Bolker et al. (2009), comparing models with and without the random
effect of interest. Continuous fixed effects were scaled and centred to improve
model fitting and interpretability in interactions.
To assess the statistical significance of effects in the logistic mixed-effect model
(GLMER) on accuracy data we used Wald χ2 tests following Bolker et al. (2009),
who warns against using LRT for comparing fixed effects in GLMERs as they are
unreliable for small to moderate sample sizes, and recommends Wald χ2 tests in-
stead (or Wald Z tests if the model is overdispersed). We implemented the Wald
χ2 tests using the Anova() function of package car (Fox and Weisberg, 2011). To
assess statistical significance for the linear mixed-effect models (LMER), we com-
puted F statistics using the anova() function of package lmerTest (Kuznetsova
et al., 2017), which calculates degrees of freedom using the Satterthwaite approx-
imation. We chose this method over gradual model simplification by LRT, as it
has been shown to be better than LRT at containing Type I error for LMERs
(Luke, 2017).
3.2.4.4 Recall task
Overt rule accuracy was relatively high for both groups, but more so for the
Aware group (Aware: System 94%, Random 92%; Unaware: System 86%, Ran-
dom 79%)(Fig. 3.5). We measured Hidden rule accuracy by only retaining trials
in which subjects had got the Overt rule correctly – since the Hidden rule was a
sub-rule of the Overt rule, it could only be applied if the latter had been correctly
applied. Hidden rule accuracy (Fig. 3.6) was comparatively lower (Aware: Sys-
tem 91%, Random: 72%; Unaware: System 72%, Random 74%). To analyse the
data, we built a GLMER with a random structure which included random inter-
cepts for subjects only (since adding random intercepts for items caused singular
fit due to insufficient variance in the Item effect) and correlated random slopes for
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Figure 3.5: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition.
subjects by Condition. We then ran the model using this random structure and
a fixed structure including Group, Condition and Block as main effects together
will all their possible interactions (Table 3.1). We found significant main effects
for Condition (χ2(1) = 6.768, p = .009) and Block (χ2(1) = 4.256, p = .039) as
well as a strong interaction between Group and Condition (χ2(1) = 11.408, p =
.001), together with a marginally significant 3-way interaction between Group,
Condition and Block (χ2(1) = 3.889, p = .049).
We carried out post-hoc comparisons of means using the Bonferroni correction,
focusing on the Group x Condition interaction first. Post-hoc tests showed that
there was an effect of Condition for the Aware group only (χ2(1) = 21.296, p
< .001), while there was no difference for the Unaware group (χ2(1) = 0.123, p
= 1); the main effect of Condition seems to be driven by the size of the effect
for the Aware group alone (Fig. 3.6). The effect was modulated by Block: a
post-hoc comparison of the Group x Condition x Block interaction showed that
the slope coefficient for Block was significantly greater for System compared to
Random items in the Aware group (System: β = 0.765, Random: β = 0.092, p =
.014), while no difference was observed for the Unaware group. This is compatible
with visual inspection of the data (Fig. 3.7), which shows a gradual increase fof
67
Chapter 3 Experiment 1
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Aware Unaware
Group
Ac
cu
ra
cy Condition
System
Random
Hidden rule accuracy
Recall task
Figure 3.6: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition. Error bars
represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 3.7: Hidden rule accuracy by block with fitted linear trends.
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Hidden rule accuracy, Recall task
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Group -2.305 0.731 0.544 1 0.461
Condition -2.588 0.563 6.768 1 0.009 **
Block 0.765 0.221 4.256 1 0.039 *
Group x Condition 2.452 0.677 11.408 1 0.001 ***
Group x Block -0.652 0.248 3.257 1 0.071
Condition x Block -0.673 0.249 3.773 1 0.052
Group x Condition x Block 0.579 0.294 3.889 1 0.049 *
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 3.1: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy.
the difference between Random and System items for the Aware group over the
course of the task.
3.2.4.5 Listening task
Raw reaction times for first-attempt correct responses were recorded, and outliers
at more than +/-2.5 standard deviations from the mean (amounting to 4% of total
data) were removed. Average reaction times by Group and Condition across the
task are shown in Fig. 3.8. To analyse reaction time data, we ran separate
LMERs for the thee phases of the RT task (Training items, Generalisation items
and Violation items).
Training items We selected a random structure with random intercepts for
Subjects and Items and a correlated random slopes for Trial and Subjects and
for Trial and Items; more complex models failed to converge. In the resulting
model, we found a significant main effect of Trial (F (1,39.2) = 15.029, p < .001)
and significant interactions for Group x Condition (F (1,1657.7) = 5.332, p =
.021) and Condition x Trial (F (1, 554.2) = 16.491, p < .001 ), as well as a
Group x Condition x Trial interaction (F (1,1679.2) = 7.101, p = .008) (Table
3.2). Plotting the residuals (the difference between actual data points and the
values predicted by the model) shows that they are homoskedastic and normally
distributed (Fig. 3.10) indicating that the model’s linear fit is appropriate for the
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Figure 3.8: Response times with averages by Group and Condition.
data.
We carried out post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction to ex-
plore the interactions found in the model. The effect of Trial was significant for
System items only, and it remained significant at the group level for both Aware
(χ2(1) = 24.530, p < .00001) and Unaware subjects (χ2(1) = 16.633, p < .0001),
reflecting a gradual speed-up of responses to System items in both groups. How-
ever, the difference between Conditions was only significant for the Aware group
(χ2(1) = 5.470, p = .039), and it was significantly affected by Trial (χ2(1) =
21.117, p < .0001). This reflects the gradual increase in RT difference between
Random and System items, which was greater for Aware subjects than for the
Unaware (Fig. 3.9).
Generalisation items For Generalisation items, we used a simpler random
structure which only included random intercepts for Items and Subjects; more
complex models failed to converge, possibly due to the fact that we had fewer
data points for generalisation trials compared to Training trials. In the result-
ing model (Table 3.3), the only statistically significant effect was a Condition
x Trial interaction (F (1,104.2) = 10.012, p = .002). The plotted residuals are
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Training items, Listening task
Coefficient SE df F p
Group 0.012 0.023 20.892 0.009 0.924
Condition 0.025 0.010 317.356 1.864 0.173
Trial -0.054 0.011 39.137 15.029 0.000 ***
Group x Condition -0.029 0.013 1657.669 5.332 0.021 *
Group x Trial 0.013 0.011 20.328 0.168 0.686
Condition x Trial 0.050 0.011 554.166 16.491 0.000 ***
Group x Condition x Trial -0.034 0.013 1679.176 7.101 0.008 **
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 3.2: Summary of LMER model for Training items.
Generalisation items, Listening task
Coefficient SE df F p
Group -0.004 0.043 20.657 0.001 0.971
Condition 0.005 0.023 247.655 0.271 0.603
Trial 0.054 0.017 73.327 2.909 0.092
Group x Condition 0.006 0.032 254.528 0.033 0.856
Group x Trial -0.029 0.022 262.897 0.712 0.400
Condition x Trial -0.067 0.024 104.159 10.012 0.002 **
Group x Condition x Trial 0.032 0.032 264.320 0.993 0.320
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 3.3: Summary of LMER model for Generalisation items.
homoskedastic and normally distributed (Fig. 3.11) indicating that the model’s
linear fit is appropriate for the data.
Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction to explore the Condition
x Trial interaction showed that the effect of Trial was only significant for System
items, and then only for the Aware group (χ2(1) = 10.509, p = .005; Unaware:
χ2(1) = 2.878, p = .36). Accross both groups, the slope coefficient estimate for
Trial was positive for System items (β = 0.04) but negative for Random items (β
= -0.012) which reflects a slowdown in RT for System items during the generali-
sation phase which affected both groups, even though it is more pronounced for
the Aware group (Fig. 3.9).
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Figure 3.9: Response times by Item Type, Group and Condition with fitted
linear trends.
Violation items We used only included random intercepts for subjects in the
random structure, as more complex models failed to converge. In the resulting
model (Table 3.4), we found a main effect of Trial (F (1,270.1) = 16.191, p < .001)
with a positive coefficient estimate (β = 0.019) which reflects a general increase
in RTs during this phase of the test (Fig. 3.9). The residuals are homoskedastic
and normally distributed (Fig. 3.12) indicating that the model’s linear fit is
appropriate for the data.
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Figure 3.10: Plotted residuals for Training items LMER.
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Figure 3.11: Plotted residuals for generalisation items LMER.
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Figure 3.12: Plotted residuals for Violation items LMER.
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Violation items, Listening task
Coefficient SE df F p
Group -0.025 0.044 21.104 0.675 0.420
Condition 0.000 0.023 269.702 0.343 0.559
Trial 0.019 0.017 270.125 16.191 0.000 ***
Group x Condition -0.018 0.029 269.702 0.355 0.552
Group x Trial 0.031 0.021 270.125 1.600 0.207
Condition x Trial 0.003 0.023 270.223 0.335 0.563
Group x Condition x Trial -0.024 0.030 270.223 0.632 0.427
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 3.4: Summary of LMER model for Violation items.
3.2.5 Discussion
3.2.5.1 Development of productive skills
If participants had acquired implicit productive knowledge of the Hidden rule, we
expected to see higher recall accuracy rates for System items relative to Random
items in the Recall task, regardless of rule awareness. Our predictions were not
confirmed: we did observe an effect of Condition on Hidden rule recall, but only
for the Aware group; there was no difference in accuracy between conditions for
the Unaware. Given that we did not find a significant effect in production among
the Unaware, we assume that Aware participants’ performance in the test was
driven by explicit knowledge.
With regards to the Unaware group, we see two possible explanations for the
lack of a visible learning effect among these subjects: either the Unaware group
did not acquire any knowledge of the Hidden rule (whether explicit or implicit), or
the task used was not sensitive enough to detect implicit knowledge. In the latter
case, it may possible that Unaware participants had developed implicit knowledge
of the rule, but that it was not detected by the task. The assumption of the
Elicited Oral imitation task, on which our testing paradigm was based, is that
where a large amount of linguistic material needs to be stored and recalled from
memory, knowledge of the language rules will supplement short-term phonological
memory capacity, allowing participants to remember longer stretches of material
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and even unconsciously correct mistakes in the original input (Erlam, 2006; 2009).
Therefore, if the testing task was not demanding enough in this respect, it is
possible that even if Unaware participants did have some representation of the
rule, they had no need to rely on it, in a situation were item memory was still
strong. Hidden rule accuracy for Random items (which could only be correctly
reproduced by relying on item memory) was about 75% for both groups, against
a chance level of 50%, suggesting that they could still rely on item memory
to a large extent. To address this point, the next experiment will include a use
recall task and introduce novel (generalisation) items, in order to create situations
where subjects have minimal or non-existent item memory. This will allow us to
determine whether the failure of the current task to detect any knowledge among
the Unaware group should be attributed to a lack of rule knowledge or to low
task sensitivity.
For the Aware group, we also observed an interaction of Block with Condi-
tion: the difference in accuracy between Random and System items increased as
the task went on. It could be, then, that the Recall task was not simply testing
knowledge developed during the Training phase, but was providing further oppor-
tunities for learning. However, while it is true that the effect increases over time
for Aware participants, a separation between conditions is already visible at the
start of the task, and increases very rapidly (Fig. 3.7). There is more than one
possible interpretation for this pattern: it could be reflecting emerging awareness
of the rule, or further development of implicit rule knowledge from training. To
address this point, in the next experiments we will retain and analyse data from
the Training phase, too, in order to gain a fuller picture of the learning process
undergone by participants.
3.2.5.2 Development of comprehension skills
In the first phase of the Listening task (Training items), we expected participants
to respond faster to System items than to Random ones, if they had acquired
any knowledge of the Hidden rule, because it would have allowed them to an-
ticipate the target picture before hearing the final noun. What we observed was
a significant speed-up for System items in both groups over the course of the
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task, but the difference between System and Random was only significant for the
Aware; the Unaware group showed greater decrease in response time for Random
items, too (Fig. 3.8). The interaction of Condition with trial in the Aware group
suggests any receptive sensitivity to the rule was developed as a consequence of
the task itself, rather than being carried over from the previous tasks. Indeed,
visual inspection of the data shows that, at the beginning of the listening task
(Fig. 3.8), both groups were slower when responding to System items than to
Random ones; only later does the pattern get reversed. If the listening task was
tapping into pre-existing knowledge, we would have expected the difference in
RT to appear from the beginning. Rather than being a test of implicit knowledge
developed during the previous tasks, then, the listening task may have served as
a learning opportunity in its own right, developing a different type of domain-
specific knowledge. This is compatible with the findings of previous IL studies
which used time listening tasks as both training and testing (Leung and Williams,
2006, 2011).
The fact that comprehension skills appear to emerge (in the Aware group)
over the course of the listening task supports a skill-specific account (DeKeyser
and Sokalski, 1996). It would appear that comprehension practice was required
in order to develop receptive skills, and that participants could not initially make
use of the knowledge they relied on during the production task. However, while
the same trend was observed for the Unaware, the difference between conditions
was only significant for Aware participants, suggesting a possible connection with
the outcomes of the production task. It could be a causal connection - aware-
ness or greater accuracy of the Hidden rule during the production task may have
favoured performance in the Listening task. This, too, would be compatible with
DeKeyser’s account of transfer between modalities (DeKeyser and Sokalski, 1996):
it is possible that the declarative knowledge acquired by Aware participants in
the first phase of the experiment served as basis for proceduralization during the
listening task. It would appear that Aware participants could rely on some ex-
plicit knowledge derived from the previous task, but that skill-specific practice
was needed for it to develop into receptive sensitivity. However, there could also
be extraneous cognitive factors affecting Aware and Unaware participants differ-
ently, underlying both performance in production, the development of conscious
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knowledge and the development of comprehension skills in the listening task.
With regards to Generalisation items, we expected to see the same pattern
we had predicted for Training items: a sustained difference between conditions,
with faster response times to System items relative to Random ones. Instead,
we observed a slowdown for System items relative to Random ones; this was
significant for Aware participants only (Fig. 3.8 & 3.9). Visual inspection of the
data suggests this is due to a loss of the advantage gained by System items over
the course of the previous phase of the task, as RTs to System items go back
down to the level of Random items, for both groups (Fig. 3.8); the slowdown
is not significant for the Unaware participants, however, because the difference
between conditions was not significant for them in the first instance.
A possible explanation explanation for this finding may be picture familiarity.
System items in this phase of the task were still grammatical; the only thing
that distinguished them from Training items was that participants were hearing
them for the first time, as they were not included in the Training phase. They
were novel picture + preposition combinations, using pictures that had already
appeared once in training (assigned to the opposite condition). By contrast,
the pictures used in matched training items appeared twice during training, so
would have been more familiar. The slowdown in response to generalisation
items may therefore be due to a lack of familiarity: either to the specific picture
+ preposition combinations (which were novel), or to the pictures themselves,
which had only appeared once in training, instead of twice. However, in that case
we would expect to see a similar slowdown to for Random items, too, since they
were equally unfamiliar. Instead, response times for the two conditions seemed
to converge in this phase of the task, which would suggest a lack of ability to
generalise the rule even for the Aware participants. This is puzzling if we assume
that the speedup for System items in the previous phase (Training items) was
a result of the task itself: if participants were gaining a new, modality-specific
skill, then there ought to be no difference between Training and Generalisation
items, since they were all equally ‘new’ in the context of the Listening task (being
presented in this modality for the first time). On the other hand, the fact that
the System items are processed differently from Random items suggest that there
is something about the rule which participants are sensitive to. A familiarity-
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based account is compatible with the hypothesis that the speedup for Training
items in the System condition was due to ease of recognition (cognitive fluency),
rather than predictive processing. The fact that the effect was found for Training
items but not Generalisation items also suggests that it may have been a low-level
effect rather than abstract generalisation: perhaps the presence of the rule simply
eased recognition of System items that had already been encountered during
training, rather than allowing Aware subjects to predict upcoming content. This
is compatible with research showing that the ability to make predictions based on
morphosyntactic information is generally impaired in L2 speakers. While there
is evidence that L1 speakers anticipate the content of upcoming stimuli based on
syntactic (Tanenhaus et al., 1995) and morphophonological cues (DeLong et al.,
2005), this does not seem to be the case with L2 learners (Martin et al., 2013). A
visual world paradigm study of adult learners of Spanish as L2 found that they
would not use forward-looking morphological cues (determiner gender) to rapidly
direct their gaze to a fitting noun, unlike native Spanish speakers (Lew-Williams
and Fernald, 2010). In a study on the implicit learning of a direct object marking
construction sensitive to animacy, Andringa and Curcic (2015) found that even
subjects who were given explicit instruction at the start of training (and who
performed well in a grammaticality judgement task) were no faster at picking the
correct picture when animacy could be predicted based on the DOM construction,
and did not show any preferential gazing either.
Finally, our prediction for Violation items was to observe the opposite pat-
tern to Training and Generalisation items: we expected a slowdown in responses
to (now ungrammatical) System items relative to Random ones. Instead, we
observed an overall slowdown, with no differences between groups or condition.
Given that the violation trials were at the very end of the task, this could simply
be an effect of fatigue. However, it could also be that experiencing unexpected
outcomes for System items generated a surprisal effect which then affected Ran-
dom items, too, by causing participants to become more hesitant in their re-
sponses. Based on the available data, however, it is not possible to conclusively
attribute the slowdown to either of these suggested reasons.
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3.3 Conclusion
In this first experiment, we did not find evidence of implicit rule learning which
could translate into production skills. Only those who were aware of the Hidden
rule exhibited higher recall accuracy for System items, suggesting that they were
relying on their explicit knowledge of the rule when performing the task. The lack
of evidence of implicit rule knowledge may be due the task not being sensitive
enough, or to the fact that groups did not in fact develop implicit knowledge.
Accordingly, with regards to comprehension skills, we did not find evidence of
implicit knowledge being transferred from the production to the comprehension
task for either group: some sensitivity to the rule appeared to emerge during the
course of the task, but only for aware participants, which suggests it may have
benefitted from existing declarative rule knowledge. In the next experiment, we
will address these issues by modifying both production and comprehension task,
in order to make them more sensitive to implicit knowledge.
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Experiment 2: Developing
productive generalisation
4.1 Introduction
The findings of Experiment 1 suggest that only Aware participants had developed
sensitivity to the Hidden rule, as evidenced by a recall advantage for System items,
which was probably driven by their explicit knowledge of the rule. The lack of a
significant effect for the Unaware group would seem to indicate that participants
did not develop implicit knowledge of the rule by doing the production task.
However, we have suggested that this could also be due to the fact that the task
was not sensitive enough to detect implicit knowledge. To address this possibility,
we ran two further experiments, in which we modified the testing phase in order
to make it more sensitive to implicit knowledge. This was achieved by employing
a harder recall task and introducing cued production of novel (generalisation)
items, as explained in Section 4.2.1. We also made a number of changes to the
training methodology: based on the results of Experiment 1, we modified the
training paradigm to reduce the opportunity for explicit learning; the modified
paradigm is described in Section 4.2.2. Finally, given the inconclusive results
of the comprehension task from Experiment 1, we decided to use a different
measure of receptive knowledge, employing a recognition memory task instead of
the reaction time task used previously (Section 4.2.3). This chapter and the next
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report the findings of two further experiments we conducted, using two variations
of the modified training paradigm from Experiment 1. Experiment 2, reported
in this chapter (Section 4.3) introduces long-term recall of training items and
generalisation items, as well as a new comprehension task. Experiment 3 (Chapter
5) employs a modified version of the training paradigm used in Experiment 2,
designed to increase engagement with the stimuli and improve acquisition of both
Overt and Hidden rules.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Introducing productive generalisation
In Experiment 1, we found a significant effect of condition on recall accuracy for
the Aware group, but not for the Unaware group. While this may indicate that
participants had developed no implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule, it could also
be the case that the task was not sensitive enough. It is possible that, if both item
memory and implicit rule knowledge are available as sources of information, item
memory may be preferentially used, masking any potential evidence of implicit
knowledge. The testing phase in Experiment 1 required participants to recall 8
items at a time; accuracy for Random items was roughly 75% for both groups, far
above the 50% chance level, which indicates that item memory was still strong. In
order to explore this possibility, we introduced a long-term recall task, designed to
minimise the effect of item memory. We also decided to include a generalisation
component, which will require participants to generate new sentences according
to the Hidden rule, while remaining under the impression that they are doing
a recall task. By adding generalisation items, we can examine what happens
when no item memory trace is present, which may compete with rule use. If
unaware participants have acquired any knowledge of the rule, we would expect
it to emerge in these circumstances.
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4.2.2 Changes to the training procedure
In Experiment 1, as well as in further pilot studies, we observed that the pro-
portion of participants becoming aware of the Hidden rule was relatively high
(9 out of 21), compared to similar studies (e.g. Williams, 2005). Given that the
focus of the study was on the development of implicit knowledge, which requires a
sufficient sample of unaware participants to be studied, we decided to modify the
training procedure used in Experiment 1 to discourage rule discovery, by reducing
the number of items recalled in each trial from four to two. We hypothesised that
having four items per trial facilitated hypothesis testing by allowing participants
to directly compare all four prepositions and their usage; reducing the number
of items to two per trial ensured that participants would never be exposed to
the full system in any given trial. To maintain a high memory load and com-
pensate for the reduction in items per trial, we used different means in each of
the subsequent experiments: in Experiment 2, we replaced a subset of the place
nouns with pseudowords; in Experiment 3, we inserted questions after each item,
which probed Overt rule knowledge and drew subjects’ attention to the physical
properties of the place pictured. Detailed descriptions of the training procedures
used in Experiments 2 and 3 can be found in Sections 4.3.3 and 5.2.3.
4.2.3 Measuring receptive knowledge
The results of the listening task used in Experiment 1 did not show conclusive
evidence of knowledge transfer from production to comprehension. The Aware
group, which was the only group to show a significant learning effect in the pro-
duction task, showed a difference in response times between conditions for trained
items; however, the difference emerged over time, suggesting that it may have de-
veloped as a result of the task itself. This would be compatible with a skill
acquisition approach (DeKeyser, 1997; DeKeyser and Sokalski, 1996) in which
production and comprehension skills need separate, modality-specific practice in
order to develop. Furthermore, the effect did not persist in generalisation trials,
which raises the possibility that the difference in response times observed during
the first phase of the listening task may have been due to ease of recognition,
rather than rule acquisition. Finally, as noted in Section 3.2.5, it is also possible
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that the task we used was not sensitive enough to pick up newly acquired im-
plicit knowledge, since it relied on predictive mechanisms which are often lacking
in early L2 learners. It is possible that, if participants had developed implicit
abstract knowledge of the rule, the task would not have been able to detect it.
Therefore, in the next experiments we decided to use a different measure of com-
prehension: we abandoned the listening task and adopted a recognition memory
task instead, as previously done by similar studies on implicit and incidental
learning of new linguistic forms (Paciorek and Williams, 2015; Tamminen et al.,
2015).
4.3 Experiment 2
The aim of this experiment was to test whether participants would be able to
generalise the Hidden rule to new items, in order to establish whether they had
acquired productive knowledge of the rule. It also aimed to provide a more
sensitive measure of implicit knowledge, by creating conditions for the knowledge
to emerge without strong competition from item memory, by adding long-term
recall of training items as well as generalisation items. We also used a different
measure of comprehension, a recognition memory task, in order to address some of
the issues that emerged in the previous experiment with regards to comprehension
testing. As in Experiment 1, the aim of including the comprehension task was
to test whether the knowledge acquired through the recall paradigm would be
available to comprehension as well as production processing. In the production
task, if participants had acquired implicit knowledge of the rule, we would expect
there to be a recall advantage for System items in the long-term recall task. We
would also expect participants to perform at above chance level when producing
new items in the System condition during generalisation testing, which required
productive application of the Hidden rule. In the recognition memory task, too,
we would expect endorsement rates to vary as a function of condition, with a bias
towards endorsing rule-based items over random ones, and grammatical ones over
ungrammatical ones.
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4.3.1 Participants
42 native English speakers (29 females, mean age 20.5 years) from the University
of Cambridge and surrounding community took part in the experiment, receiving
£6 as compensation. Of those who took part, two reported some knowledge of a
Slavonic language (Russian). Other foreign languages spoken by participants were
French (n = 13), German (n = 10), Spanish (n = 6), Italian (n = 4), Mandarin
Chinese (n = 1), Irish (n = 1), Greek (n = 1), Hindi (n = 1), Urdu (n = 1) and
Arabic (n = 1).
4.3.2 Materials
We used the same items as Experiment 1 , with the addition of a new set of items
to be used in generalisation. Using the same procedure outlined in Experiment
1, we selected a further 16 place nouns from a list of the most frequent nouns
used with do and na prepositions in Czech, which added to the 64 already used
in Experiment 1, for a total of 80 unique nouns. Pictures depicting the nouns
were obtained using the same procedure as Experiment 1.
4.3.3 Procedure
The general structure of the experiment was similar to that used in Experiment
1, with a training phase followed by production and comprehension testing. How-
ever, there were important differences in every task, most notably changes to the
training procedure (Fig. 4.1), the introduction of long-term recall and generali-
sation items in the Production task (Fig. 4.2) and a new type of comprehension
task (Recognition memory task).
4.3.3.1 Training phase
During the training phase, participants were exposed to 112 sentences: of these,
64 were the same matched items used in Experiment 1 (32 unique nouns appear-
ing once in each condition), the remaining 48 were unmatched items, 48 unique
nouns appearing only in one condition during training (counterbalanced across
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participants). The training phase followed the same basic procedure as Experi-
ment 1, with two differences: the number of items per trial, and the introduction
of non-words (Fig. 4.1).
The first difference was the number of items per trial: recall was every two
sentences instead of every four. The previous experiment and piloting for the
current experiment had yielded a high rate of insight; one possible explanation for
that was that each trial could contain instances of all four prepositions, allowing
for direct comparison which could facilitate hypothesis formation and testing. To
account for this, the number of items per trial was reduced to two (ensuring that
they did not contain the same preposition), so that participants would never be
exposed to the full system in any given trial.
The second difference was the introduction of non-words replacing a subset of
place nouns in the training phase. Reducing the number of items per trial meant
that the memory load for each trial was now significantly smaller, and the task
was not demanding enough. In order to both increase memory load and keep
participants engaged in the task, in half of the matched items (32 sentences) the
place noun was replaced by a four-phoneme pseudoword in the audio recording,
which participants had to repeat together with the rest of the sentence (e.g.
“Harry is gi dreet”). The full list of pseudowords used is provided in Appendix
C, p. 201.
4.3.3.2 Testing phase
Unlike Experiment 1, the production task in this experiment did not include any
further exposure to the stimulus sentences. It consisted entirely of recall screens:
participants were simply shown the graphic representation for each sentence (the
character + picture combination) and were asked to produce the correspond-
ing sentence. In this task, items already seen in training were intermixed with
generalisation items; this means that, even though all trials followed the same
procedure, the task was in fact a combination of a long-term recall task and gen-
eralisation task (Fig. 4.2). At this stage, participants were not explicitly told
to repeat the pseudoword matching the place picture, only to recall the sentence
inclusive of preposition.
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Cued recall in random order 
(only picture shown) 
Audiovisual presentation (sentence + picture)
Recall begins
x2
x2
32 place names replaced by pseudowords
Figure 4.1: Training phase procedure for Experiment 2
The testing phase consisted of 88 items in total, which were composed of
64 recall items (the 64 matched items used in training) and 24 generalisation
ones, which were half of the 48 nouns used in unmatched items during training,
presented in the opposite condition (counterbalanced across participants). The
items were presented in 11 blocks of 8 items each (7 blocks with recall items,
3 with generalisation ones), presented in random order, with generalisation and
recall blocks intermixed.
Long-term recall In long-term recall trials, participants were shown the re-
call cues (character + picture combinations) for the 64 matched items already
encountered during training (32 unique pictures, shown once in the System and
once in the Random condition).
Generalisation In generalisation trials, participants were shown 24 novel char-
acter + picture combinations (generalisation items). Generalisation items were
derived from a subset of training items: we selected half of the 48 unmatched
items from the training phase (counterbalancing them across participants) and
presented them in the opposite condition during the production task. The gen-
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+
Recall items
Generalization items
24 familiar pictures in novel combinations
Cued recall
64 Matched items from training phase
88 items
(randomized)
Figure 4.2: Production task procedure for Experiment 2
eralisation items were composed of pictures participants had already seen during
training, but the character would be in a different position, requiring a different
preposition. Participants were not told about the insertion of these novel com-
binations and believed that all picture combinations they saw had already been
presented during training. None of the participants reported becoming aware of
this manipulation at any stage during or after the experiment.
Recognition memory task Given the results of the RT task from Experiment
1, we decided to use a different task to assess for receptive rule knowledge of the
end of the experiment. We opted for a recognition memory task, following Pa-
ciorek (2012). During each trial, participants heard stimulus sentences while the
corresponding place picture was displayed on screen, but without any character
superimposed. They were then prompted to respond by button press whether
they had heard the sentence before over the course of the experiment, on a scale
from 1 (“Definitely no”) to 6 (“Definitely yes”). They were instructed to base
their answer on the sentence, rather than on the picture alone. The task consisted
of 48 sentences, all using pictures participants had already seen during training.
24 of these were the a subset of the 64 matched items used in training (Old items);
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the other 24 were New items, i.e. half of the 48 nouns from unmatched training
items, presented in the opposite condition (the other 24 had already been used as
generalisation items for the generalisation task – this was counterbalanced across
participants). For New items in the System condition, prepositions were assigned
violating the Hidden rule, so as to make the items ungrammatical (Table 4.1);
System Random
Old Grammatical Neutral
New Ungrammatical Neutral
Table 4.1: Summary of item types used in Recognition memory task and their
grammaticality.
4.3.3.3 Debriefing questionnaire
Participants were debriefed using the same questionnaire employed in Experiment
1 (Appendix A) to assess awareness of the Overt and Hidden rules.
4.3.4 Results
4.3.4.1 Task scoring
Scoring for the production task followed the same procedure outlined in Experi-
ment 1 for recall task scoring (Section 3.2.4.1, p. 63).
4.3.4.2 Rule awareness
Awareness of the Overt and Hidden rule was assessed by debriefing questionnaire
(Appendix A), as already done in Experiment 1. With regards to the Hidden
rule, we initially divided participants into Aware and Unaware groups, following
the criteria already used for Experiment 1 (Section 3.2.4.2, p. 64). However, we
noticed that a number of participants did not explicitly mention the distinction
between open and enclosed spaces (or any of the other formulations accepted in
Experiment 1), but when giving translation for the pseudowords in Questions
3 and 6, they used English prepositions“in” and “on” (and near synonyms) as
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translations for the enclosed and open space System prepositions respectively (the
equivalents of Czech v and na). We decided to code these answers separately and
created a third Transfer category, in which we entered participants who mapped
the English “in”/“on” distinction onto the Hidden rule, in addition to Aware and
Unaware.
4.3.4.3 Analysis
We excluded participants who did not become aware of the Overt rule (N = 6).
A further 3 participants were excluded for failing to perform all the tasks in the
experiment. A total of 33 participants were included in the analysis (22 females,
mean age 20 years, SD = 2.09). Based on their awareness of the Hidden rule,
participants were initially divided into Aware (N = 10), Transfer (N = 6), and
Unaware (N = 17). We decided to merge the Transfer group into the Aware
group for analysis purposes, based on the following assessment.
To assess the extent to which transfer of English categories may aid Hidden
rule recall in our task, we investigated the amount of overlap between the two
systems in our items set. We first ran an online norming study to elicit judgments
from native English speakers, to establish which of the two English prepositions
(in or on) participants would be most likely to associate with the place nouns
used in our study. 49 native English speakers, recruited from the University
of Cambridge and surrounding community, took part in the norming study. A
comparison of the two rules revealed a high amount of overlap in our item set:
80% of System items could be correctly produced by transferring the English rule
in vs on distinction onto our Hidden rule (mapping in onto the enclosed space
preposition in our study, and on onto the open space one). Therefore, given the
magnitude of the advantage, we decided to enter participants from the Transfer
group into the Aware group for the purposes of our analysis.
Data from the training phase and production task was analysed with separate
logistic mixed-effect models (GLMERs) following the same procedure as Exper-
iment 1 for model selection and for drawing statistical inferences. Data from
the recognition memory task was analysed using mixed-effects proportional odds
models (also known as cumulative link mixed models, CLMMs) for ordinal re-
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Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy
Training phase
Figure 4.3: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition
during training phase.
gression, as the data was in the form of Likert-scale ratings. We implemented the
CLMMs in R using the package ordinal (Christensen, 2019). We selected the ran-
dom structure as done with other models, gradually adding random effects to the
maximal fixed structure and only retaining them if they significantly improved
model fit. Since there is currently no way to simultaneously assess significance for
the effects included in a CLMM, we used likelihood-ratio testing (LRT) to assess
the statistical significance of individual effects by comparing models with and
without the effect of interest, starting form the maximal structure and gradually
removing effects.
Since the phia package is not capable of making comparisons based on CLMMs,
posthoc comparisons of means for comprehension task data were carried out by
first constructing an Anova table with Group and Condition as factor (and their
interaction if it was found to be significant in the CLMM) and then comput-
ing multiple comparisons of groups means from the Anova using the Bonferroni
correction, with package emmeans.
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Figure 4.4: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition
during long-term recall (Production task).
4.3.4.4 Training phase
Both Overt rule accuracy (Aware: System 97%, Random 96%; Unaware: System
95%, Random 91%) and Hidden rule accuracy (Aware: System 98%, Random
97%; Unaware: System 98%, Random 97%) were very high during the training
phase (Fig. 4.3).
There were no significant differences in Hidden rule accuracy: we fitted a
GLMER with the maximal fixed effects structure (Group, Condition and Block
together with all their interactions), random intercepts for subjects and items,
random slopes for subjects by block and for items by condition; no effects were
found for any of the predictors.
4.3.4.5 Testing phase
Long-term recall Overt rule accuracy, Aware: System 80%, Random 74%;
Unaware: System 79%, Random 76% (Fig. 4.4). Hidden rule accuracy, Aware:
System 77%, Random 51%; Unaware: System 57%, Random 51% (Fig. 4.5). To
analyse Hidden rule accuracy, we fitted a GLMER including Group, Condition,
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Figure 4.5: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition during
Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50%
chance level.
Block and their interactions as fixed effects, and random slopes for subjects and
items (more complex models failed to converge). We found significant effects of
Condition (χ2(1) = 40.018, p < .0001) and Group (χ2(1) = 4.465, p = .035),
as well as an interaction between Group and Condition (χ2(1) = 22.511, p <
.0001)(Table 4.2); there was no effect of Block on accuracy. Post-hoc comparisons
of the Group x Condition interaction using the Bonferroni correction showed that
the effect of Condition was significant for the Aware group (χ2(1) = 59, p < .0001)
but not for the Unaware (χ2(1) = 3, p = .17). Hidden rule recall for Random
items was at chance level for both groups (Aware: 51%, t(20) = 0.8, p = .4;
Unaware: 51%, t(20) = -0.2, p = .8), which suggests that participants had no
item memory. Conversely, accuracy on System items was above chance for Aware
participants (77%, t(20) = 3.7, p = .002) but only marginally so for the Unaware
(57%, t(20) = 2.1, p = .05).
Generalisation Generalisation items were novel System items derived made
from pictures previously seen in training, but in the opposite condition, and they
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Figure 4.6: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group for generalisation items.
Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 4.7: Average Hidden rule accuracy during Generalisation plotted against
average accuracy for System items during Long-term recall task.
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Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term recall
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Group -1.030 0.26 4.465 1 0.035 *
Condition -1.288 0.17 40.018 1 0.000 ***
Block 0.076 0.12 1.221 1 0.269
Group x Condition 1.045 0.22 22.511 1 0.000 ***
Group x Block 0.092 0.16 0.002 1 0.961
Condition x Block -0.031 0.17 1.562 1 0.211
Group x Condition x Block -0.183 0.22 0.701 1 0.402
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 4.2: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term
recall.
were presented intermixed with Recall items during the Production task. Hidden
rule accuracy on Generalisation items was 74% for Aware participants, and 61%
for Unaware (Fig. 4.6). We carried out one-sample t-tests against chance level
(50%) to assess whether participants were above chance in their accuracy. Both
groups were significantly above chance (Aware: t(15) = 3.9, p = .001; Unaware:
t(16) = 2.5, p = .025). Accuracy on generalisation items positively correlated
with average recall accuracy for System items in the Long-term recall task for
both Aware (Pearson’s R = .69, p = .003) and Unaware participants (Pearson’s
R = .61, p = .009) (Fig. 4.7).
Recognition memory task Average ratings for Old items (Fig. 4.8) were
higher for System items than for Random ones (Aware: System 4.6, Random
3.8; Unaware: System 4.6, Random 4.2). We constructed a CLMM with random
intercepts for subjects and items and correlated random slopes for subjects by
condition, entering Group and Condition as fixed factors. Stepwise model simpli-
fication revealed a main effect of Condition (χ2(1) = 9.71, p = .002), which was
significant for both Aware and Unaware in posthoc paired t-tests (Aware: t(15)
= -2.6, p = .019; Unaware: t(21) = -2.3, p = .033).
Average ratings for New items (which included ungrammatical System items)
(Fig. 4.8) followed different trends for Aware and Unaware, with a tendency
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Figure 4.8: Mean ratings in the Recognition memory task by Item type, Group
and Condition.
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Figure 4.9: Mean d-prime scores for Old vs. New items, by Group and Condi-
tion.
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among the Aware to give lower ratings for ungrammatical System items (Aware:
System 3.2, Random 3.6) while the opposite was true for the Unaware group
(Unaware: System 4.0, Random 3.8). We constructed a CLMM with random
intercepts for subjects and items and correlated random slopes for subjects by
condition, entering Group and Condition as fixed factors. There were no signifi-
cant effects of any factors (Fig. 4.8).
To explore the extent to which participants were sensitive to the rule in com-
prehension, we carried out a comparison of Old vs. New items (Fig. 4.9). New
items in the System condition were ungrammatical, while new Random item
could not be, due to the lack of an underlying rule. If participants had developed
sensitivity to the Hidden rule, we expected them to show sensitivity to novelty in
the System condition, where it would have made items ungrammatical, than in
the Random condition. In order to account for response bias (either towards or
against endorsement), we compared response to Old and New items using signal
detection measures (d’ ) (Fig. 5.10). Since we had used a 1-to-6 Likert scale as re-
sponse variable in the recognition memory task, we first derived binary measures
of endorsement by splitting the scale into two halves (responses 1 to 3: “No”, 4
to 6: “Yes”). Following Tamminen et al. (2015), we then obtained d’ scores by
calculating the difference between the z-transformed proportion of correct “Yes”
responses to Old items (hits) and incorrect “Yes” responses to New items (false
alarms) for each subject. We entered the d’ scores into a mixed ANOVA with
Group as between-subject factors and Condition as within-subject factor, which
revealed main effects of Condition (F (1,36) = 5.99, p = .019), and an interaction
between Group and Condition (F (1,36) = 5.85, p = .021). Post-hoc comparisons
using the Bonferroni correction showed that the effect of Condition was only
significant for the Aware group (χ2(1) = 19.6, p = .003).
4.3.4.6 Additional analyses
L1 transfer Our findings suggest that participants had successfully developed
productive knowledge of the Hidden rule, based on the the Czech v/na alterna-
tion. However, as previously pointed out, this distinction is in some ways similar
to one found in English, the in/on alternation. Even though, as remarked in Sec-
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Figure 4.10: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group, Condition and Transfer
status during Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line
marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 4.11: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Transfer status for
Generalisation items. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks
50% chance level.
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tion 3.1.1, the two rules differ in their distribution, we decided to run a norming
study (as described in Section 4.3.4.3) to determine the exact extent to which
L1 transfer from English could drive Hidden rule accuracy. We found that 80%
of the items in our study could, in theory, be produced correctly by transfer-
ring the English in/on distinction. For this reason, participants who reported
“discovering” the English in/on alternation as the rule governing preposition use
in the experiment were included in the Aware group, as previously done in Ex-
periment 1. Given previous studies showing that L1 transfer can be decisive in
determining the implicit acquisition of a novel rule (Leung and Williams, 2014),
it was possible that Unaware participants, too, may have unconsciously relied on
the English rule in the production task. To investigate this possibility, we coded
the items in our study as either Transfer or Non-transfer depending on whether
they could be produced correctly by transferring the in/on distinction, based
on the results of the norming study. We found no significant effect of Transfer
on Hidden rule accuracy in either Long-term recall (χ2(1) = 0.34, p = .56) or
Generalisation items (χ2(1) = 0.60, p = .44). Visual inspection of the averages
(Fig. 4.10 & 4.11) shows that there is a numerical difference for both groups, with
generally higher recall and generalisation accuracy for Transfer items relative to
Non-transfer items. Therefore, it is possible that there may be have been some
facilitation from transfer of the English in/on alternation alongside learning of
the Hidden rule; however, this is not sufficient to explain our findings, suggesting
that participants also developed sensitivity to the open vs. enclosed regularity
encoded by the Hidden rule.
Breakdown of Aware group In our analysis, we included in the Aware group
even participants who could not report the exact rule, but who believed that
the prepositions were encoding the in/on distinction found in English (Section
4.3.4.3). This was taken as a conservative approach, given the high overlap be-
tween our target rule and the English one. The rationale for this choice was that
these participants may benefit from applying explicit knowledge of the English
rule, which, even though it was not the target rule, was close enough to the target
rule to get a significant proportion of items correct. Therefore, including them
in the Unaware group would potentially artificially inflate accuracy rates in the
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Figure 4.12: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Condition for Aware, Transfer
and Unaware subjects during Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the
mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 4.13: Average Hidden generalisation rule accuracy for Aware, Transfer
and Unaware subjects. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks
50% chance level.
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group, masking the extent to which unaware participants had acquired implicit
knowledge of the Hidden rule.
At the same time, however, further by-item analysis revealed that transfer
of the English in/on distinction did not seem to play a significant role in par-
ticipants’ performance. Additionally, it may be argued that participants who
mapped the novel prepositions onto the English rule were not ‘aware’ of our rule
in any traditional sense of the word, and should therefore not be treated as such.
In fact, their questionnaire responses could even indicate that they had strong
implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule, but were not able to verbalise it; there-
fore, they resorted to the closest rule they could verbalise, that is, the English
distinction. To explore these possibilities, we conducted a further analysis break-
ing down participants into three groups: Aware (who could verbalise the Hidden
rule), Transfer (who reported the English rule), and Unaware (who could not
report any rule).
In recall, Transfer participants performed very similarly to the Aware group
(Fig. 4.12). A glmer with Group and Condition revealed an interaction between
Group and Condition (χ2(1) = 22.62, p ¡ .0001). In the Random condition, all
groups were at chance level. In the System condition, there was a significant
difference between Aware and Unaware (χ2(1) = 11.28, p = .005) and between
Transfer and Unaware (χ2(1) = 9.51, p = .012), but not between Aware and
Transfer. In generalisation, we found no significant effect of Group in a glmer
with Group as fixed effect, and random intercepts for subjects and items. (χ2(1)
= 3.72, p = .16). However, visual inspection shows that the Transfer group was
closer to the Aware group than to the Unaware groups in terms of accuracy, and
had the highest accuracy overall numerically (Fig. 4.13)
We then looked again at the effect of item Transfer status, this time entering
the three groups (Aware, Transfer and Unaware) as levels for Group, in order to
assess whether the Transfer group would benefit more from Transfer items relative
to the other groups. In long-term recall, there was no significant effect of Transfer
status (χ2(1) = .33, p = .57): all groups performed similarly regardless of item
Transfer status (Fig. 4.14). In generalisation, we found no statistically significant
effect of Transfer status, either (χ2(1) = 3.20, p = .20). Visual inspection of the
data (Fig. 4.15) shows opposite trends for the Aware group, who performed better
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Figure 4.14: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Condition and Transfer status
during Long-term recall for Aware, Transfer and Unaware subjects. Error bars
represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
on Transfer items, and for the Transfer group, who, somewhat counterintuitively,
tended to perform better on non-Transfer items. Numerically, the Transfer group
performed best overall (however, it should also be emphasised that the data
sample for this analysis was quite small, given the small amount of generalisation
items relative to recall ones, combined with the fact that only 20% of items where
classed as Transfer, so there could be spurious variation).
4.3.5 Discussion
4.3.5.1 Development of productive knowledge
In this experiment, as in the previous one, we predicted that if participants had
acquired knowledge of the Hidden rule, they should be more accurate when re-
calling System items relative to Random ones. Indeed, we found a significant
advantage for the System condition in Hidden rule recall; however, at the group
level this was only significant for Aware participants, even though the Unaware
showed a trend in the same direction. We also introduced generalisation items
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Figure 4.15: Average Hidden rule generalisation accuracy by Transfer status
for Aware, Transfer and Unaware subjects. Error bars represent SE of the mean,
dotted line marks 50% chance level.
- familiar pictures used to form novel picture-character combinations in the Sys-
tem condition, as a way to probe for implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule, which
may be otherwise masked by reliance on item memory. Analysing performance
on these items, we found evidence of productive generalisation of the Hidden rule
for both groups: both the Aware (accuracy: 74%) and Unaware group (accu-
racy: 61%) were significantly above chance in their Hidden rule accuracy when
producing novel System items. For the Unaware, average accuracy on Gener-
alisation items was higher than that for System items in the recall task (57%
in Recall, 61% in Generalisation. Even though the difference between the two
averages is not statistically significant, it is compatible with the hypothesis that
item memory may create “noise” which impairs the use of implicit rule knowl-
edge, meaning generalisation items created more favourable conditions for the
expression of implicit knowledge. Nevertheless, recall accuracy for System items
significantly correlated with generalisation accuracy for the Unaware group as
well as the Aware, suggesting that it too was driven by sensitivity to the Hid-
den rule. Finally, performance on Random items was at chance for both groups,
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suggesting that participants had little or no memory for specific items.
We also looked at the effect of L1 transfer on performance in the production
task. Overall, transfer of L1 categories had no significant impact on accuracy, even
though it may have caused some facilitation. When we divided the Aware groups
into Aware and Transfer subgroups based on the rule they had reported (the exact
Hidden rule, or the English in/on distinction), we found that the Transfer group
performed very similarly to the Aware group, and significantly better than the
Unaware group in recall. In generalisation, they numerically outperformed the
Aware group, even though the effect was not statistically significant. However,
their performance was not significantly affected by item Transfer status, either -
in fact, in generalisation there was a trend towards better performance for non-
transfer items, and they appeared to perform better even than the Aware group.
It is therefore possible that the Transfer subgroup had developed strong implicit
knowledge of the Hidden rule, but that they were unable to verbalise it in the
questionnaire and as a result produced the closest alternation of which they had
explicit knowledge, namely the English in/on rule.
4.3.5.2 Development of comprehension skills
In the recognition memory task, we exposed participants to two kinds of items:
Old items (previously seen in training), and New items, which were composed of
familiar pictures in novel combinations. New items in the System condition were
designed to be ungrammatical (using the wrong System preposition for the type
of place), so as to assess the effect of rule violation on recognition.
When asked whether they recognised items previously encountered in the
Training phase, both groups were significantly more likely to endorse System
items compared to Random ones, which suggests they had developed sensitiv-
ity to the Hidden rule. However, the endorsement bias for System items may
also be the consequence of a general preference or sense of cognitive fluency for
these items - for instance, the fact that the character and the picture are closer
together may make the items easier to perceive and encode (this and other possi-
ble reasons for System advantage across experiments will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 8). In order to probe the possible development of receptive
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rule knowledge, the recognition memory task also included new ungrammatical
System items, which we compared to new Random items. If participants were
sensitive to the Hidden rule, we predicted that they should be more likely to
reject the new System items, which violated the rule, compared to new Random
items. While we saw a trend in this direction for the Aware group, however, it
was not significant. Sensitivity to Hidden rule violation, however, emerged when
using a more sensitive measure d’, which accounted for the bias towards endorsing
System items by comparing items within conditions.
In the Unaware group, we saw a tendency to endorse System items over Ran-
dom items even when ungrammatical. The direct comparison of System to Ran-
dom items suggests that there may be a general preference for System items,
which drives endorsement patterns for old items and even partially counteracts
the effect of explicit knowledge in the Aware in endorsing violation items. It could
be the case that, due to the more compact visual representation, System items
are easier to encode or simply have higher “cognitive fluency” than Random ones.
In an AGL study, Kinder et al. (2003) found that the visual fluency of stimuli
during training (manipulated by masking them with visual noise) affected how
likely participants were to judge them as grammatical in a subsequent judgement
task. However, in the case of the Unaware group we found no difference between
conditions even when comparing d’ scores for Seen vs. New items, which suggests
that they had no sensitivity to Hidden rule violation. Overall, we found no ev-
idence of implicit knowledge transfer from the production to the comprehension
task. We see higher endorsement rates for old System items compared to Ran-
dom ones, but no evidence of sensitivity to violation in the Unaware. However,
it is possible that implicit knowledge may have emerged if participants had been
tested on new grammatical System items, instead of just ungrammatical ones:
to address this issue, the recognition memory task in the next experiment will
include separate violation and generalisation items, in order to better assess the
extent of any receptive implicit knowledge participants may have developed.
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Experiment 3: Modified training
paradigm
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we report the findings of a new experiment (Experiment 3), in
which we adopted a different method for generating memory load, relative to Ex-
periment 2. We no longer used pseudowords to replace of place nouns: apart from
the novel prepositions, all the words participants heard were in English. Instead,
we inserted questions after each item presentation (Figure 5.1, as described in
Section 5.2.3.1). The goal of this manipulation was to increase the effectiveness
of the training paradigm, in two ways. The first question was aimed at drawing
participants’ attention to the physical properties of the place, which are crucial
to the Hidden rule. We hypothesised that this would strengthen the association
between the place’s characteristics (open vs. enclosed space) and the sentence
participants had just heard, promoting acquisition of the Hidden rule. The sec-
ond question was aimed at promoting knowledge of the Overt rule, by probing
participants’ understanding of the relation between the preposition used and the
character’s position relative to the picture on screen. Since the Hidden rule is
actually a sub-rule of the Overt one - it is necessary to get the Overt rule right in
order to get the Hidden rule right too - higher accuracy on the Overt rule would
result in a greater number of trials in which the Hidden rule could be applied.
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As in Experiment 2, both a long-term recall task and generalisation items were
included in the testing phase (Section 5.2.3.2). We also made changes to the
types of items included in the comprehension task (outlined in Section 5.2.3.2),
in order to avoid confounds that emerged in Experiment 2 and clearly separate
the effect of novelty from that of rule violation.
As in the previous experiment, we would expect participants to have bet-
ter recall for System items and to be be above chance in producing the correct
prepositions for new System items, if they had acquired knowledge of the Hidden
rule. If changes to the training paradigm had the intended effect, we would also
expect accuracy for both rules to be higher than in Experiment 2. Finally, in the
recognition memory task, we would expect to see higher endorsement rates for
grammatical System items relative to Random ones, both old and new ones, but
lower endorsement rates for ungrammatical System items.
5.2 Experiment 3
5.2.1 Participants
42 native English speakers (39 females, mean age 20.7 years) from the University
of Cambridge and surrounding community took part in the experiment, receiving
£6 as compensation. The foreign languages most commonly spoken by partici-
pants were French (n = 15), Spanish (n = 10) and German (n = 7), followed by
Russian (n = 2), Mandarin (n = 2), Malay (n = 2), Swedish (n = 2), Italian (n
= 1), Turkish (n = 1) and Kurdish (n = 1).
5.2.2 Materials
We used the same items used for Experiment 2. We only made a change the
order in which recall and generalisation items were presented during the test (see
Section 5.2.3.2 for details).
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5.2.3 Procedure
The general structure of the experiment was very close to that used of Experiment
2, with a training phase followed by production and comprehension testing. The
main differences were: changes to the training procedure (Section 5.2.3.1), item
sequencing during the Production task (Section 5.2.3.2), and item types used in
the recognition memory task at the end of the experiment (Table 5.1).
5.2.3.1 Training phase
The items used during the training phase were the same used in Experiment 2.
Participants were exposed to 112 sentences, made up of the 64 matched items
used in Experiment 1 and 2 (32 unique nouns appearing once in each condition),
and the 48 were the unmatched items also used in Experiment 2. Generalisa-
tion items were nouns which appeared in only one condition during training,
counterbalanced across participants. The training phase followed the same basic
procedure as Experiment 2, with one exception: all the place nouns were in En-
glish, as done previously in Experiment 1, and participants were instead asked
questions after each item (Fig. 5.1), to which they replied by button press. For
instance, after the item ”Harry is gi desert”, they would see the following ques-
tion: ”How much do you like this place?”, to which they would reply on a scale
from 1 to 5 (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much). After giving their response, the next
question would appear: ”Has Harry reached the desert yet?” (Y/N). In his case,
the correct answer would be ”Yes” if Harry were shown superimposed onto the
picture (System condition), and ”No” if he were shown beside the picture (Ran-
dom condition). The question would remain on screen until participants gave the
correct answer, which acted as feedback on their response. The next item was
then presented, followed by questions. Every two trials, participants were asked
to recall the previous two items using picture cues, as done in Experiment 2.
5.2.3.2 Testing phase
The testing phase followed the same procedure as Experiment 2: participants
were simply shown recall cue screens (picture + character combinations) and
asked to produce the corresponding sentence, without any further exposure. Un-
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Cued recall in random order 
(only picture shown) 
Audiovisual presentation (sentence + picture)
+ Q1. “How much do you like this place?” (1-5)
+ Q2. “Has Harry reached the desert yet?” (Y/N)
Recall begins
x2
x2
Figure 5.1: Training phase procedure for Experiment 3
known to them, some of the items presented were not from the training phase, but
were novel (generalisation) items. However, unlike Experiment 2, generalisation
items were presented in a block at the end of the task instead of being randomly
intermixed with recall items (Fig. 5.2). The reason for intermixing Generalisa-
tion items together with Recall items in Experiment 2 had been a concern that
participants may become aware of the manipulation; this was deemed less likely
to occur if Generalisation items were “concealed” among Recall ones. However,
the drawback of this solution was that it introduced a confounding factor of time:
by spreading out a relatively small amount of Generalisation items over the entire
testing phase, we increased the potential for variation due to extraneous factors,
such as fatigue. Since participants in Experiment 2 did not show any awareness
of the manipulation (which is supported by at-chance recall accuracy on Random
items, suggesting very limited item memory), in this experiment we decided that
it was safe to present Generalisation items as a block at the of the testing phase.
Long-term recall We used the same 64 matched items as Experiment 2 for
long-term recall trials.
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+
Recall items
Generalization items
24 familiar pictures in novel combinations
Cued recall
64 Matched items from training phase
88 items
(in sequence)
Figure 5.2: Production task procedure for Experiment 3
Generalisation We used the same 24 generalisation items as Experiment 2 for
generalisation trials, but presented them all at the end of the Production task,
instead of intermixing them with long-term recall trials.
Recognition memory task The comprehension task followed the same proce-
dure as Experiment 2, but with the addition of Generalisation (new, grammatical
items) as well as Violation (new, ungrammatical) ones in the System condition.
Generalisation items were derived from the other half (24 items) of the 48 un-
matched items from the Training phase, presented in the opposite condition.
Violation items were ungrammatical versions of a subset of the matched items
from training (the same ones used for Long-term recall trials), modified by in-
verting their preposition assignment, which made System items ungrammatical.
Finally, Seen items (old items) were taken from another subset of the 64 matched
items from training. The way in which the new items were created meant that
they were not matched for picture familiarity. Violation items were made from
pictures that had already been seen twice during training (once per condition),
while Generalisation items were made from pictures that had already been seen
once (Table 5.1).
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System Random Times picture seen in training:
Seen Grammatical Neutral 2
Violation Ungrammatical Neutral 2
Generalisation Grammatical Neutral 1
Table 5.1: Summary of item types used in Recognition memory task and their
grammaticality.
5.2.3.3 Debriefing questionnaire
Participants were debriefed using the same questionnaire used in Experiments 1
and 2 (Appendix A) to assess awareness of the Overt and Hidden rules.
5.2.4 Results
5.2.4.1 Task scoring
We scored the production task following the same procedure followed in Experi-
ment 1 and 2, and the comprehension task following the same procedure used in
Experiment 2.
5.2.4.2 Rule awareness
We assessed awareness of the Overt and Hidden rule based on the debriefing
questionnaire (Appendix A). We followed the scoring procedure already used for
Experiment 2 (Section 4.3.4.2, p. 88), which included dividing participants into
Aware, Unaware and Transfer for the purposes of Hidden rule awareness.
5.2.4.3 Analysis
One participant was excluded for failing to become aware of the Overt rule. A
further two participants were excluded for technical reasons (one for failing to
perform the task correctly, one due to missing data). A total of 37 subjects were
included in the analysis (25 females, mean age 21 years, SD = 4.98). Of these, 8
reported awareness of the Hidden rule and a further 8 explicitly transferred the
English in vs. on distinction; following Experiment 2, both groups were classed
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Figure 5.3: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition
during the training phase.
as Aware (n = 16). The remaining 21 participants were included in the Unaware
group.
Accuracy data was analysed with mixed-effect logistic models (GLMERs),
following the same procedures for model selection and statistical inference used
in Experiment 1 and 2. Comprehension (Likert scale) data was analysed with
cumulative link mixed models for ordinal regression (CLMMs), following the pro-
cedures used in Experiment 2 for the same task.
5.2.4.4 Training phase
Overt rule accuracy (Fig. 5.3) was very high for both groups (Aware: System
96%, Random 95%; Unaware: System 96%, Random 97%); Hidden rule accuracy
was very high, too (Aware: System 96%, Random 98%; Unaware: System 97%,
Random 98%). We fitted a logistic mixed-effects model with random intercepts
for subjects and correlated random slopes for subjects by condition, with Group,
Condition and Block as fixed effects together with all their interactions. None of
the factors entered in the model had a significant effect on Hidden rule accuracy
in this phase of the experiment.
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Figure 5.4: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition
during long-term recall (Production task).
5.2.4.5 Testing phase
Long-term recall Overt Rule (Fig. 5.4) remained relatively high during Long-
term recall (Aware: System 91%, Random 88%; Unaware: System 93%, Random
92%), while Hidden rule accuracy (Fig. 5.5 & 5.6) decreased for both groups
(Aware: System 69%, Random 55%; Unaware: System 56%, Random 57%). We
fitted a logistic mixed-effects model with random intercepts for subjects and items
and correlated random slopes for subjects by condition, with Group, Condition
and Block as fixed effects together with all their interactions (Table 5.2). The
model revealed significant interactions between Group and Condition (χ2(1) =
7.84, p = .005) and between Condition and Block (χ2(1) = 3.87, p = .049)(Fig.
5.6). Post-hoc comparisons of the Group x Condition interaction using the Bon-
ferroni correction showed that the effect of Condition was significant for the Aware
group (χ2(1) = 9.36, p = 0.004) but not for the Unaware (χ2(1) = 0.48, p = 0.979)
Generalisation As in Experiment 2, Generalisation items were novel System
items derived from pictures previously seen in training as part of Random items.
Average Hidden rule accuracy rates for Generalisation items (Fig. 5.7) were 69%
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Figure 5.5: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition during
Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50%
chance level.
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Figure 5.6: Hidden rule accuracy by block during the Production task, with
fitted linear trend.
113
Chapter 5 Experiment 3
Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term recall
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Group -0.700 0.256 0.27 1 0.605
Condition -0.694 0.225 2.14 1 0.143
Block 0.026 0.091 0.78 1 0.376
Group x Condition 0.821 0.294 7.84 1 0.005 **
Group x Block -0.115 0.117 0.39 1 0.530
Condition x Block -0.031 0.124 3.87 1 0.049 *
Group x Condition x Block 0.317 0.162 3.84 1 0.050
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 5.2: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term
recall.
for the Aware, and 51% for the Unaware group. Only the Aware group performed
above chance in a one-sample t-test againt chance level (t(15) = 3.3, p = .005),
while the Unaware group were at chance (t(20) = 0.3, p = .75).
Average accuracy on generalisation items positively correlated with recall ac-
curacy for System items in the Long-term recall task in the Aware group (Pear-
son’s R = .85, p < .001), but not in the Unaware (Pearson’s R = .11, p = .60)
(Fig. 5.8).
Recognition memory task Average ratings for Seen items (Fig. 5.9) were
generally higher for System than for Random ones (Aware: System 4.8, Random
4.2; Unaware: System 4.6, Random 4.3). We constructed a CLMM with random
intercepts for subjects and items and correlated random slopes for subjects by
condition, entering Group and Condition as fixed factors. Stepwise model sim-
plification revealed a main effect of Condition (χ2(1) = 14.4, p < .001), which
was significant at the group level for both Aware (t(15) = -3.8, p = .002) and
Unaware (t(20) = -2.7, p = .02).
Average ratings for Generalisation items (Fig. 5.9) were generally higher for
System than Random ones (Aware: System 4.1, Random 3.8; Unaware: System
3.8, Random 3.6). We constructed a CLMM with random intercepts for subjects
and items and correlated random slopes for subjects by condition, entering Group
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Figure 5.7: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group for Generalisation items.
Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 5.8: Average Hidden rule accuracy during Generalisation plotted against
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Figure 5.9: Mean ratings in the Recognition memory task by Item type, Group
and Condition.
**
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Aware Unaware
Group
d'
Condition
Random
System
d' scores for Seen vs. Violation items
Recognition memory task
Figure 5.10: Mean d-prime scores for Seen vs. Violation items, by Group and
Condition.
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Figure 5.11: Mean d-prime scores for Seen vs. Generalisation items, by Group
and Condition.
and Condition as fixed factors. Stepwise model simplification showed a main effect
of Condition (χ2(1) = 9.52, p = .002). However, the difference between conditions
was not significant at the group level for either Aware (t(15) = -2, p = .07) or
Unaware (t(20) = -1.8, p = .09).
Average ratings for Violation items (old item with reversed preposition assign-
ment) varied as a function of Group and Condition (Aware: System 3.7, Random
3.9; Unaware: System 4.3, Random 4.0) (Fig. 5.9). We constructed a CLMM
with random intercepts for subjects and items and correlated random slopes for
subjects by condition, entering Group and Condition as fixed factors. Stepwise
model simplification revealed a significant interaction between Group and Con-
dition (χ2(1) = 6.92, p = .009). Against predictions, Unaware participants were
actually more likely to endorse System items than Random ones, while the oppo-
site trend was found for Aware participants (Fig. 5.9). The difference was only
significant for the Unaware group (t(20) = -3, p = .007), not for the Aware (t(15)
= 1.4, p = .18).
To explore the extent to which participants were sensitive to the rule in com-
prehension, we carried out a comparison of Seen vs. Violation items (Fig. 5.10).
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Both items types were composed of pictures seen twice in training, which were
equally familiar to subjects. However, only Seen items had appeared in training;
any difference in endorsement between Seen and Violation items should be due
to the change in preposition. If participants had developed sensitivity to the
Hidden rule, we expected them to show greater sensitivity to preposition change
in the System condition, where it would have made items ungrammatical, than
in the Random condition. Following the same procedure as Experiment 2, we
compared response to Seen and Violation items using signal detection measures
(d’ ) (Fig. 5.10). We entered the d’ scores into a mixed ANOVA with Group as
between-subject factors and Condition as within-subject factor, which revealed
main effects of Group (F (1,35) = 5.7, p = .023), Condition (F (1,35) = 11.0,
p = .002), and an interaction between Group and Condition (F (1,35) = 4.9, p
= .034). Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction showed that the
effect of Condition was only significant for the Aware group (χ2(1) = 11.1, p =
.003). We also calculated d’ scores for Seen vs. Generalisation items, but found
no significant effects of either Group or Condition (Fig. 5.11).
5.2.4.6 Additional analyses
L1 transfer As done previously for Experiment 2, we carried out further anal-
yses to determine whether L1 transfer had affected participants’ performance.
We entered data in for recall and generalisation in separate glmers with Group
and Transfer status as fixed predictors. In recall, Aware participants appeared
to perform better on Transfer items (Fig. 5.12), but there was no statistically
significant effect of Transfer, either as main effect (χ2(1) = .56, p = .45) or in
interaction with Group (χ2(1) = 1.47, p = .23) . In generalisation, too, we found
no significant effect of Transfer; this is supported by visual inspection of the data
showing minimal differences between Transfer and Non-transfer items (Fig. 5.13).
Breakdown of Aware group We ran a further analysis of the data by sepa-
rating participants from the Aware group into those that could verbalise the exact
Hidden rule (Aware, n = 8) and those who transferred the English in/on distinc-
tion (Transfer, also n = 8). For recall, we again found a significant interaction
between Group and Condition (χ2(1) = .8.64, p = .013). Post-hoc comparisons
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Figure 5.12: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group, Condition and Transfer
status during Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line
marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 5.13: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Transfer status for
Generalisation items. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks
50% chance level.
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Figure 5.14: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Condition for Aware, Transfer
and Unaware subjects during Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the
mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
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Figure 5.15: Average Hidden generalisation rule accuracy for Aware, Transfer
and Unaware subjects. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks
50% chance level.
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Figure 5.16: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Condition and Transfer status
during Long-term recall for Aware, Transfer and Unaware subjects. Error bars
represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50% chance level.
showed that there was a significant difference between Aware and Unaware par-
ticipants in the System condition (χ2(1) = 7.77, p = .032), while the Transfer
group was not significantly different from either the Aware (χ2(1) = .95, p = 1)
or Unaware group (χ2(1) = 2.70, p = .60) (Fig. 5.14). For generalisation items,
there was a main effect of Group (χ2(1) = 10.5, p = .005). Post-hoc comparisons
showed that while the Aware and Unaware groups differed significantly from each
other (χ2(1) = 9.17, p = .007), again the Transfer group did not significantly dif-
fer from either the Aware (χ2(1) = 1, p = .95) or Unaware group (χ2(1) = 3.53,
p = .18).
Finally, we again looked at the effect of Transfer and Non-transfer items after
breaking down the Aware group into the relevant subgroups (Figs. 5.16 & 5.17).
For System item recall, we found a significant main interaction of Transfer with
Group (χ2(1) = 12.83, p = .002). Post-hoc comparisons showed that the effect
of Transfer was significant for the Transfer group only (χ2(1) = 12.68, p = .001).
For generalisation items, we found an interaction between Group and Transfer
(χ2(1) = 6.22, p = .045). Post-hoc comparisons with the Bonferroni correction
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Figure 5.17: Average Hidden rule generalisation accuracy by Transfer status
for Aware, Transfer and Unaware subjects. Error bars represent SE of the mean,
dotted line marks 50% chance level.
failed to reach significance, possibly because of the small number of Non-transfer
generalisation items. However, visual inspection of the data (5.17), shows a pat-
tern similar to that we found in recall data (5.16): the Transfer group performed
above chance - on par with the Aware group - on Transfer items, but was exactly
at chance level on Non-transfer items, unlike the Aware group.
5.2.5 Discussion
5.2.5.1 Development of productive knowledge
If participants had developed productive knowledge of the Hidden rule, we ex-
pected recall accuracy to be higher for System items than for Random ones, and
we also expected performance on Generalisation items to be above chance. Our
predictions were only confirmed for the Aware group: Aware participants were
significantly more accurate in their recall of System items, and above chance in
their production of Generalisation items. By contrast, the Unaware group showed
no difference between conditions in long-term recall and were at chance level in
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their production of Generalisation items. Likewise, the Aware group exhibited
a significant correlation between System recall accuracy and generalisation, as
previously observed in Experiment 2, but no such correlation was observed for
the Unaware group. This suggests that participants in this experiment did not
develop any implicit productive knowledge of the Hidden rule, unlike what we
observed in Experiment 2, and that participants in the Aware group relied on
explicit knowledge to do the task.
As done for Experiment 2, we analysed the effect of L1 transfer on accuracy
in the production task. Again, there was no overall statistical effect L1 transfer.
However, when we divided the Aware group into Aware and Transfer subgroups
- based on the rule they verbalised in the questionnaire - we observed a different
pattern from that of Experiment 2. Overall, performance by the Transfer group
was intermediate between that of the Aware group and the Unaware group, both
in recall and generalisation, and did not differ significantly from either. When we
further broke down the data by item Transfer status, we saw that the Transfer
group was the only that benefitted from L1 transfer: their performance on Non-
transfer items was at chance level in both recall and generalisation. This suggests
that they had developed no knowledge of the Hidden rule, and that their responses
were entirely driven by explicit knowledge of the English in/on alternation.
5.2.5.2 Development of comprehension skills
When presented with items they had already encountered during training, both
groups were more likely to endorse System items compared to Random ones,
as already observed in Experiment 2. The fact that this was the case for the
Unaware participants, too, who otherwise showed no evidence of having acquired
the Hidden rule in this experiment, supports the hypothesis that the endorsement
bias for System items was due at least in part to a general preference for these
items, rather than to rule knowledge.
When presented with novel, grammatical items, there was an overall tendency
for participants to endorse System items over Random ones; however, it would
seem that this, too, was due to an endorsement bias for System items. Signal
detection measures revealed no evidence of generalisation: when comparing d’
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scores for Seen vs. Generalisation items, there was no difference between condi-
tions for either group. If participants had acquired receptive rule knowledge and
were able to generalise it, we would have expected d’ scores for Seen vs. Gener-
alisation items to be lower in the System condition, since the presence of the rule
in may make participants more likely to believe they had already encountered
generalisation items, as previously observed in similar studies (Paciorek, 2012).
Finally, for Violation items (items from training, with reversed preposition
assignment), we expected participants to be more sensitive to the preposition
change in the case of System items, and therefore be less likely to endorse them.
Again, direct comparison between condition was skewed by an endorsement bias
for System items in both groups, which meant that we observed no difference
between conditions in the Aware, and we actually found higher endorsement rates
for Systems in the Unaware, despite grammatical violations. When comparing
d’ scores for Seen vs. Violation items, however, we found a significant difference
between conditions for the Aware but not for the Unaware, indicating that only
aware participants were sensitive to violation of the Hidden rule.
5.2.5.3 Comparison of Experiments 2 and 3
In these last two experiments, we investigated the development of productive
generalisation of a novel form-meaning association. Specifically, we investigated
whether the Hidden rule, which we had used during Experiment 1, could be
acquired by participants through a recall-based paradigm and then used pro-
ductively to generate novel phrases. Given the findings from Experiment 1, we
modified both training and testing paradigm in order to promote the acquisition
of implicit rule knowledge, and have better means of detecting it. In the train-
ing phase, we reduced the number of items to be retained for short-term recall
from four to two, adding different kinds of memory load instead: pseudowords
replacing a subset of place nouns (Experiment 2) or questions probing Overt rule
knowledge and drawing attention to the physical characteristics of the place pic-
tured (Experiment 3). In the testing phase, we increased the difficulty of the
recall task, which now involved cued long-term recall of 88 items from training
in random sequence, without any further exposure. This was done in order to
124
Chapter 5 Experiment 3
minimise memory for specific items, in the hope that doing so would facilitate
the emergence of abstract knowledge in productive behaviour. Likewise, we in-
troduced generalisation items - novel picture-character combinations disguised
as recall cues - in order to assess whether true productive knowledge had been
developed.
In Experiment 2, we found a learning effect for both Aware and Unaware,
which suggests that participants had acquired implicit knowledge of the Hidden
rule and could use it productively. Specifically, we found a significant effect in
both recall and generalisation for the Aware; among the Unaware, we found a
significant effect in generalisation, with a tendency towards an effect in recall,
too. In Experiment 3, we found no learning effect for the Unaware - either in
recall or generalisation; we still found significant effects in both recall and gener-
alisation among the Aware, albeit with lower overall accuracy rates compared to
Experiment 2. The effect size (Cohen’s d) for Aware participants in Experiment 2
was 0.89, which dropped to 0.49 in Experiment 3, showing a significant reduction
in effect size. Similarly, the effect size for Unaware in Experiment 2 was 0.49,
dropping to as low as -0.12 in Experiment 3.
The diminished effect of Condition in Experiment 3 was not due not only to
lower performance on System items (Exp. 2: Aware 77%, Unaware 57%; Exp.
3: Aware 69%, Unaware 56%) but also to improved recall accuracy for Random
items (Exp. 2: Aware 51%, Unaware 51%; Exp. 3: Aware 55%, Unaware 57%).
Unlike Experiment 2, both groups in this study were significantly above chance in
their Hidden rule recall accuracy for System items (Aware: t(20) = 3.6, p = .003,
Unaware: t(20) = 2.6, p = .02), but also, at least in the case of the Unaware,
for Random ones (t(20) = 3.2, p = .004), with a tendency in the same direction
for the Aware group, too (t(20) = 2.1, p = .06). The higher recall accuracy for
Random items, in particular, suggests that participants had better item memory
than in Experiment 2.
In generalisation trials, too, we saw an overall decrease in Hidden rule ac-
curacy in Experiment 3 relative to Experiment 2, which affected both groups.
For the Unaware group, the effect disappeared entirely, and participants were
at chance levels in their responses. Following Dienes (2014), we calculated the
Bayes factor for Unaware accuracy in the Generalisation trials of Experiment 3,
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to check whether our failure to replicate the effect for the Unaware group should
be taken as support for the null hypothesis (i.e. that participants really were at
chance level), or simply as inconclusive. All factors were obtained using the cal-
culator developed by Dienes (2008). As a rule, a Bayes factor (B) below 1/3 is
considered to support the null hypotheses, B > 3 supports the theory, while a
B between 1/3 and 3 is inconclusive (Dienes, 2014). We obtained a Bayes factor
(B) of 0.29, which supports the null hypothesis - i.e. that the Hidden rule did
not have any effect on performance by Unaware participants in Experiment 3 (by
contrast, the Aware group, who performed above chance in Experiment 3 despite
not being as accurate as in Experiment 2, had B = 5.18).
To test for the development of receptive knowledge, in Experiments 2 and
3 we used a recognition memory task instead of the listening task previously
employed. In both experiments, participants from all groups showed evidence a
general endorsement bias for System items, which meant that directly comparing
endorsement rates for items in the System and Random condition did not provide
an accurate measure of their receptive knowledge. When using signal detection
measures to account for this bias, we found evidence of sensitivity to Hidden rule
violation in the Aware in both Experiment 2 and 3, but not in the Unaware,
which would seem to indicate that this violation detection was driven by explicit
knowledge. In Experiment 3, we introduced generalisation items, but found no
evidence of generalisation for either group: the presence of the Hidden rule in
new items did not have any effect on familiarity judgements, which would seem
to indicate a lack of rule generalisation. Overall, the results of the recognition
memory task from these to experiment show little evidence of implicit knowledge
being transferred from production to comprehension.
5.3 Conclusion
In Experiment 2, we found evidence of implicit learning of the Hidden rule, which
resulted in productive generalisation of the rule even for participants who had not
become aware of the rule. In Experiment 3, we did not replicate this finding. The
lower overall accuracy and smaller effect size that we observed, for both groups, in
this experiment suggests that the failure to replicate may be due to the different
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training paradigm employed. Bayes factor analysis suggests that the null result
in Experiment 3 was not simply a failure to replicate Experiment 2, but that
it provides support for a lack of effect (null hypothesis). Possible reasons for
the difference will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 7. Since the two
experiments differed in training paradigm but used the exact same materials for
production training and testing, this confirms that the unconscious transfer of
English categories was not primarily responsible for the advantage on System
items in Experiment 2 (although it may have had a facilitating effect). It also
suggests that the recall advantage found for System items in Experiment 2 could
not simply be due to item salience. Findings from the recognition memory task,
on the other hand, suggest that there was no transfer of implicit knowledge from
production to comprehension.
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Experiment 4: The role of
working memory and overnight
consolidation
6.1 Introduction
The outcome of Experiment 2 suggests that it was possible for participants to de-
velop implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule through elicited recall - regardless of
whether they had become aware of its content or not - and to generalise it to new
instances in spoken production. Our use of memorisation as a learning tool was
partly based on the assumption underlying the Oral Imitation task, which is that
linguistic material exceeding phonological working memory capacity will force a
listener to rely on linguistic knowledge to successfully reproduce it. Following
work by Radulescu and colleagues, we also hypothesised that our recall paradigm
would promote the extraction of regularities by overloading participants’ memory
capacity (Radulescu, 2014; Radulescu et al., 2019). However, our previous exper-
iments did not not test that hypothesis. Therefore, in order to explore the effects
of working memory on the learning process, we decided to run a new experiment
which would also include a test of phonological working memory.
Additionally, our previous experiments all consisted of a single session, which
did not provide an opportunity for overnight memory consolidation. As pointed
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out by DeKeyser (2003), however, language learning studies of short duration
are biased in favour of explicit knowledge. Adding an opportunity for delayed
testing, while still resulting in a relatively short study, may help us tap into
some of the processes involved in more prolonged, naturalistic implicit learning,
such as sleep consolidation. It could help us to confirm whether the effects we
observed in previous experiments were short-lived priming effects, or whether
they constituted true learning of new form-meaning connections, which could
become integrated in the knowledge system. In the latter case, we may expect
to see an improvement in test performance after the opportunity for overnight
consolidation, as has been observed in previous research (Tamminen et al., 2012,
2015).
To address both these points, we decided to run a fourth experiment which
would use the same training paradigm as Experiment 2, with the addition of
delayed generalisation testing to investigate overnight consolidation, while also
incorporating a measure of working memory. The following sections (6.1.1 &
6.1.2) provide a brief overview of the roles of working memory and consolidation
in implicit learning, while Section 6.2 reports the findings of Experiment 4.
6.1.1 The role of working memory in implicit L2 learning
Working memory (WM) is a type of short-term memory that allows us to tem-
porarily store and manipulate information in our mind while performing complex
cognitive tasks (Baddeley, 1992). In the multi-component model of WM devel-
oped by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and its subsequent developments, WM in-
cludes separate storage for phonological and visuospatial information, as well as
an executive function component which controls attention (Baddeley, 2000, 2015;
Baddeley et al., 1998). Working memory, particularly its phonological compo-
nent, is known to correlate with L1 proficiency (Baddeley, 2003; Kidd et al.,
2018), and there is a growing body of research showing that it correlates with
L2 proficiency, too (Miyake and Friedman, 1998; Van den Noort et al., 2006;
Williams, 2011). Phonological WM has been shown to support acquisition of
both L2 vocabulary (Baddeley et al., 1998; French, 2006; Williams and Lovatt,
2003) and grammar (French and O’Brien, 2008; Speciale et al., 2004).
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The available experimental evidence suggests that the effect of WM on L2
learning may depend on the training paradigm used (Grey et al., 2015; Robin-
son, 2005; Tagarelli et al., 2011); however, the exact nature of this relationship is
unclear. In a study on the acquisition of a semi-artificial language based on Ger-
man syntax, Tagarelli et al. (2011) found that WM predicted learning outcomes
under explicit, but not under incidental, conditions. Likewise, Grey et al. (2015)
found no effect of WM under incidental learning conditions of a semi-artificial
language combining English lexicon with Japanese syntax. Further support for a
link between WM and explicit learning comes from research showing that WM
correlates with the ability to use corrective feedback (Fyfe et al., 2015; Goo,
2012). On the other hand, Robinson (2005) found a correlation between WM
(measured by reading span) and learning of Samoan under incidental learning
conditions, where participants had to process sentences for meaning without any
prior grammar instruction. The testing phase used by Robinson (2005) differed
from Tagarelli et al. (2011) and Grey et al. (2015) in that it incorporated a pro-
duction measure, which is particularly relevant to the present study. Specifically,
Robinson (2005) found a positive correlation between WM and performance on
a guided sentence production task (where participants were given words to ar-
range in the correct order to form correct sentences), as well as an aural GJT;
by contrast, Tagarelli et al. (2011) used an aural GJT with judgement source
attribution, while Grey et al. (2015) used a visual GJT and a picture-matching
task. Robinson’s (2005) findings are compatible with research suggesting that
WM is particularly implicated in L2 speech production (Skehan, 2015). Since
the present study is specifically concerned with examining production abilities as
a consequence of implicit learning, we may expect WM to have an effect on our
outcome measures, as it did in Robinson (2005). However, Robinson (2005) did
not test learning under explicit conditions; given the evidence of a link between
WM and explicit learning (Fyfe et al., 2015; Goo, 2012), we may also expect to
see a correlation between WM and rates of Hidden rule awareness in our study,
on the assumption that high WM capacity will afford participants greater re-
sources for making and testing hypotheses on possible rules underlying the input.
Finally, as previously mentioned, including a measure of phonological WM in our
study will allow us to test the assumptions behind our recall paradigm, namely
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that it promotes rule learning by pushing memory capacity. If that is the case,
we may expect to see a non-linear relationship between WM and rule accuracy:
high-WM participants for whom the memory load is too small may benefit less
from training than those with lower WM; but it also conceivable that those at
the lowest end of the WM scale will not benefit as much, if the load becomes too
great. Therefore, we may expect to find that there is an “optimal” level of WM
which allows participants to draw the greatest benefit from the training task,
while those with higher or lower WM capacity will show smaller learning effects.
6.1.2 Memory consolidation and generalisation
In addition to the role played by short-term memory, L2 learning is of course
dependent on long-term memory. We know that sleep promotes the encoding of
new representations in long-term memory, in a process known as consolidation
(Burnham, 1903; Gais and Born, 2004; Winocur and Moscovitch, 2011); this oc-
curs in a variety of situations, from learning word lists (Ficca et al., 2000) to
the acquisition of motor skills (Brashers-Krug et al., 1996). It has also been
suggested that consolidation during sleep is needed in order to integrate novel
memories into existing knowledge without disrupting the latter, allowing for the
gradual formation of abstract generalisations from individual episodic memories.
Dual-mechanism models such as the Complementary Learning Systems model
(McClelland et al., 1995; O’Reilly and Norman, 2002; Schapiro et al., 2017) hy-
pothesise that this is carried out in the hippocampus and the neocortex, which
play complementary roles in handling the transition from individual representa-
tions to more abstract general knowledge: the hippocampus is responsible for the
fast encoding of new episodic memories, while the neocortex slowly integrates
them into existing knowledge. This is required in order to avoid “catastrophic
interference” (French, 1999; McClelland et al., 1995): if new representations were
fed directly into the knowledge system, there would be a radical restructuring
of the system each time any new memories are formed which do not conform to
familiar patterns.
Generalisation of a rule to new instances, such as is required in our study,
should therefore benefit from consolidation, since it involves a shift away from
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individual representations to more abstract knowledge. Indeed, in language learn-
ing, consolidation has been shown to support both the integration of new vocabu-
lary into the lexicon (Davis and Gaskell, 2009; Dumay and Gaskell, 2007; Gaskell
and Dumay, 2003; Mirkovic´ and Gaskell, 2016), the abstraction of phonological
categories (Fenn et al., 2003) and phonological constraints in speech production
(Gaskell et al., 2014), as well as the generalisation of novel morphology to new
lexical items (Tamminen et al., 2012, 2015). In their study on the acquisition of
novel derivational morphology, Tamminen et al. (2015) tested for the integration
of novel affixes into the lexicon using an implicit measure (semantic priming in a
sentence congruity task) and an explicit one (a sentence congruity judgement). In
the implicit task, they found no evidence of integration immediately after train-
ing; however, when they tested participants again after a 1-week interval, they
did find evidence of integration into the lexicon (provided that the training phase
contained enough unique exemplars), suggesting that consolidation was necessary
for it to emerge. Conversely, generalisation on the explicit measure could already
be observed immediately after training. Further evidence of the role played by
consolidation comes from a study by Morgan-Short et al. (2012a), which explored
the long-term retention of an artificial language learned under either explicit or
incidental conditions. Having previously shown that only incidental training led
to native-like processing, as evidenced by ERP responses to grammatical viola-
tions (Morgan-Short et al., 2012b), Morgan-Short and colleagues found the same
native-like responses even after months of no exposure. Strikingly, however, they
also found that both groups showed more native-like processing than they had
in the original study, suggesting that the time lapse had had a beneficial effect
for both the explicit and implicit training group. Taken together, these findings
suggest that consolidation favours the development of generalisation and auto-
matic knowledge in L2. Therefore, we may expect to see an improvement in
generalisation performance after an opportunity for overnight consolidation.
6.2 Experiment 4
The aim of this experiment was to explore the contribution of working memory
to the learning process, as well as testing the effect of overnight consolidation
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on implicit knowledge acquired during the training phase. In order to obtain a
larger sample of participants, data collection was carried out online instead of in
a laboratory. This is an increasingly common method of carrying out behavioural
research and has been shown to be provide generally reliable data (Clifford and
Jerit, 2014; Crump et al., 2013), including for implicit learning studies (Kerz
et al., 2017). Based on findings from Experiments 2 and 3, we reverted to the
training and testing paradigm used in Experiment 2, which had proved successful
at generating implicit rule knowledge, unlike the one we used in Experiment 3.
Doing so would also allow us to test our hypothesis with regards to the different
outcomes of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, which we attributed to the change in
training methodology. A replication of results from Experiment 2 would provide
validation for the paradigm used. We therefore used the same training and testing
methodology as Experiment 2, with the addition of a second generalisation task,
carried out one day after training, and a measure of WM (a forward digit span
task). In order to avoid making the experiment too long, given the introduction of
additional consolidation and WM tasks, we chose not to include a comprehension
component in this experiment, focusing on production only.
If participants had acquired implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule (and the
training paradigm from Experiment 2 was indeed better suited for generating
implicit knowledge), we would expect to see higher recall rates for System items
and above-chance performance on generalisation items, as in previous experi-
ments. We would also expect performance on the generalisation task to improve
in the second testing session, as a consequence of overnight consolidation. With
regards to the role of WM, several different predictions could be made, based
on the existing literature. Following Robinson (2005), we may expect there to
be a positive linear relationship between WM and rule accuracy, with high-WM
subjects performing better than low-WM ones. On the other hand, if our recall
paradigm worked by loading working memory, we may expect to see an inverted
U-shape relationship between WM and Hidden rule accuracy: subjects whose
WM span is optimally suited to the task load should show the greatest learning
effect, while those at the opposite ends of the range, for whom the load is either
too small or too large, should show a smaller effect. Finally, given the evidence of
a link between WM and explicit learning (Fyfe et al., 2015; Goo, 2012), we may
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expect WM to correlate with discovery of the Hidden rule, as high-WM subjects
would have more resources available for hypothesis testing and rule search.
6.2.1 Participants
We tested 42 native English speakers (25 females, mean age = 30.9) recruited
through online platform Prolific (www.prolific.ac). Participants were from the
United Kingdom (N = 29), USA (N = 7), Australia (N = 3), New Zealand (N =
2) and Canada (N = 1). Knowledge of foreign languages was limited compared to
previous samples; only one participant reported being fluent in a language other
than English (Spanish).
6.2.2 Materials
We used the same materials previously used for Experiments 2 and 3: 80 unique
place nouns, from which we derived a total of 160 unique items. Of these, 112
were used as training items (64 matched + 48 unmatched), while the remaining
48 served as generalisation items.
6.2.3 Procedure
Unlike previous experiment, the experiment was not carried out in a laboratory
but was instead deployed online, recruiting participants through online platform
Prolific (www.prolific.ac). We recreated the design of previous experiments using
JavaScript library jsPsych (De Leeuw, 2015), which allowed participants to run
the experiment in a web browser on their own computers. The experiment was
composed of a training phase followed by a production task which included long-
term recall and two blocks of generalisation items, one on the day of training
(Day 1) and one after a 24-hour interval (Day 2). No comprehension tasks were
included in the experiment.
6.2.3.1 Training phase
The training phase (Fig. 6.1) followed the same procedure used in Experiment 2.
Participants were exposed to 112 sentences: of these, 64 were the same matched
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Cued recall in random order 
(only picture shown) 
Audiovisual presentation (sentence + picture)
Recall begins
x2
x2
32 place names replaced by pseudowords
Figure 6.1: Training phase procedure for Experiment 4
items used in previous experiments (32 unique nouns appearing once in each
condition), while the remaining 48 were unmatched items, nouns appearing only
in one condition during training (counterbalanced across participants). Nouns in
half of the matched items (32 nouns) were replaced by pseudowrds. Recall was
every two items.
6.2.3.2 Testing phase
On Day 1, the testing phase (Fig. 6.2) followed the same procedure as Experiment
3: a long-term recall task in which participants had to recall the 64 matched items
using the corresponding pictures as cue, followed by a block of 24 generalisation
items (in this respect, we deviated from Experiment 2 by presenting recall and
generalisation items in sequence rather than intermixing them, because previ-
ous experiments had revealed that it was not necessary to disguise generalisation
items to make ensure that participants would not become aware of the manipula-
tion). On Day 2, a second set of 24 generalisation items was administered, using
the same procedure (Day 1 and Day 2 generalisation items were counterbalanced
across participants).
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+
Cued recall
112 items
(in sequence)
+
Recall items
64 Matched items from training phase
Generalization, Day 1
24 familiar pictures in novel combinations
Generalization, Day 2
24 familiar pictures in novel combinations
Figure 6.2: Production task procedure for Experiment 4
6.2.3.3 Digit Span task
At the end of Day 2, we administered a forward Digit Span task to measure
phonological working memory. Participants were exposed to digit sequences of
increasing length, starting from two digits. Digits were flashed in rapid succession
on screen: each digit was displayed for 800ms, with a 200ms interval between
digits. After the digit sequence, a digital number pad appeared on screen, and
participants were required to enter the sequence they had just seen by clicking on
the appropriate keys. They had the option to erase entered digits if they made
any mistakes. Participants did five trials for each sequence length, before moving
on to the next level. If they got more three or more trials wrong on any given
level, the task was terminated.
6.2.3.4 Debriefing questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, awareness of the Overt and Hidden rules was
assessed using a debriefing questionnaire (Appendix A), as done in previous ex-
periments.
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of digit span scores for Experiment 4 participants.
6.2.4 Results
6.2.4.1 Task scoring
Production data was transcribed and scored following the same procedure as
Experiments 1-3. The digit span task was scored as follows: each level with
3 correct trials out of 5 counted as 0.5 points, while levels with 4 or 5 correct
counted as 1 point.
6.2.4.2 Rule awareness
We assessed awareness of the Overt and Hidden rule based on the debriefing
questionnaire (Appendix A), following the scoring procedure already used for
Experiments 2 and 3.
6.2.4.3 Analysis
Due to variation in the recording devices used by participants, audio quality was
not consistently high. Three subjects were excluded from the analysis due to
low overall audio recording quality; a further four were excluded for failing to
complete all parts of the experiment. Finally, 11 subjects failed to become aware
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of the Overt rule and were therefore not included in the analysis, following the
procedure from previous experiments. A total of 24 subjects were included in
the analysis (16 females, mean age 28 years, SD = 6.53). Trials from remaining
participants that were unintelligible due to poor audio quality (3% of total data)
were eliminated.
Awareness rates for both Overt and Hidden rule were lower than in previous
experiments: as noted above, 11 subjects failed to become aware of either rule
and were excluded (for comparison, the corresponding figure was 6 subjects in
Experiment 2, and only 1 in Experiment 3). Furthermore, of those included in
the analysis, only 4 subjects became aware of the Hidden rule. No subjects were
classed as Transfer.
Despite the very small number of participants in the Aware group (N = 4)
they were entered in the analysis as a separate group alongside the Unaware
group (N = 20). Since the analysis was carried out on a by-trial basis, this
yielded a sufficient number of observations even for the Unaware group (255 obs.
in Long-term recall) given an analysis with Group, Condition and Digit Span as
independent variables.
We analysed production accuracy data using generalized mixed-effect models
(GLMERs) for logistic regression, as done in previous experiments. We no longer
included Block as a factor in these models, as it did not have any effect on accuracy
in either Experiment 2 or 3. Where fitting random effects was not possible due to
low variability (Long-term recall phase) we ran a binomial logistic regression with
Condition and Digit Span as predictors. The distribution of Digit Span scores
in the data was not normal (Fig. 6.3); therefore, logistic regression was a fitting
choice of statistical analysis for our data, since it does not assume normality for
independent variables.
6.2.4.4 Training phase
While there was some variation in Overt rule accuracy (Aware: System 89%,
Random 97%, Unaware: System 87%, Random 85%), Hidden rule accuracy dur-
ing the training phase was almost at ceiling for both groups (Aware: System 98%,
Random 97%, Unaware: System 96%, Random 96%) (Fig. 6.4). We found no
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Figure 6.4: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition
during the training phase.
significant effects of either Group, Condition or Digit Span in a GLMER with
random intercepts for subjects and items, random slopes for subjects by block
and for items by condition.
6.2.4.5 Testing phase
Long-term recall In long-term recall, Overt rule accuracy was lower than in
the training phase, particularly for the Unaware (Aware: System 76%, Random
83%; Unaware: System 50%, Random 45%) (Fig. 6.5). Hidden Rule accuracy
was also lower among the Unaware group (Aware: System 71%, Random 47%,
Unaware: System 57%, Random 49%) (Fig. 6.6). To analyse Hidden rule accu-
racy rates, we initially constructed a GLMER with Group, Condition and Digit
Span as predictors and random intercepts for subjects and items; however, we
had to eliminate all random effects as each of the specified models had singular
fit, due to low variability among subjects and items. We therefore ran a binomial
logistic regression with Group, Condition and Digit Span as predictors. There
was no effect of Digit Span on accuracy, but there was a significant main effect
of Condition (χ2(1) = 11.384, p = .001) and an interaction between Group and
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Figure 6.5: Combined Overt and Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition
during Long-term recall.
Condition (χ2(1) = 4.772, p = .029) (Table 6.1). Post-hoc comparisons showed
that the effect of Condition was highly significant for the Aware group (χ2(1) =
14.030, p < .001) but only approached statistical significance for the Unaware
(χ2(1) = 3.775, p = .052).
Generalisation Generalisation items were novel System items derived from
pictures previously seen in training as part of Random items. Hidden rule accu-
racy scores increased from Day 1 (Aware: 65%, Unaware: 46%) to Day 2 (Aware:
72%, Unaware: 56%)(Fig. 6.7). We entered Hidden accuracy scores for both days
in a GLMER with Group, Day and Digit Span as fixed factors and random inter-
cepts for subjects, which showed a significant main effect of Group (Table 6.2).
As in previous tasks, there was no correlation between Digit Span and accuracy.
While the overall increase from Day 1 to Day 2 was not significant, a one-sample
t-test against chance level (50%) showed that the Unaware group was significantly
above chance on Day 2 (t(16)=2.53, p=.02), despite being below chance on Day
1 (t(16)=-2.134, p= .05). Due to its small sample size (n = 4), the Aware group
fails to meet statistical significance; however, their average accuracy on Day 2
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Figure 6.6: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group and Condition during
Long-term recall. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50%
chance level.
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Figure 6.7: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group for Day 1 and Day 2
Generalisation items. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks
50% chance level.
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Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term recall
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Group 0.039 0.021 3.244 1 0.072
Condition 0.088 0.021 11.384 1 0.001 ***
Digit Span 0.025 0.017 2.709 1 0.100
Group x Condition 0.047 0.021 4.772 1 0.029 *
Group x Digit Span 0.015 0.017 1.004 1 0.316
Condition x Digit Span 0.014 0.017 1.525 1 0.217
Group x Condition x Digit Span 0.023 0.017 1.837 1 0.175
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 6.1: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term
recall.
(72%) is comparable to that of Aware participants in Experiment 2 (74%). For
Unaware participants, there was no correlation between generalisation accuracy
(Day 1 or Day 2) and recall accuracy for System items (Day 1: Pearson’s R =
-0.06, p = .8, Day 2: Pearson’s R = .11, p = .67). Correlations for the Aware
group were not statistically significant on account of its small sample size, al-
though they showed the same trend observed in Experiment 2 (Day 1: Pearson’s
R = .79, p = .20, Day 2: Pearson’s R = .73, p = .26).
6.2.5 Discussion
In this experiment, we further investigated the development of productive implicit
knowledge of the Hidden rule, using the training paradigm we already adopted in
Experiment 2. As in previous experiments, we predicted that, if participants had
acquired productive knowledge of the rule, we should see an advantage for Sys-
tem items in long-term recall, as well as above-chance accuracy when producing
novel (generalisation) System items. In addition to this, we added a measure of
working memory, to test our assumptions that the training paradigm promoted
rule learning by loading participants’ memory capacity. Finally, we tested partic-
ipants on a second set of generalisation items after the opportunity for overnight
consolidation, predicting that they should display higher accuracy compared to
immediate generalisation testing. Unlike our previous experiments, Experiment 4
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Figure 6.8: Average Hidden rule accuracy during Generalisation plotted against
average accuracy for System items during Long-term recall task.
was not laboratory-based: we instead carried out data collection on the internet,
recruiting participants through an online research platform.
With respect to productive knowledge in long-term recall, the pattern of re-
sults we observed was very similar to that of Experiment 2. The Aware group
showed a significant difference between System and Random items, with higher
recall accuracy for System ones. Among Unaware participants, there was a visible
trend towards an effect of Condition, but it failed to reach statistical significance.
One of our aims when switching to online data collection had been to collect a
larger participant sample, in order to have more statistical power than Experi-
ment 2; we hoped that this would help to shed more light on the nature of the
trend we observed for Unaware participants. However, even though the initial
sample was bigger, Experiment 4 suffered from higher attrition rates than previ-
ous experiments due to both technical issues and lower levels of compliance from
participants, meaning that the resulting sample of Unaware subjects (n = 20)
was comparable to those of previous experiments (Experiment 2: 17 Unaware,
Experiment 3: 21 Unaware). Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether
the trend we see reflects an underlying difference which would be statistically
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Hidden rule accuracy, Generalisation
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Group 0.714 0.252 7.738 1 0.005 **
Day -0.170 0.130 2.400 1 0.121
Digit Span 0.099 0.191 0.213 1 0.644
Group x Day -0.008 0.130 0.000 1 0.987
Group x Digit Span 0.103 0.191 0.305 1 0.580
Day x Digit Span 0.048 0.101 0.212 1 0.645
Group x Day x Digit Span -0.030 0.101 0.089 1 0.766
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 6.2: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy, Generalisation
items.
significant, given a larger sample.
In generalisation trials, the pattern of results we observed was partially dif-
ferent from that of Experiment 2. In this experiment, we included two blocks of
generalisation items, administering the first one immediately after recall testing
(Day 1) and the second one after a 24-hour delay (Day 2). On Day 1, only the
Aware performed above chance, while the Unaware were at chance level in their
production of generalisation items. This differed from what we observed in Ex-
periment 2, where both groups were above chance in generalisation immediately
after training. On Day 2, however, we saw an improvement in performance for
both Aware and Unaware: even though the difference between Day 1 and 2 was
not statistically significant, which means our predictions on consolidation were
only partially supported, the increase meant that both groups were now per-
forming above chance. Finally, we did not find a significant correlation between
System recall and generalisation accuracy in the Unaware group, even on Day
2, which again deviates from what we observed in Experiment 2. Nevertheless,
while it does not fully replicate the outcome of Experiment 2, this pattern of
results indicates that participants had acquired implicit knowledge of the Hidden
rule, and could use it productively.
With regards to the role of working memory in the learning process, our pre-
dictions were not confirmed. We had expected to see a relation between working
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memory and Hidden rule accuracy, either in the shape of a positive linear correla-
tion between the two, or as a U-shaped relationship, on the assumption that the
recall paradigm worked by loading participants’ memory capacity to an optimal
level. However, we did not find any correlation between the two. Our prediction
of a connection between working memory and awareness of the Hidden rule could
not be confirmed either: due the extremely small number of participants who
became aware of the rule (n = 4), we could not detect any statistical relationship
between working memory and Hidden rule awareness. In order to fully explore
the possible effects of working memory on the learning process, we tested for an
effect of WM on Overt rule accuracy, too; we did not find any effect of working
memory on Overt rule accuracy in either the training phase (χ2(1) = 2.637, p =
.10) or the long-term recall task (χ2(1) = 0.876, p = .35). The lack of correlation
between WM and recall accuracy which we observed could be due a variety of
factors: it is possible that the specific measure of WM we used (forward digit
span task) could be less sensitive to linguistic processes than a reading span task,
which was the measure of WM used in Robinson (2005). It is possible that WM
as a construct is not particularly relevant to implicit learning, and that focusing
on the distinction between procedural and declarative memory instead (Antoniou
et al., 2016; Ettlinger et al., 2014; Morgan-Short et al., 2014) may have yielded a
more informative picture. These possibilities will be explored in greater detail in
the general discussion (Chapter 8).
Finally, in the the production phase of this experiment we also observed very
low rates of Overt rule accuracy in the Unaware group (50% for System items, 45%
for Random items), relative to previous experiments. Even though all participants
in the experiment were aware of the Overt rule, it appears that Unaware subjects
in this experiments were not able to reliably used this rule in spoken production.
Since the Hidden rule has been defined as a “sub-rule” of the Overt rule, this
would seem to pose a problem when claiming that participants had acquired
the Hidden rule. However, chance-level performance on the Overt rule is not
incompatible with knowledge of the Hidden rule. In its essence, the Hidden rule
is an association between particular prepositions and particular place types. In
the context of this experiment, the Hidden rule should only be applied, and the
relevant prepositions used, when the character was in a particular position on
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screen, as dictated by the Overt rule. Therefore, failure to use the Overt rule
correctly did not imply that the Hidden rule association had not been acquired:
it only indicates that subjects could not reliably determine when they should
apply the Hidden rule (i.e. when the character was in one position on on screen,
and not in the other).
6.3 Conclusion
In Experiment 4, we reverted to the training paradigm used in Experiment 2,
with the addition of further generalisation testing one day after training. We
found evidence of implicit learning of the Hidden rule and productive use of the
rule by both Aware and Unaware participants, with above-chance performance
in generalisation tasks in both groups, and an effect of condition on recall in the
Aware. The experiment mostly replicated the findings of Experiment 2, with
one notable difference: the effect only emerged after overnight consolidation in
the Unaware group, who were above chance on the second day of generalisation
testing only. Nevertheless, the similarities between Experiment 2 and 4, despite
the fact that the two studies were delivered in different settings and were sampling
from different populations, suggest that the training paradigm had a significant
impact on learning outcomes, as we had hypothesised. This issue will be explored
in greater detail in the next chapter, which carries out a systematic comparison
of Experiments 2, 3 and 4. Finally, in this experiment we also included measures
of working memory, in order to test our assumptions with regards to the role of
memory in our training paradigm. However, we did not find any effect of digit
span on accuracy, either for Hidden or Overt rule. Possible reasons for this lack
of correlation will be explored in the general discussion (Chapter 8).
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Effects of training paradigm
7.1 Introduction
The last three experiments we conducted all produced evidence of rule learning:
however, only in two of them (Experiments 2 and 4) did participants acquire im-
plicit, productive knowledge of the Hidden rule. Experiment 3 failed to replicate
the results of Experiment 2 with respect to Unaware participants, despite being
similar in design, using the same materials and recruiting participants from the
same community. By contrast, Experiment 4, which sampled participants from a
very different community and was conducted on the web instead of in a laboratory,
used the exact same training paradigm as Experiment 2 and partially replicated
its findings. Therefore, we hypothesized that the experimental paradigm used
- specifically, the training procedure used - may have been responsible for the
differences we observed between Experiments 2 and 3. In the following sections,
we will compare the two versions of the training procedure which we used in the
last three experiments and examine the differences between them, in order to
establish whether they may have affected learning outcomes.
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7.2 Comparison of Experiments 2, 3 and 4
7.2.1 Procedure
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 all used one of two variations of the same training
paradigm, which involved presentation of two items in sequence, followed by
short-term recall. Experiments 2 and 4 used the same procedure, with recall ev-
ery two items and pseudowords replacing half of place nouns in matched items,
for a total of 32 nouns (Fig. 4.1, p. 86). In Experiment 3, recall was also every
two items but all place nouns were in English, and participants had to answer
questions after each item presentation (Fig. 5.1, p. 108).
All participants recruited for our experiments were native English speakers,
but they differed in other respects. Participants in Experiments 2 and 3 were
recruited from the the same pool (University of Cambridge students and sur-
rounding community) and were broadly similar in terms of language background,
educational level and age (Exp. 2: mean age 20.5, Exp. 3: mean age 20.7).
Participants for Experiment 4 where recruited online through platform Prolific
Academic, mostly from the United Kingdom; only 14 out of 42 subjects in the
experiment reported being in education (either full- or part-time) at the time of
the study. Most were either in full-time (N = 14) or part-time (N = 14) employ-
ment; a further 10 subjects (3 of which were students) were not in employment,
while 4 did not report their employment status. Participants in Experiment 4
were also significantly older than the sample used in previous experiments (mean
age 28.2) (Table 7.1).
Design summary, Experiments 2 - 4
Setting Mean age Design feature
Exp. 2 Lab-based 20.5 (SD = 2.09) Pseudowords
Exp. 3 Lab-based 20.7 (SD = 4.98) Questions
Exp. 4 Online 28.2 (SD = 6.53) Pseudowords
Table 7.1: Summary table of Experiments 2, 3 and 4.
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7.2.2 Results
In Experiment 2, we found a significant effect of Condition on Hidden rule recall
for the Aware, with higher accuracy for System items, and a trend in the same
direction for the Unaware. Additionally, both groups in this experiment were
significantly above chance in generalisation. In Experiment 3, the effect of Con-
dition on Hidden recall shrank for both groups: compared to Experiment 2, recall
accuracy decreased for System items, but increased for Random ones. Only the
Aware group in this experiment was significantly above chance in generalisation.
In Experiment 4, we found the same pattern of long-term recall that we had ob-
served in Experiment 2, with a significant effect for the Aware group, and a trend
in the same direction for the Unaware. In generalisation, Aware participants were
above chance on both Day 1 and Day 2; the Unaware were above chance on Day
2 only (Table 7.2).
Hidden rule accuracy, Experiments 2 - 4
Long-term recall
Group System Random Cohen’s d Generalisation
Exp. 2 Aware (n = 16) 77% 51% 0.89 74%
Unaware (n = 17) 57% 51% 0.49 61%
Exp. 3 Aware (n = 16) 69% 55% 0.49 69%
Unaware (n = 21) 56% 57% -0.12 51%
Exp. 4 Aware (n = 4) 71% 47% 0.89 t1: 65%, t2: 72%
Unaware (n = 20) 57% 49% 0.59 t1: 46%, t2: 56%
Table 7.2: Hidden rule accuracy during production tasks by group and experi-
ment, Experiments 2 to 4.
We see similarities between the findings of Experiment 2 and 4, despite differ-
ent demographics and modes of delivery, which set them apart from Experiment
3. Experiment 3 differs from the other two studies in several ways. The effect
size for Condition in Long-term recall is smaller than in the other two experi-
ments: this is due to both lower accuracy on System items, both in recall and
generalisation, and higher recall accuracy for Random ones. Overall, we found
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no evidence of implicit learning of the Hidden rule in Experiment 3, unlike what
we observed the other two experiments.
There are two ways in which the training paradigm used could have con-
tributed to creating this pattern of results. Firstly, the combination of higher
recall accuracy for Random items, and lower accuracy for System ones, suggests
that the training procedure used in Experiment 3 may have encouraged reten-
tion of memories for individual items, while impairing rule generalisation. The
paradigm used in Experiment 3 differed from the other version in that it lacked
pseudowords: all place nouns were in English. We therefore hypothesised that
the use of pseudowords in Experiments 2 and 4 may have made it harder for
subjects to retain individual items, thus encouraging rule abstraction. We con-
ducted a post-hoc analysis of the data from Experiments 2 and 4 to assess the
effect of pseudowords in these studies, in order to determine whether the lack
of pseudowords could explain the outcome of Experiment 3. The results of the
analysis are presented in Section 7.3.
Secondly, we hypothesised that differences in learning outcomes may have
been due to different attentional demands created by the two training paradigms.
In Experiment 3, participants were asked questions which drew their attention
to the physical characteristics of the places pictured by asking them to rate their
attractiveness, and which probed their knowledge of the Overt rule. Given the
crucial role played by attention in implicit learning, it is possible that these
questions may in fact have been detrimental to the acquisition of the Hidden
rule, by directing attention away from the form-meaning connections underlying
it. Specifically, questions asking participants to rate the places pictured may have
drawn their attention to the places themselves, rather than their association with
specific prepositions. Similarly, questions probing Overt rule knowledge could
have been directing participants’ attention to the Overt rule at the expense of
the Hidden rule. To test these hypotheses, we first conducted a post-hoc analysis
of data from Experiment 3, to determine whether the rating given to an item
during training had any impact on recall accuracy for that item during testing
(Section 7.4.1). We then conducted a further analysis to test whether there was
a trade-off in our studies between Overt and Hidden rule learning, by examining
the effect of Overt rule accuracy in training across all three experiments (Section
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7.4.2).
7.3 Effect of pseudowords
In order to determine whether the use of pseudowords in Experiments 2 and 4
had impaired the formation of specific item memories, we conducted a post-hoc
analysis of Hidden rule accuracy scores during Long-term recall, based on whether
the items had been presented with an English place noun or a pseudoword during
training.
In Experiment 2, we discovered that the use of pseudowords during training
had an effect on Hidden rule recall accuracy for those items during Long-term
recall (Fig. 7.1). The effect was modulated by condition: there was a significant
interaction between place name Type (English vs. Pseudoword) and Condition
(χ2(1) = 5.22, p = .02) in a GLMER with Condition, Group and place name
Type as fixed effects and random intercepts for subjects and items. Post-hoc
comparisons showed that if a Random item had its place noun replaced by a
pseudoword during training, subjects were significantly less likely to recall it
correctly in the Long-term recall task (t(63) = 2.1, p = .04). For System items,
we observed the opposite trend - participants were on average more accurate when
recalling System items presented with pseudowords, although the difference fell
short of statistical significance (t(63) = -2, p = .06).
When performing the same analysis on Experiment 4 data, we did not initially
observe the same pattern: averaging across participants by group, we found no
effect of place name Type on Hidden rule accuracy in Long-term recall (Fig.
7.1). However, a breakdown of the data at the subject level, with Digit Span
score included as factor, revealed an interaction between Digit Span and place
name Type (Fig. 7.2). We built a GLMER with Group, Condition, place name
Type and Digit Span as predictors, and random intercepts for subjects together
with correlated random slopes for subjects by condition. The model revealed a
significant 4-way interaction between Group, Condition, Type and Digit Span
(χ2(1) = 4.355, p = .037) as well as main effects of Group (χ2(1) = 10.135, p =
.001), Condition (χ2(1) = 6.182, p = .013) and place name Type (χ2(1) = 8.849,
p = .003).
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Figure 7.1: Average Hidden rule accuracy by Group in the Long-term recall task
(Experiments 2 and 4), based on version of place name used for item presentation
during training. Error bars represent SE of the mean, dotted line marks 50%
chance level.
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Figure 7.2: Effect of place name Type (noun vs. pseudoword) in Experiment
4 Long-term recall task by Group, Condition and Digit Span score. Solid lines
represent fitted linear models.
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Experiment 2, Pseudoword effect
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Condition -1.161 0.24 40.11 1 0.000 ***
Type -0.073 0.25 0.20 1 0.654
Group -1.254 0.30 4.11 1 0.043 *
Condition x Type -0.260 0.34 5.22 1 0.022 *
Condition x Group 1.246 0.31 22.06 1 0.000 ***
Type x Group 0.497 0.32 1.55 1 0.214
Condition x Type x Group -0.427 0.45 0.92 1 0.338
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 7.3: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term
recall, with place name Type (English vs. Pseudoword) added as factor.
Visual inspection of the data (Fig. 7.2) shows that the 4-way interaction is due
to an effect of pseudowords in the Unaware group, which is modulated by Digit
Span score. Specifically, there is a trend for Unaware subjects at the high end of
the Digit Span scale to perform similarly to Unaware subjects in Experiment 2:
for training items which contain an English noun, there is no difference in recall
between System and Random conditions; conversely, when training items contain
a pseudoword, accuracy on those items in Long-term recall is higher if they are
in the System condition, and lower if they are in the Random condition.
7.4 Use of questions
Besides the use of pseudowords in Experiments 2 and 4, the second potential
source of difference we surveyed was the insertion of questions after each item
in Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, all place nouns were presented in English;
no pseudowords were used in the experiment apart from the spatial prepositions
gi, ro, wa and ne. Instead, participants saw two questions: one asking them to
provide a rating of the place pictured in the item, as a way of drawing attention
to its physical characteristics, and one probing their knowledge of the Overt rule.
In the following sections, we will examine the effects of item rating (Section 7.4.1)
and Overt rule accuracy during training (Section 7.4.2) on Hidden rule accuracy
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Experiment 4, Pseudoword effect
Coefficient SE χ2 df p
Condition 0.320 0.129 4.898 1 0.027 *
DS 0.148 0.139 0.863 1 0.353
Type 0.241 0.081 6.981 1 0.008 **
Group 0.590 0.185 9.437 1 0.002 **
Condition x DS 0.122 0.097 1.216 1 0.270
Condition x Type 0.075 0.081 0.099 1 0.753
DS x Type -0.045 0.062 0.651 1 0.420
Condition x Group 0.152 0.129 0.913 1 0.339
DS x Group 0.028 0.139 0.050 1 0.822
Type x Group 0.088 0.081 0.590 1 0.443
Condition x DS x Type -0.086 0.062 1.615 1 0.204
Condition x DS x Group 0.088 0.097 0.926 1 0.336
Condition x Type x Group 0.044 0.081 0.042 1 0.838
DS x Type x Group 0.087 0.062 1.947 1 0.163
Condition x DS x Type x Group 0.129 0.062 4.355 1 0.037 *
Note: Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘ ’ 1
Table 7.4: Summary of GLMER model for Hidden rule accuracy, Long-term
recall, with place name Type (English vs. Pseudoword) added as factor.
in the Long-term recall task.
7.4.1 Item rating
In the training phase of Experiment 3, participants were asked to rate the at-
tractiveness of each place pictured as a way to draw attention to its physical
properties, on the assumption that they would come to associate those proper-
ties with the specific preposition they heard as part of that item. However, it
is also possible that this manipulation merely focused participants’ attention on
the picture itself and how pleasant they found it, thus favouring the retention of
specific items, rather than rule generalisation as hoped. If that were the case,
we might expect to see a correlation between how highly participants rated an
item during training, and how accurate they were when recalling it in the testing
phase. To test this hypothesis, we broke down Hidden accuracy scores in the
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Long-term recall task of Experiment 3 by the rating given to items during the
training phase. We built a GLMER with Group, Condition and Item rating as
predictors and random intercepts for subjects and items. There was no effect of
Item rating on accuracy (χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .218), and no interactions of Item
rating with other factors, either, indicating that the first question participants
were asked did not have any effect on learning outcomes.
7.4.2 Overt rule accuracy
Overt rule accuracy, Experiments 2 - 4
Training phase Long-term recall
Group System Random System Random
Exp. 2 Aware (n = 16) 97% 96% 80% 74%
Unaware (n = 17) 95% 91% 79% 76%
Exp. 3 Aware (n = 16) 96% 95% 91% 88%
Unaware (n = 21) 96% 97% 93% 92%
Exp. 4 Aware (n = 4) 89% 97% 76% 83%
Unaware (n = 20) 87% 85% 50% 45%
Table 7.5: Overt rule accuracy by group and experiment, Experiments 2 to 4.
The second question participants were asked, after each item presentation
in the training phase of Experiment 3, tested their knowledge of the Overt rule.
They were asked to indicate the character’s position relative to the place pictured
(at the place, or far from it), and received indirect feedback on their answer:
the experiment would only resume once they had given the correct answer. This
manipulation did seem to improve the acquisition of the Overt rule in Experiment
3, resulting in higher Overt rule accuracy scores during the Long-term recall task
compared to other experiments (Table 7.5).
However, it also possible that, by drawing attention to the Overt rule, this
paradigm may have been drawing attentional resources away from the Hidden
rule, hindering its acquisition. If participants only had a finite amount of atten-
tion that they could allocate to either rule during the training phase, there may
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Figure 7.3: Average Hidden rule accuracy for System items in Long-term recall,
plotted against mean Overt rule accuracy during training (for both System and
Random items) with fitted linear models.
have been a trade-off between the two rules: the more attention was given to the
Overt rule during training, the less would be available to the Hidden rule, which
would make subjects less likely to acquire it. If that were the case, we may ex-
pect to see a negative correlation between Overt rule accuracy during the training
phase (as a proxy of the amount of attention devoted to the rule) and Hidden rule
accuracy in the testing phase. Specifically, we looked at Hidden rule accuracy for
System items only, in order to isolate a measure of Hidden rule knowledge from
the effect of item memory, which is what would drive recall accuracy for Random
items.
To test our hypothesis, we constructed separate GLMER models for data
from Experiments 2, 3 and 4, entering Group, Condition and Overt rule accuracy
during training as predictors of Hidden rule accuracy for System items in the
Long-term recall task (Fig. 7.3). In Experiment 2, we found an interaction
of training Overt rule accuracy with Group (χ2(1) = 15.76, p < .0001), with
post-hoc comparisons showing a strong positive correlation for the Aware group
(χ2(1) = 21.3, p < .0001), but none for the Unaware. In Experiment 3, there
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was a significant main effect of training Overt rule accuracy (χ2(1) = 5.20, p =
.022); however, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons showed that it was
only significant at the group level for the Aware group (χ2(1) = 6.00, p = .029)
and not for the Unaware. Finally, in Experiment 4, we found no effect of training
Overt rule accuracy (χ2(1) = 0.008, p = .929). This is not surprising: given
the pattern observed in previous experiments, we may have expected an effect to
be driven by the Aware group; however, the group of aware participants in this
experiment was extremely small (n = 4), which would be insufficient to detect
statistical trends.
7.5 Discussion
In order to shed light on the pattern of results we observed in Experiments 2, 3
and 4, we carried out a post-hoc analysis of the features characterising each of the
two training paradigms we used: pseudowords replacing a subset of place nouns
(Experiments 2 and 4), and questions after each item presentation (Experiment
3).
With regards to the use of pseudowords in Experiments 2 and 4, we hypoth-
esised that it may have been responsible for the higher recall rates observed for
System items in these experiments, together with lower Random recall rates. Our
findings confirmed this hypothesis. In Experiment 2, we found that the use of
pseudwords replacing place nouns in the training phase affected recall for those
items. In the Unaware group, it led to lower recall accuracy for Random items
and higher accuracy for System items. In fact, it seems to have been responsible
for the learning effect observed in Unaware participants: for training items which
used the English place noun, no difference could be detected in recall between
System and Random items. For Aware participants, the use of pseudowords had
the same effect on Random items, decreasing recall accuracy, but not on System
items, for which accuracy was consistently high. This may have been due to the
effect of explicit rule knowledge: if Aware participants were relying preferentially
on explicit rule knowledge to perform the recall task, this could have masked any
variation in implicit knowledge as a consequence of the pseudoword manipulation.
In Experiment 4, we initially did not observe the same effect of pseudoword use,
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when averaging across participants by group. However, breaking down the data
by Digit Span score, we saw that there was an effect in Experiment 4, too, which
interacted with Digit Span. Specifically, Unaware participants at the high end
of the Digit Span score displayed the same effect as those in Experiment 2: the
use of pseudowords in training items led to better recall in testing if they were
in the System condition, and worse if they were in the Random condition. By
contrast, if the training items contained an English place noun, there was no dif-
ference in Long-term recall accuracy between conditions. These findings suggest
that the use of pseudowords did indeed affect item memory and facilitate implicit
rule learning in Experiments 2 and 4: possible explanations for this effect will be
further explored in the general discussion (Chapter 8).
With regards to the use of questions in Experiment 3, our findings suggest
that the questions did not have any measurable direct consequences for the devel-
opment of implicit Hidden rule knowledge. The first question asked participants
to provide ratings for the places they saw: we hypothesised that this may hinder
learning by focusing participants’ attention on the places themselves, rather than
the association between places and prepositions. However, the post-hoc analysis
showed that this was not the case: there was no correlation in either group be-
tween the rating given to an item in training, and recall accuracy for that item
in the testing phase. The second question probed participants’ knowledge of the
Overt rule: we hypothesised that it may have been hindering acquisition of the
Hidden rule, by drawing attentional resources away from it and focusing them on
the Overt rule. Against our predictions, however, we did not find a negative cor-
relation between Overt rule accuracy during training and Hidden rule accuracy in
the testing phase. On the contrary, in the Aware group we found a positive cor-
relation between the two (in Experiments 2 and 3); in the Unaware group there
was no correlation whatsoever, either positive or negative. This suggests that
performance on the Overt rule in training was not implicated in the development
of implicit Hidden rule knowledge. Rather, it may have been connected with
the ability to use explicit knowledge deliberately, as suggested by the positive
correlation with Hidden rule recall we found in the Aware group.
Finally, even though we did not find a direct correlation between specific
questions and lowered performance in testing, it is possible that the insertion of
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questions led to an overall decrement in learning because it forced participants to
do the training procedure under dual-task conditions, which has been shown to be
detrimental for implicit learning (Hendricks et al., 2013; Jime´nez and A Va´zquez,
2005; van Schagen, 2017). In an extension of Radulescu et al. (2019), van Scha-
gen (2017) tried overloading subjects’ working memory with a dual task instead
of increasing entropy: not only did the experimental manipulation not improve
learning, but participants in the dual-task condition actually performed worse
than those in a single-task control condition (van Schagen, 2017). In a series of
AGL experiments, Hendricks et al. (2013) found that dual-task requirements did
not affect implicit learning of an artificial grammar under standard conditions,
but that they did when the testing phase required transfer of the rules onto a
novel set of letters. Hendricks et al. hypothesised that transfer to new letters,
where perceptual similarity would be diminished, required some amount of ex-
plicit, intentional processing, unlike simple AGL learning. It is possible that the
type of testing used in our experiment, which involved cued retrieval and pro-
duction rather than simple pattern recognition, may have posed similar demands
on subjects, requiring a degree of intentional processing. Therefore, learning in
Experiment 3 could have been hindered by dual-task requirements, as it was in
Hendricks et al. (2013).
7.6 Conclusion
The results of this analysis support our general hypothesis that learning outcomes
in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 varied as a function of the training paradigm used.
Admittedly, this was not designed as a between-groups study, and the fact that
we performed the analysis post-hoc means that we could not control for variables
such as participants’ age and educational background. Crucially, we did not have
measures of Digit Span for participants in Experiments 2 and 3. Therefore, any
conclusions we can draw on the differences between the two experiments can only
remain at the level of speculation. Nevertheless, the pattern of results emerging
from our analysis strongly suggests that changes made to the training paradigm
had a measurable impact on learning outcomes, in both Aware and Unaware
participants, and plausibly determined the extent to which subjects could acquire
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implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule. This highlights the importance of using
appropriate training procedures in implicit learning research: mere exposure is
not enough, and even subtle changes to the way in which participants attend to
the input can have an impact on their ability to extract patterns from it.
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General discussion
The main goal of this study was to investigate the development of implicit, pro-
ductive knowledge of novel linguistic regularities. Our primary research question
was whether it would be possible for learners to develop implicit knowledge of a
novel linguistic rule and use it correctly in production. We found that, through
recall-based activities, participants could develop implicit knowledge of a novel
linguistic regularity, and use it correctly in spoken production without becoming
aware of its content. Specifically, participants acquired implicit productive knowl-
edge of a pair of novel spatial prepositions and their usage, which was based on
a distinction between open and enclosed spaces found in natural language. Even
though this rule bears some similarity to a rule found in participants’ L1 (the
in/on alternation in English), our analysis showed that participants’ responses
were not significantly influenced by transfer from L1 (even though it may have
had a facilitating effect), indicating that they had acquired a novel distinction.
However, we also found that learning outcomes were highly sensitive to the type
of training paradigm used. The use of pseudowords replacing place nouns ap-
peared to affect both recall and generalisation accuracy on the rule-based items.
Our findings also suggest that this manipulation affected participants differently
depending on working memory. Possible explanations for the observed effect of
pseudowords, and its interaction with working memory, are discussed in Section
8.1.3.
Our second research question concerned the relationship between produc-
tion and comprehension skills. We asked whether developing implicit knowledge
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through a production task would also lead to learning gains in comprehension.
The data which we collected from two different types of receptive tasks suggests
that there was minimal transfer of implicit knowledge from production to com-
prehension, supporting a skill-specific account of implicit knowledge (DeKeyser
and Sokalski, 1996). However, there are a number of methodological issues which
may have confounded these results, which means we can only draw tentative con-
clusions from them. Details of the comprehension tasks and of methodological
problems affecting them can be found in Sections 8.2 and 8.5.
Our training paradigm was based on elicited recall, which was intended to
promote rule learning by loading participants’ memory capacity. We therefore
hypothesised that working memory would predict rule learning. Against our
predictions, we did not find a direct relationship between working memory and
learning outcomes. Again, there are potential issues with the way memory load
and working memory were conceptualised in this study, which may explain our
findings. We did, however, find that working memory interacted with the effect
of learning paradigm discussed above, potentially explaining differences between
experiments in this respect. Based on the existing literature, we also predicted
that overnight consolidation would aid the development of implicit generalisation.
Our prediction was supported by the data; this is compatible with an emergentist
account of language acquisition, where rules are acquired as a consequence of
abstractions from stored exemplars. The effects of working memory, consolidation
and potential individual differences on learning and awareness are discussed in
Section 8.3.
As could be expected, participants who had become aware of the rule had
higher accuracy than those who remained unaware, presumably because they
could rely on explicit knowledge do to the task. However, even performance by
aware participants was affected by changes to the training paradigm which we
assumed had en effect on the development of implicit knowledge. Therefore, it is
likely that aware participants were relying on a mixture of explicit and implicit
knowledge when performing the task. Issues pertaining rule awareness and the
development of explicit knowledge among participants are discussed in Section
8.4.
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8.1 Development of productive rule knowledge
8.1.1 Main findings
In Experiment 1, we began to explore the use of cued recall as a way to detect
implicit knowledge of a rule participants had been exposed to during training
(the Hidden rule). In the testing phase, participants were exposed to items from
training once again; every eighth item, a recall cycle began, in which they were
asked to repeat the last eight items as cued by the corresponding pictures, which
were presented in random order. We compared recall accuracy on System items
(which were constructed following the Hidden rule) to that on Random items
(which sampled randomly for a different pair of prepositions) on the assumption
that if participants had acquired sensitivity to the Hidden rule, they should dis-
play higher recall accuracy for prepositions in the System condition, where they
would be able to supplement item memory with rule knowledge. That is what
we found for the Aware group, but not for the Unaware group. In Experiments
2, 3 and 4 the testing phase changed to long-term recall: participants received no
further exposure to the items and were instead shown all the pictures correspond-
ing to items from training, again in random order, and were asked to recall the
sentence corresponding to each picture. In all experiments, participants who had
become aware of the Hidden rule had significantly higher accuracy for System
items, indicating that they were using their rule knowledge when doing the task.
Unaware participants, by contrast showed no difference in accuracy between con-
ditions in two of the experiments (Experiments 1 and 4), but showed a trend in
that direction in the other two experiments (Experiments 2 and 4), which came
close to being statistically significant. Our hypothesis was that recall accuracy
would provide a measure of implicit rule knowledge: however, our findings sug-
gest that was not the case. The evidence suggests that the Aware were relying
on explicit rule knowledge when doing the recall task, while performance by the
Unaware was still mainly driven by item memory. Reasons for this conclusion are
laid out in Section 8.1.2.
In Experiments 2, 3 and 4, we also introduced generalisation items as part
of the recall task. Generalisation items were made of familiar place pictures
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arranged into new combinations in the System condition. They were presented
as recall items, but they had not actually appeared during training: therefore,
producing the correct sentence associated with them would require productive
use of the Hidden rule. As could be expected, the Aware group were significantly
above chance when producing generalisation items in all three experiments, again
indicating that they could rely on explicit knowledge of the rule to perform the
task. Unaware participants, too, performed significantly above chance in this
task in Experiments 2 and 4 (although not as well as the Aware group), which
suggests that they had developed implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule and were
using it productively to generate new items in this task. In Experiment 3, on
the other hand, they did not perform above chance, suggesting they had not
developed implicit knowledge in this experiment. As previously suggested, this
was likely due to differences in the training paradigm, which are further discussed
in Section 8.1.3.
The Hidden rule partially overlapped with a rule found in the participants’
L1 (the in/on distinction in English. However, our additional analyses showed
that participants did not just map the novel forms onto the English rule, but
had acquired a novel distinction alongside the novel forms. While there was a
numerical advantage in accuracy rates for items that could be transferred from
English, the difference was not significant. Therefore, even though L1 transfer
may have aided participants, it could not by itself explain their performance (with
the exception of the Transfer subgroup in Experiment 3, which is compatible with
our conclusion that participants in that experiment did not develop any implicit
knowledge of the Hidden rule).
8.1.2 Comparison of recall and generalisation: are they
indexing the same factor?
In Experiment 1, we used short-term recall as a way to investigate implicit rule
knowledge: however, we found that only participants who had become aware of
the rule showed a learning effect, meaning that the task did not reveal any evi-
dence of implicit knowledge. Furthermore, analysing performance by the Unaware
group across experiments 2, 3 and 4, we see a consistent discrepancy between
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System item recall and generalisation. For this group, we observed above-chance
generalisation accuracy in two of the experiments (Experiments 2 and 4), but we
never found a clear effect of Hidden rule knowledge on recall. We see a trend
towards an effect in recall in these experiments, but it always falls just short of
statistical significance. If both generalisation accuracy and recall accuracy for
System items were driven by implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule, we would
expect them to correlate with each other: that was indeed the case for the Aware
group, where we found a strong correlation between System item recall and gen-
eralisation across all three experiments. For the Unaware group, on the other
hand, the connection between between System recall and generalisation accuracy
was weaker, with only a statistically significant correlation in Experiment 2.
Our interpretation for these findings is that System recall accuracy in the Un-
aware group was driven mostly by better memory for System items, rather than
productive rule knowledge. In generalisation, on the other hand, Unaware sub-
jects had to rely on productive rule knowledge to perform the task, since no item
memory was available. This explains how it could be possible for the Unaware
group to be above chance in generalisation, but not show a significant effect of
the rule in recall: in this group, there was an imperfect correlation between recall
for System items and generalisation, because they relied on different, although
related, sources. By contrast, System recall accuracy in the Aware group could
be supported by explicit productive rule use, as generalisation was, leading to a
significant effect for both measures and a high correlation between the two. The
Aware group had explicit knowledge of the rule, which they could use deliberately
during both recall and generalisation trials. The Unaware group, on the other
hand, only had implicit knowledge, which cannot be used deliberately (Cleere-
mans and Jime´nez, 2002): therefore it is likely that, for this group, if implicit
rule knowledge emerged at all during the recall task it would only “fill the gaps”
left by item memory.
There is, of course, a close connection between recall accuracy for System
items and the development of implicit rule knowledge: we assume that rule knowl-
edge emerged as a consequence of generalisation from individual items stored in
memory. As we have seen, however, the opposite is not true: recall accuracy
for individual System items in the Unaware group was driven by memory, not
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by implicit rule knowledge. How, then, should we explain the trend towards an
advantage for System items that the Unaware exhibited in recall? It is possible
that better memory for System items was a direct consequence of the Hidden
rule, which had the effect of increasing their semantic consistency. The fewer un-
related meanings a lexeme has, the more semantically consistent it is; semantic
consistency in lexical items has been shown to aid both word recognition and
word learning (Rodd et al., 2002, 2012). System items were based on the Hidden
rule, which assigned each System preposition to either enclosed or open spaces
only; therefore, System prepositions were semantically more consistent than Ran-
dom ones, because they were always used with the same kinds of noun. This may
have affected the ease with which System items could be memorised and recalled,
even prior to the development of productive rule knowledge. Further support
for this interpretation comes from the observed effect of training paradigm on
recall and generalisation, which is discussed in Section 8.1.3, as well as data from
comprehension tasks (Section 8.2).
8.1.3 The role of training paradigm
Unlike our first experiment, Experiments 2, 3 and 4 all used variations of the
same procedure, which included recall every two items in training, and long-term
recall together with generalisation in testing. As previously mentioned, we found
differences in Hidden rule recall and generalisation accuracy between these three
experiments, which we attributed to differences between the specific versions of
the training procedure used. Generalisation was only observed in Experiments
2 and 4, which used a training paradigm in which a subset of place nouns were
replaced by pseudowords, unlike Experiment 3; these experiments also yielded
higher recall rates for System items. The analysis we performed in Chapter 7
showed that, in Experiment 2, the introduction of pseudowords had the effect of
improving memory for System items in the Unaware group, while it led to worse
recall for Random items for both groups. This effect supports our hypothesis
that System recall accuracy among the Unaware was driven by item memory,
rather than rule knowledge. If System item recall depended exclusively on rule
knowledge, then we should see no difference based on how the item was presented
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in training. That is indeed what we observed for the Aware group, who showed
an effect of pseudoword use on recall for Random items, but not for System ones.
Their recall accuracy for System items was consistently high regardless of noun
type, because, as argued earlier, it was driven by explicit rule knowledge rather
than item memory.
If, as previously argued, semantic consistency is what was driving higher re-
call rates for System items, this suggests that the use of pseudowords replacing
English place nouns in training items enhanced the effect of semantic consistency.
In fact, it is possible that the manipulation was increasing the effect of semantic
consistency by forcing learners to pay more attention to the relevant properties
of the places pictured. They had to do so because a potential aid to recall (the
English label for the place) had been removed: therefore, to correctly recall the
preposition, they had to associate it with the visual depiction of the place, which
would lead to greater activation of features relevant to the rule (open vs. en-
closed space). For System items, this had a beneficial effect, because the same
prepositions were always associated with similar kinds of pictures, thus making it
easier to encode and recall them. The introduction of the pseudoword, however,
also increased task demands, since more material now needed to be encoded in
order to be able to recall the sentence: the preposition, the pseudoword replacing
the place noun, and visual information concerning the place picture (because the
pseudoword, unlike the English place noun, did not provide any information in
that sense). This would increase memory load, which should make recall harder.
Even though separate stores exist in working memory for visual and verbal in-
formation, evidence suggests that thy share the same central capacity limit, due
to limited attentional resources (Cowan, 2001, 2015), and that when both verbal
and visual information have to be retained at the same time, there is a trade-off
between the two (Saults and Cowan, 2007). In System items, it appears that
the increased memory load was offset by the beneficial effect of semantic consis-
tency, leading to higher recall rates despite increased task demands. For Random
items, on other hand, the introduction of pseudowords in training led to lower
recall rates: since these items did not benefit from semantic consistency, their re-
call deteriorated as a consequence of greater task demands. This interpretation is
also compatible with our finding, in Experiment 4, that the effect of pseudowords
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on item recall was modulated by working memory capacity: only high-WM par-
ticipants in this experiment showed the effect observed in Experiment 2, with a
recall advantage for System items. It would appear that, in order to reap the
benefits of semantic consistency for System items, participants needed to have
enough working memory capacity to be able to store visual information about
the place, alongside the phonological material.
8.2 Transfer from production to comprehension
The findings of the generalisation task supported our main experimental hypoth-
esis: participants could develop implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule and use it
productively, given the right circumstances. Our second research question con-
cerned the nature of this knowledge: we asked whether the knowledge developed
through a production task, which could be detected in productive behaviour,
would also translate into sensitivity to the rule in a comprehension task. By
contrasting comprehension measures with the outcome of the production tasks,
we could attempt to gain insight into the nature of the knowledge acquired.
We hypothesised that, if the knowledge acquired in training amounted to ab-
stract implicit rule knowledge, we should see evidence of it in a comprehension
test, too. On the other hand, if it is the case that implicit knowledge requires
modality-specific proceduralisation to emerge, as argued by DeKeyser (DeKeyser
and Sokalski, 1996; Li and DeKeyser, 2017), we would expect to see a dissocia-
tion between the results of the production and the comprehension test. We found
some evidence for a proceduralisation account: in the listening task, sensitivity
to the rule seemed to emerge over the course of the task, more so for participants
who had explicit knowledge of the rule. However, this sensitivity only developed
for items which had already been encountered during training, not to generali-
sation or violation items, which is what we would have expected if participants
had developed knowledge of the rule. We found a similar pattern in the recogni-
tion memory task, with a general preference for previously encountered System
items, but no evidence of generalisation; sensitivity to violation was limited to
Aware participants. This suggests that participants, overall, had developed little
or no receptive implicit knowledge of the rule, which would support a skill-specific
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account. However, several methodological issues may have confounded the out-
comes of the tasks we used, which are discussed below in greater detail.
8.2.1 Listening comprehension
In Experiment 1, we used a listening task with timed responses to test for com-
prehension skills. Participants heard the sentences as a pair of pictures appeared
on screen (one depicting an open space, the other an enclosed one); their task
was to select the picture matching the noun as quickly as possible. If participants
were sensitive to the Hidden rule in comprehension, we predicted that they would
respond faster to System items, where the preposition offered a cue to the type
of upcoming noun. What we did find was that, for Training items, a difference
between conditions was not visible at the start, but it gradually emerged over the
course of the task. The trend was visible for both groups, but it was only statisti-
cally significant for the Aware group, where it was more pronounced. This finding
would seem to indicate that they were relying on explicit declarative knowledge
to begin with and that this began to be proceduralised over the course of the RT
task, leading to a gradual increase in processing speed. This is compatible with
DeKeyser and Sokalski’s (1996) account of implicit knowledge in comprehension
and production as separate skills, which require specific practice to develop.
However, several factors speak against this interpretation of the emerging dif-
ference between System and Random items observed in the Aware group. Firstly,
a trend in the same direction, while not statistically significant, was also observed
in the Unaware group, who ought to have no explicit knowledge of the rule. Sec-
ondly, results from the rest of the listening task are not compatible with what we
would have expected to see, had the participants developed true rule knowledge.
After Training items, the task also included a set of new items conforming to
the training pattern (Generalisation items) and another new set in which System
items were altered to make them ungrammatical (Violation items). For General-
isation items, we were expecting to observe the same pattern we had observed for
Training items, with faster responses for System items. For Violation items, we
were expecting to see a reversal of the pattern, with a slowdown for System items.
Neither of these predictions were confirmed: the effect of Condition disappeared
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shortly after the beginning of the Generalisation block, and no further changes
were detected. This suggests that participants were not predicting upcoming con-
tent in the first phase of the listening task, but were simply faster at recognising
the items: they were relying on memory rather than rule. A comprehension-
specific skill did develop, but it was a recognition skill, rather than rule-based.
To summarise, the result of the listening task showed no development of receptive
implicit knowledge in the Unaware group. In the Aware group, we saw emerging
sensitivity to item type recognition, but no generalisation or sensitivity to viola-
tion. However, it is still possible that they had acquired receptive rule knowledge
but could not use in this task, because it was requiring them to use it predic-
tively: literature on L2 processing shows that early L2 learners lack the ability to
anticipate upcoming content based on morphosyntactic dependencies, unlike L1
speakers (Lew-Williams and Fernald, 2010; Martin et al., 2013). To address this
point, in subsequent experiments we used a different comprehension task, which
did not require subjects to formulate predictions.
8.2.2 Recognition memory
In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested comprehension using a recognition memory
task. Participants were presented with a mixture of new and old items, and
asked whether they thought they had already encountered those items during
training, giving them a rating on a scale from 1 (“Definitely no”) to 6 (“Definitely
yes”). In both experiments, when presented with items already encountered
during training, both aware and unaware participants were significantly more
likely to endorse System items.
Initially, we compared System and Random items to obtain a measure of Hid-
den rule sensitivity, as we did in production. However, as previously discussed,
our findings from the production task showed that the comparison between con-
ditions in recall was not, as we had hoped, tapping into implicit rule knowledge:
rather, it was sensitive to item memory in the Unaware, and to explicit rule
knowledge in the Aware. Likewise, direct comparison of conditions in compre-
hension suffered from a general endorsement bias for System items. Even in the
Aware group, sensitivity to Hidden rule violation only emerged when using sig-
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nal detection measures and comparing d’ scores, rather than directly comparing
System to Random items. However, even using signal detection measures we did
not find any evidence of generalisation in either the Aware or Unaware group.
This suggests that subjects did not have implicit receptive knowledge, and that
sensitivity to rule violation in the Aware was driven by explicit knowledge.
As previously mentioned, in both recognition memory tasks we found an en-
dorsement bias for System items, but only for those items that had already been
seen during training. This seems to stem from a general preference for System
items rather than sensitivity to the rule: it also appeared in situations where
Unaware participants otherwise showed no sensitivity to the rule (Experiment
3), and even caused them to endorse ungrammatical System items over Random
ones, suggesting that it was due to visual features rather than the verbal content.
However, it could not just be a general preference for the visual features of Sys-
tem items: if that were that case, we should see a preference for System items
in generalisation trials, too, which is not what we found. Rather, there seemed
to be an ease of recognition for the visual representations of System items from
training, possibly due to visual features which made them easier to encode than
Random items. For instance, the character in the System condition was superim-
posed onto the picture, rather than next to it as in the Random condition: this
meant that participants needed to attend to a smaller screen area, which may
have made it easier to encode the items. This would be compatible with previous
findings by Kinder et al. (2003) on the effect of cognitive fluency in implicit learn-
ing: in an AGL task, they manipulated the ease of recognition for items during
the training phase by adding visual noise, and found that items which were more
easily perceived were also more likely to be judged as grammatical in the testing
phase later (Kinder et al., 2003).
To summarise, in comprehension tasks we observed an advantage for train-
ing items in the System condition, as we did in the recall task, but we found
no evidence of generalisation in either group, or of sensitivity to violation in the
Unaware group. We only found evidence of sensitivity to violation in the Aware
group; however, the fact that this group did not show any evidence of generalisa-
tion as well suggests that they were mainly relying on their explicit knowledge to
detect rule violation. This implies that participants could not transfer implicit
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knowledge from the production task to the comprehension task, supporting a
skill-specific account of implicit knowledge.
8.3 Cognitive factors and individual differences
8.3.1 Working memory
In using elicited recall as our training paradigm, we hypothesised that it would
promote rule extraction by loading participants’ short-term memory capacity.
This was based on the assumption underlying the Elicited Oral Imitation task
(Slobin and Welsh, 1973), on which our paradigm was based, that elicited sen-
tence recall involves a process of decoding and re-encoding of linguistic material
(Potter and Lombardi, 1990). We also followed previous work on rule induction
(Radulescu, 2014; Radulescu et al., 2019) which showed that loading participants’
memory capacity could promote the extraction of regularities from complex sylla-
ble strings. Therefore, in Experiment 4 we introduced a measure of phonological
WM (digit span task), expecting to find a correlation between WM capacity and
learning outcomes. Against our predictions, we found no direct effect of WM on
either recall or generalisation accuracy in the production task.
One possible reason for this finding is that the measure of WM we used did
not capture aspects of this construct relevant to L2 learning. In a study on the
incidental learning of Samoan by Robinson (2005), WM correlated with perfor-
mance on a production task in the testing phase. However, Robinson did not
measure WM with a digit span task, as we did, but used a reading span task.
This task requires participants to maintain words in mind while simultaneously
processing full sentences, which involves semantic and morphosyntactic process-
ing as well as loading phonological short-term memory; accordingly, it has been
shown to correlate with reading comprehension scores, unlike the digit span task
(Daneman and Carpenter, 1980). It may be the case that what was driving the
correlation found in Robinson (2005) was the linguistic component indexed by
the reading span task, which may also play a role in language learning. The
digit span task, while not entirely free from linguistic influence either (Schmidt
et al., 2019), arguably constitutes a “purer” measure of phonological WM than
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the reading span task. The lack of correlation of digit span scores with learning
outcomes in our study is compatible with findings by Grey et al. (2015), who
found no effect of phonological WM (assessed by non-word repetition task) on
learning outcomes in a study of the implicit learning of a semi-artificial language.
However, we did find an interaction of WM with the pseudoword effect. This
suggests that the measure of working memory we used captured the factor which
allowed subjects to take advantage of the presence of pseudowords in items during
training, enabling them to memorise visual information about the place pictured
together with the preposition and the pseudoword. Therefore, it is possible that
working memory was responsible for the amount of material participants could
encode upon stimulus presentation, but that it was not implicated in their ability
to draw implicit generalisations from that material. It has been suggested that
WM may be a better predictor of learning under explicit, rather than implicit,
conditions (Tagarelli et al 2011, Grey et al 2015), and that measures of declarative
and procedural memory may be more relevant for implicit learning (Antoniou
et al., 2016; Ettlinger et al., 2014; Morgan-Short et al., 2014). In Radulescu
(2014) and Radulescu et al. (2019), memory load was achieved by increasing
entropy (input complexity) rather than the amount of material to be memorised,
which may have been a critical feature: in an extension of Radulescu (2014),
van Schagen (2017) found that working memory capacity, measured by digit
span task, was not a predictor of learning outcomes in their paradigm. All this
suggests that working memory may not have been a relevant construct to our
experiment, which investigated the development of implicit knowledge and its
productive generalisation, while measures of procedural and declarative memory
may have been more relevant.
8.3.2 Rule extraction and memory consolidation
In our last experiment, we also added the opportunity for overnight consolidation,
including a second block of generalisation testing 24 hours after the training ses-
sion. Following the literature on consolidation in language learning (e.g. Gaskell
and Dumay, 2003; Gaskell et al., 2014; Morgan-Short et al., 2012a; Tamminen
et al., 2012, 2015) we expected participants’ scores on the generalisation task to
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improve after sleep, as a consequence of integration and abstraction from indi-
vidual items. Compatibly with our hypothesis, we did observe an improvement
in generalisation accuracy on Day 2, even though the difference was not statis-
tically significant. In the Unaware group, however, the improvement meant that
they performed significantly above chance in generalisation on the second day of
testing, while they showed no evidence of generalisation on the first day.
The fact that generalisation in the Unaware group only emerged on Day 2,
as a consequence of memory consolidation, is compatible with previous research
on the integration of novel morphology in L2 (Tamminen et al., 2012, 2015):
Tamminen et al. (2015) found evidence of integration on implicit measures only
after overnight consolidation, while explicit measures showed an effect already
immediately after training. The fact that generalisation benefitted from memory
consolidation (and therefore, strengthening of item memory traces) also suggests
that it may be driven by patterns of similarity between items, rather than the
application of abstract categorical rules, which is compatible with computational
modelling of results from similar implicit learning experiments (Alikaniotis, 2018).
In Williams (2005), participants acquired implicit knowledge of the rule governing
a pair of novel determiners, which alternated based on noun animacy. Applying
a distributional semantics analysis to the items used in Williams (2005), Alikan-
iotis (2018) found that accuracy in generalisation was sensitive to collocational
patterns for training and testing nouns in natural language, suggesting that se-
mantic relatedness, rather than the application of an abstract categorical rule,
was driving participants’ responses.
In Experiment 4, the fact that generalisation only emerged after consolida-
tion for the Unaware may have also contributed to the weak correlation between
recall and generalisation scores, by introducing an additional source of individ-
ual variability to the transition from individual representations to abstract rules
may vary between individuals. Research on memory consolidation shows that
there is a limit to the amount of material which can be consolidated overnight
(Feld et al., 2016), which entails that memory consolidation is selective. A range
of extraneous factors can affect what is consolidated: for instance, emotionally
charged material is preferentially consolidated over neutral material (Payne et al.,
2008), and so is information which is relevant to a subject’s future plans and ex-
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pectations, compared to irrelevant information (Fischer and Born, 2009; Wilhelm
et al., 2011).
While overnight consolidation may be helpful, however, evidence from IL re-
search shows that it is not strictly necessary for implicit generalisation to emerge:
implicit learning studies, going as far back as Reber (1967), often take place over
the course of one session only, showing immediate learning effects. In SLA, im-
plicit generalisation of novel form-meaning connections can emerge and be de-
tectable immediately after training (Leung and Williams, 2011; Paciorek and
Williams, 2015; Williams, 2005). Similarly, in our study, we found evidence of
generalisation in Unaware participants immediately after training in one of our
experiments (Experiment 2). Therefore, there is a discrepancy in our study: in
Experiment 2, we found implicit generalisation already on the day of training,
while in Experiment 4, it only emerged after overnight consolidation. The reasons
for this discrepancy may be connected to both differences between populations
and the development of rule awareness, which will be discussed in the following
sections.
8.3.3 Differences between populations
Participants in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were recruited from among students at
the University of Cambridge and surrounding community. The use of university
students as subjects, while very common in psychological research, has been crit-
icised for sampling from a restricted, specific group that is in many ways not
representative of the population as a whole (Henrich et al., 2010). By contrast,
participants in Experiment 4 were older, less likely to speak foreign languages and
to be in education than the subjects we used for our first three experiments. In
general terms, Experiment 4 replicated the findings of Experiment 2, with above-
chance generalisation among the Unaware indicating that they had developed
implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule, and could use it productively. However,
there were also differences: most notably, generalisation only emerged for the
Unaware on Day 2, and accuracy on the Overt rule in long-term recall was far
lower in this experiment than in Experiment 2, despite the fact that all partici-
pants were aware of the rule. Subjects were also less likely to become aware of
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the Hidden rule, relative to previous experiments. Some of these discrepancies
may be due to individual differences which we did not account for, resulting from
the fact that we sampled from two different distributions: university students for
the first three experiments, and general population for the fourth one.
The lower accuracy on the Overt rule observed among Unaware subjects in
Experiment 4, for instance, suggests that they were less able to use explicit knowl-
edge strategically under time-pressured conditions, which could be explained by
individual differences such as executive function. Individual cognitive differences
might also explain lower rates of Hidden rule awareness. The effect of pseud-
words which we found in Experiment 2 was reproduced in Experiment 4, but
only among participants with high digit score spans. Due to the lack of working
memory measures in previous experiments, we cannot say for certain, but it is
possible that the distribution of working memory scores in the student population
we surveyed in our first three experiments was skewed towards the higher end of
the scale, relative to the general population: it has been shown that educational
attainment correlates with higher performance on a range of cognitive measures,
including working memory (Guerra-Carrillo et al., 2017; Ritchie et al., 2015).
It is also likely that the different level of foreign language skills and exposure
played a role. Apart from one, none of the subjects of Experiment 4 reported
speaking a foreign language, while the vast majority of subjects from previous ex-
periments spoke at least one. Previous research on the implicit learning of novel
form-meaning connections showed that experience of learning a foreign language
with gendered determiners facilitated the acquisition of novel determiners, even
if they encoded animacy instead of gender (Williams, 2005); this is likely because
subjects were used to paying attention to determiner forms as a potential source
of information. More generally, prior experience of language, both L1 and L2,
shapes attention patterns, which affects the kind of information that learners are
able extract from the input (e.g. N. Ellis and Sagarra, 2010).
Finally, the specificities of Experiment 4 may also be due to contingent fac-
tors related to the way the experiment was run, rather than underlying differences
in the population. Unlike previous experiments, Experiment 4 was run online,
allowing participants to take part remotely using their own desktop computers.
The advantage of online data collection is that it gives researchers the opportu-
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nity to collect large amounts of data, over a short period of time, sampling from a
large population. A possible disadvantage of running experiments online is that it
does not afford as much control over participant behaviour as a laboratory setting
would. Despite this, research on the topic suggests that the results of internet-
based data collection are mostly comparable with lab-based studies (Clifford and
Jerit, 2014; Crump et al., 2013): implicit learning studies have also been success-
fully run online, including a replication of Williams (2005) using a crowdsourcing
platform (Kerz et al., 2017). In our study, it is highly unlikely that participants
could have significantly altered outcomes through “cheating” behaviour, such as
writing down items for later recall, due to both the speed of presentation and the
nature of the task (since recall was cued by pictures). Furthermore, this kind of
strategy might have been possible for recall items but not for generalisation ones,
which were the crucial measure by which we established whether participants had
acquired productive implicit knowledge of the rule. On the other hand, lack of
engagement with the task may have a constituted a bigger problem. The higher
proportion of subjects who did not become aware of the Overt rule and had to be
eliminated from analysis suggests that participants, on average, were not as at-
tentive in this experiment as they would have been in a laboratory setting. Given
that implicit learning, as shown in the literature and in our study, is sensitive to
even minor changes in experimental procedure, we cannot rule out the possibility
that lower attention had an impact on the outcomes of Experiment 4, possibly
explaining the delay in the emergence of generalisation as well as overall lower
rates of Hidden rule awareness.
8.4 Implicit and explicit knowledge: the role of
awareness
Our comparison of experiments, which shows variation in Hidden rule accuracy
in both the Aware and the Unaware groups, gives us an indirect way to assess the
development of implicit knowledge, suggesting that it was affecting the perfor-
mance of both groups. An analysis of performance by Aware participants across
experiments may therefore offer some insights in the interaction between implicit
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and explicit knowledge, as well as the development of the latter.
Aware participants’ accuracy on System item recall, like that of the Aware
group, varied considerably between experiments. It was considerably higher in
Experiment 1 than in the following experiments. This may not seem surprising,
since the recall task in Experiment 1 was easier than the one used in the following
experiments: participants received additional exposure to each of the items, and
only had to recall eight at the time, instead of the whole training set. Therefore,
item memory was better in this experiment, as evidence by high recall accuracy
for Random items, too. However, if Aware participants were relying primarily on
their explicit, categorical knowledge of the Hidden rule when doing the task, we
should not see such a big difference; indeed, they should have consistently high
accuracy for System items in all experiments. Instead, their accuracy on System
items seemed to track variation in accuracy in the Unaware group: they were
consistently about 15-50% more accurate than the Unaware group. This suggests
that Aware performance on System items was influenced by item memory, as well
as rule knowledge. The Aware group also exhibit similar fluctuation in generalisa-
tion accuracy between experiments, which again suggests that they were relying
on a mixture of explicit and implicit knowledge, and shows that the generalisation
task was sensitive to both implicit and explicit knowledge. Therefore, having a
reliable measure of awareness is crucial to establish whether implicit knowledge
was developed during the task, by ruling out the possibility that Unaware par-
ticipants, too, may have been relying on explicit knowledge during generalisation
testing.
Retrospective verbal reports, which we used to measure rule awareness in our
study, have been criticised for potentially not being sensitive enough to conscious
knowledge. Specifically, the concern is that there may be underreporting of con-
scious knowledge, if participants are not confident or unable to accurately report
the content of their knowledge (Rebuschat, 2013; Shanks and St. John, 1994). To
address this point, we tried to make our questionnaire as sensitive as possible by
including multiple indirect questions aimed at probing participants’ knowledge of
the rule, by asking participants to provide a translation of the novel prepositions
as well as providing their impressions on preposition usage (Appendix A).
Additionally, some of the criticism addressed to the use of retrospective verbal
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report stems form concerns which are not relevant to our particular experimental
setup. The original criticism of verbalisation as a measure of awareness concerned
its use in AGL experiments such as Reber (1967), where the rule to be learned
was usually a complex finite-state grammar, which could only be verbalised as
an intricate set of conditional rules. The Hidden rule in our experiment, by
contrast, was a simple binary distinction which would be quite easy to formulate
in abstract categorical terms, being based on the distinction between open and
enclosed spaces. Therefore, we would argue that it is unlikely that if someone had
some level of awareness of it they would not be able to express it verbally, either as
an abstract rule or when providing translations for the prepositions. Furthermore,
concerns about under-reporting of conscious knowledge usually applied to studies
which used receptive tasks as measures of rule knowledge, while ours used a
production task. It could be argued that the strength of representation required
for correctly using a form in production is greater than that required for sensitivity
to it in comprehension; therefore, a representation that is strong enough to be
causally efficacious in production, but still cannot be verbalised, is likely to be
truly unconscious.
Despite this, it is possible that, even though participants in the Unaware
group were not yet able to verbalise their knowledge at the time of testing, they
may have been in the process of developing explicit knowledge, and that this
may have driven their performance in the generalisation task. The fact that we
found generalisation already on the day of training, in Experiment 2, is in con-
trast with previously cited findings by Tamminen and colleagues, which showed
that generalisation on implicit measures could only occur after sleep consolidation
(Tamminen et al., 2012, 2015), while generalisation on explicit measures could
be observed immediately after training. Therefore, it is possible that emerging
explicit knowledge was driving generalisation by Unaware participants in Exper-
iment 2 immediately after the training session. We may speculate that Unaware
participants in Experiment 2, at the moment of testing, were more “advanced”
towards awareness than those of Experiment 4, which would explain both their
better performance in generalisation and the fact that more participants had be-
come aware of the Hidden rule by the end of Experiment 2, than in Experiment
4. Had the experiment lasted longer, it is possible that the Unaware group, too,
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would have become fully aware of the Hidden rule, and eventually become able
to verbalise it.
On the other hand, aspects of the Aware group’s performance contradict this
account of emerging awareness driving performance, suggesting a categorical dif-
ference between the two groups instead. One is the different effect of pseudowords
on the two groups: in Experiment 2, Aware participants showed the same reduc-
tion in Random item recall accuracy as the Unaware did when pseudowords were
used, but they did not show a corresponding increase in System accuracy. They
were just as accurate on System items regardless of whether the item contained
a pseudoword during training, suggesting that their performance was driven by
the application of a rule, while that of the Unaware was driven by item mem-
ory. Another categorical difference we observed between Aware and Unaware
participants is the correlation between Overt rule accuracy in training and Hid-
den rule accuracy in recall, which we only found among Aware participants. The
Overt rule was acquired by subjects through a process of explicit rule search, as
prompted by task instructions, and was used deliberately; the correlation with
Hidden rule accuracy in recall suggests this process, too, was a consequence of
deliberate explicit rule use in the Aware group, but not in the Unaware. There-
fore, it appears that Aware and Unaware were in two distinct states with regards
to the application of explicit knowledge during the task, which goes against an
account of emerging awareness driving performance.
A second possibility is that it was not awareness that was graded, but the
strength of the underlying representation: awareness could be discrete and epiphe-
nomenal, a consequence of strong emerging representations. According to graded
accounts of awareness, the quality of mental representations, including their
strength of activation, determines how likely they are to enter conscious aware-
ness (Cleeremans and Jime´nez, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006). Dehaene et al. (2006)
draw a distinction between different kinds of unconscious representations in per-
ception, subliminal and preconscious ones. Both are characterised by a lack of
conscious attention to the stimulus; however, they differ in stimulus strength
and consequent degree of activation. Subliminal representations are so weak that
the subject would not become aware of them, even in the presence of directed
conscious attention. Preconscious representations, on the other hand, are char-
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acterised by stronger and more widespread activation, such that they have the
potential to be consciously accessed, but temporarily remain unconscious as long
as attention is engaged elsewhere. In our case, the relevant representation would
be the subjects’ own implicit knowledge of the Hidden rule (or more properly,
patterns of association between prepositions and broad clusters of nouns). As the
strength of the representation increases, going form subliminal to preconscious,
participants are increasingly likely to become aware of their implicit structural
knowledge. When they do, they develop explicit knowledge, formulating an ab-
stract categorical rule which describes the observed pattern, and which may en-
ter into a synergy with existing implicit knowledge, leading to a positive shift
in performance. This is compatible with previous research on the interaction
between implicit and explicit knowledge in AGL (Mathews et al., 1989), which
found that a process of implicit learning followed by explicit rule discovery yielded
better learning outcomes than either implicit or explicit learning alone. In our
study, different strength of implicit representations would explain the differences
in Unaware performance between Experiments 2 and 4, while the emergence of
awareness, and consequent explicit rule knowledge, would explain the differences
observed between Aware and Unaware participants across experiments.
8.5 Study limitations and directions for future
research
Several of the conclusions we drew from our experimental findings, while they
fit the available data, must remain tentative due to a number of methodological
limitations in the study. One such limitation is the fact that we did not have
measures of cognitive abilities for any of the experiments, apart from Experiment
4. For instance, our interpretation of the interaction between pseudowords and
working memory in Experiment 4 rests on the assumption that participants re-
cruited in previous experiments had working memory scores above population
average; however, we cannot test the assumption due to the lack of cognitive
measures in these experiments. Additionally, the only cognitive measure that we
have for our subjects is phonological working memory, which, against our predic-
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tions, did not predict learning outcomes in our study. Adding other measures,
such as tests of declarative and procedural memory, or executive function, may
have helped to shed more light on individual variation in processes involved in ac-
quiring the Hidden rule, such as abstraction from individual representations and
the relationship between Overt and Hidden rule accuracy. Therefore, a potential
development of the current study would be to replicate our experiments with the
addition of more detailed cognitive testing, including measures of procedural and
declarative memory, in order to shed light on the individual differences involved in
learning thorough elicited recall and in the transition from item memory to gen-
eralisation. Additionally, our comparison of training paradigms was carried out
post-hoc, which means that factors found to have potential explanatory power
(such as the use of pseudowords, or sampling from different populations) were
not controlled for in advance. A potential avenue for development in this respect
would be to carry out a controlled comparison of the elements which we found
to have an effect on learning outcomes, particularly the effect of pseudowords,
which, if confirmed, could have significant pedagogical implications. A further
potential development connected with individual differences would be to explore
the role of foreign language experience. While we collected information on foreign
languages spoken, this was primarily used a way to control for potential confounds
(e.g. knowledge of Slavonic languages), rather than as a factor of interest in its
own right. However, as previously mentioned, this may have been one source of
variation contributing to different performance across the population samples we
tested. It has been argued that bilinguals have better meta-linguistic awareness
(Cummins, 1978; Galambos and Goldin-Meadow, 1990), which can help learners
to infer grammatical rules and dissociate form from content. This could have
affected performance in our experiment, both in terms of rule acquisition and in
the development of rule awareness. Further analysis could therefore focus on the
effect of bilingualism as a potential explanatory variable in our data, either as
a binary variable (bilingual vs. monolingual) or as a n-ary variable (number of
languages spoken). Similarly, gender could also be analysed as a potential fac-
tor of interest, as there is evidence that gender may affect L2 learning strategies
(Do¨rnyei, 2005; Oxford et al., 1988).
A second problem area for our methodology lies in the choice of tasks used to
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test for comprehension skills. The listening task used in Experiment 1 required
participants to process input predictively, which is often problematic for early L2
learners. Therefore, this may mean that the task was not sensitive enough to
implicit knowledge. Additionally, even Aware participants in this task showed
limited receptive knowledge of the rule, with no generalisation to new instances
or sensitivity to violation. This may be due to the fact that they were tested
immediately after training, without the opportunity for overnight consolidation.
Given the literature on consolidation and integration in implicit measure (Tam-
minen et al., 2012, 2015), it is possible that a second testing session after the
opportunity for overnight consolidation would have yielded different results, and
that generalisation in comprehension may have emerged. Likewise, in the recog-
nition memory task used in Experiments 2 and 3, we found sensitivity to violation
(in the Aware), but no generalisation, which suggests responses were driven by
explicit knowledge. It is possible that the integration required for implicit gen-
eralisation to show would have required overnight consolidation. Additionally,
we only included a measure of generalisation in the recognition memory task of
Experiment 3, in which Unaware participants did not develop implicit knowledge
of the rule, but not in Experiment 2, where they did develop implicit productive
knowledge. Therefore, we cannot know whether they would have performed dif-
ferently from the Aware, had we included the task in Experiment 2: they might
have shown implicit generalisation immediately after training. Further research
could address all these open questions by replicating the training paradigm of
Experiment 2 with the addition of both immediate and delayed comprehension
tasks, including measures of generalisation and well as sensitivity to violation,
in order to better explore the interplay between overnight consolidation and the
development of receptive knowledge.
A third problem in our study was the visual difference between conditions,
which may have created a confound: System items were always represented by
a character superimposed onto a picture, while Random items always featured
the character and the picture side by side. The comprehension tasks revealed
a general bias towards System items, which may have resulted from a visual
preference for them. It is also possible that participants preferred System items
because the situation they depicted was less ambiguous and more ecologically
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valid from a linguistic point of view than that encoded by Random items. Sys-
tem sentences could be clearly translated using a preposition such as “in/on/at”
in English, while Random items did not have an equally straightforward transla-
tion, partially because of the vagueness of the spatial relationship they encoded:
they were variously translated by subjects as “next to”, “away from” or “near”.
However, we did not counterbalance the type of visual representation across con-
ditions, precisely in order to maintain ecological validity. In Czech, as in many
other natural languages, prepositions used to indicate position in a location are
sensitive to the type of location, but those that indicate proximity are not: the
Czech equivalents of “near” or “next to” are not sensitive to the open vs. enclosed
space distinction, unlike v and na. Counterbalancing the visual representation
would have meant assigning the rule-based condition to a visual depiction encod-
ing proximity, which would have been unnatural from a linguistic point of view.
We know that implicit learning can occur with a variety of natural language rules,
but that it is less likely to happen when participants are exposed to linguistically
unnatural ones, such as novel classifiers encoding relative size (Chen et al., 2011;
Leung and Williams, 2014). At any rate, the visual difference between condi-
tions may have constituted a confound for comprehension tasks, and, potentially,
for the long-term recall task. It would not have had any consequences for the
generalisation task, which was crucial to establishing whether participants had
acquired productive implicit knowledge, because a preference for System visual
items alone could not have explained participants’ ability to generalise the Hidden
rule in production.
Besides these considerations, however, it may be argued that the ecological
validity of our study was still limited, because we did not use a true natural lan-
guage rule: while it was derived from natural language, the rule employed in our
study was a reduced, simplified version of a natural rule. The v/na alternation
in Czech, it may be recalled, relies on patterns of prototypicality as well as some
morphophonological regularities, while also including idiosyncratic elements. By
contrast, the Hidden rule in our study could be captured by a straightforward
categorical distinction between open and enclosed spaces, which is the distinction
that Aware participants reported discovering. It is unclear whether we would have
observed the same learning outcomes if participants had been exposed to the nat-
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ural Czech rule instead, instead of the simplified version. Further research could
address this point by moving away from the categorical rule we used, and instead
training participants on a more complex or “fuzzy” one, akin to the real Czech
rule, in which the distribution of forms was following probabilistic patterns. Ex-
isting literature on studies using artificial language suggests that learners should
acquire and reproduce the patterns of statistical distribution characterising prob-
abilistic in the input, when presented with a probabilistic distribution (Wonnacott
et al., 2017, 2008). If we were to replicate these findings with the natural Czech
rule, it would greatly improve the ecological validity of our findings, which in turn
would lend support to implicit learning as a potentially beneficial component in
L2 instruction.
8.6 Conclusion
The findings of our study show that it is possible to acquire implicit knowledge of
a novel linguistic rule through a production task, and use it in spoken production
to generate new instances, while remaining unaware of the contents of the rule.
The subjects in our study could successfully produce new sentences following the
rule they had learned, regardless of whether they had become aware of it. This
was not significantly influenced by L1 transfer: participants learned a novel dis-
tinction and could apply it productively, rather than just map the novel forms
onto existing L1 distinctions (even though transfer from L1 may have provided
some added facilitation). Our findings show that participants could develop pro-
ductive implicit knowledge through production activities, against the predictions
made by Processing Instruction (VanPatten and Cadierno, 1993). However, just
as guiding attention is central to PI interventions, so it must be in production-
based training tasks. Learning outcomes in our experiments were dependent on
the specific training paradigm used, which confirms that implicit learning is very
sensitive to the way in which attention is oriented: mere exposure to the stimuli
is not enough to obtain implicit learning.
Participants who had developed explicit knowledge of the rule consistently
outperformed participants who remained unaware of it. However, they were also,
to some extent, affected by changes in the training paradigm in a manner sim-
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ilar to unaware participants, which suggests that their performance was based
on a combination of implicit and explicit knowledge. At the same time, perfor-
mance on the Overt rule - which participants were told about and encouraged
to discover - was not consistently high, even though all subjects included in the
analysis were aware of its contents. This is compatible with previous findings
from AGL research, showing that neither memorisation nor explicit rule search
by themselves lead to optimal results, while the best learning outcomes were ob-
tained through a combination of memorisation and explicit learning, arranged in
sequence (Mathews et al., 1989).
Our results also suggest that there is a skill-specific aspect to implicit knowl-
edge, supporting DeKeyser’s position (DeKeyser, 1997; DeKeyser and Sokalski,
1996). We found little to suggest that the knowledge developed through recall-
based training could be used in comprehension tasks to generalise to new in-
stances; the only instances of transfer we found could be attributed to explicit
knowledge. This mirrors the findings of studies using comprehension-based IP ac-
tivities such as VanPatten and Cadierno (1993) and VanPatten and Sanz (1995),
which led on improvement on all measures apart from, crucially, production tasks
tapping into implicit knowledge. This suggests that a combination of comprehen-
sion and production activities, both designed in such a way as to direct partic-
ipants’ attention to the relevant form-meaning connections, may be optimal for
the development of fluency and automaticity L2 learning.
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Debriefing questionnaire
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Participant code:               
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. 
Debriefing Questionnaire 
Age:   Gender: 
1. Did you think the use of words ro, wa, ne and gi was governed by any rules? 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
2. Did you think it depended on whether the character was inside or outside/near the place pictured? 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
3. Did you think there were any other rules?   
☐ Yes  ☐ No  
If you answered ‘No’, go to Question 4. If you answered ‘Yes’, please describe the rules: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. When during the experiment did you come to the conclusion that this was a rule? 
☐ Part 1 ☐ Part 2 ☐ Part 3 
5. How confident were you? (1 = Not confident at all, 5 = Very confident) 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Could you give a rough translation of the words ro, gi, wa and ne? 
☐ Yes  ☐ No  
 If you answered YES, please write any translations below: 
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Instructions to participants
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After practice:
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Appendix C
Items
All nouns and corresponding pictures were used in Experiments 1 to 4, with the
exception of the following items which were introduced from Experiment 2: open
spaces - airport, boat, catwalk, dam, market, ship, train station, vineyard ; en-
closed spaces - airplane, canteen, hairdresser’s, hotel, living room, pub, shopping
centre, shower.
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Open spaces
1. Airport 2. Beach
3. Boat 4. Bridge
5. Bus stop 6. Campsite
7. Car park 8. Catwalk
9. Cemetery 10. Dam
11. Desert 12. Dock
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13. Field 14. Garden
15. Golf course 16. Hill
17. Ice rink 18. Island
19. Market 20. Motorway
21. Mountain 22. Pavement
23. Petrol station 24. Playground
25. Red carpet 26. Roof
196
27. Roundabout 28. Savannah
29. Ship 30. Skate park
31. Ski slope 32. Square
33. Stadium 34. Stairs
35. Tennis court 36. Terrace
37. Train station 38. Veranda
39. Vineyard 40. Zebra crossing
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Enclosed spaces
41. Airplane 42. Aquarium
43. Bakery 44. Bank
45. Bathroom 46. Bedroom
47. Canteen 48. Casino
49. Cave 50. Cellar
51. Changing room 52. Church
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53. Classroom 54. Factory
55. Garage 56. Greenhouse
57. Gym 58. Hairdresser’s
59. Hospital 60. Hotel
61. Kitchen 62. Laboratory
63. Library 64. Lift
65. Living room 66. Museum
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67. Nightclub 68. Office
69. Prison 70. Pub
71. Restaurant 72. Sauna
73. Shopping cen-
tre
74. Shower
75. Stable 76. Supermarket
77. Swimming pool 78. Tent
79. Theatre 80. Tunnel
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List of pseudonouns used
The following pseudowords were used to replace a subset of place names (n =
32) in Experiments 2 and 4:
groam
fribe
zule
shay
dreet
bleam
voom
ploan
prole
brile
snope
glane
koop
prait
raim
draid
breel
trape
cray
pline
kipe
frobe
preem
blune
hain
frean
neak
soam
shoop
fay
trule
sloat
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